On a neglected feature of moral agency

Ratio 34 (1):68-80 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 68-80, March 2021.

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

2021

DOI

10.1111/rati.12287

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,897

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

When Ignorance is No Excuse.Maria Alvarez & Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 64-81.
Vice, Blameworthiness and Cultural Ignorance.Elinor Mason & Alan T. Wilson - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press. pp. 82-100.
Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition.Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Culpable ignorance in a collective setting.Säde Hormio - 2018 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 94:7-34.
A Capacitarian Account of Culpable Ignorance.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):398-426.
Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame.Matthew Talbert - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
On Culpable Ignorance and Akrasia.Philip Robichaud - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):137-151,.
Moral ignorance and the social nature of responsible agency.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):821-848.
Moral and Factual Ignorance: a Quality of Will Parity.Anna Hartford - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1087-1102.
Perspectives on Ignorance From Moral and Social Philosophy.Rik Peels (ed.) - 2016 - New York: Routledge.
Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution.Alexander A. Guerrero - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):59-97.
Huckleberry FInn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance".Arpaly Nomy - 2015 - In Michael Mckenna Randolph Clarcke & Smith Angela M. (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 141-156.
Moral responsibility and the concept of agency.Helen Steward - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
Explaining (away) the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press. pp. 146–162.
Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-08-26

Downloads
42 (#378,918)

6 months
9 (#308,527)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Zachary Barber
University of Rochester

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Skepticism about moral responsibility.Gideon Rosen - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.
Freedom and Action.Roderick Chisholm - 1966 - In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Random House.

View all 13 references / Add more references