Authors
Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg
Abstract
Eliminativism about macroscopic material objects claims that we do not need to include tables in our ontology, and that any job – practical or theoretical – they have to do can be done by 'atoms arranged tablewise'. This way of introducing eliminativism faces the worry that if there are no 'atoms', that is, if there are no simples and the world is 'gunky', there are no suitable entities to be 'arranged tablewise'. In this article, I discuss various strategies the eliminativist can have to face this objection, and I conclude by showing that the objection is actually misdirected and does not threaten eliminativism at all.
Keywords eliminativism  gunk
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References found in this work BETA

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Cornell University Press.
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Quining Qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.

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