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Nathan Biebel [4]Nathan W. Biebel [1]
  1.  21
    Pragmatic encroachment and justified group belief.Nathan Biebel - 2023 - Synthese 202 (2):1-20.
    The theory of pragmatic encroachment states that the risks associated with being wrong, or the practical stakes, can make a difference to whether one’s evidence is good enough to justify belief. While still far from the orthodox view, it has garnered enough popularity that it is worth exploring the implications when we apply the theory of pragmatic encroachment to group epistemology, specifically to the justificatory status of the beliefs of group agents. When we do, I claim, we discover two novel (...)
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  2. Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.
    One of the most common excuses is ignorance. Ignorance does not always excuse, however, for sometimes ignorance is culpable. One of the most natural ways to think of the difference between exculpating and culpable ignorance is in terms of justification; that is, one’s ignorance is exculpating only if it is justified and one’s ignorance is culpable only if it not justified. Rosen :591–610, 2008) explores this idea by first offering a brief account of justification, and then two cases that he (...)
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  3.  14
    On the culpable ignorance of group agents: the group justification thesis.Nathan W. Biebel - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    People are often responsible for what they do, but they also often possess an excuse. One of the most common excuses is ignorance. Not all ignorance constitutes an excuse, however, for some ignorance is culpable and culpable ignorance is no excuse. But what about group agents? In our everyday practices, we blame group agents constantly. But if groups can be blameworthy, they plausibly can also be excused. Surely one such excuse is ignorance. But, as with individual agents, some group ignorance (...)
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  4.  39
    Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance.Nathan Biebel - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):1-21.
    It is widely agreed that ignorance of fact exculpates, but does moral ignorance exculpate? If so, does it exculpate in the same way as non-moral ignorance? In this paper I will argue that on one family of views explaining exculpating non-moral ignorance also explains exculpating moral ignorance. The view can be loosely stated in the following way: ignorance counts as an excuse only if it is not the result of a failure to meet some applicable reasonable epistemic standard—call this the (...)
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  5.  39
    The Justification Thesis: A Theory of Culpable Ignorance.Nathan Biebel - 2019 - Dissertation, Tulane University
    This dissertation examines the relationship between ignorance and responsibility. Ignorance is often treated as an excuse, but there are times when ignorance does not excuse. Ignorance that does not excuse is usually known as culpable ignorance. Since ignorance is largely an epistemological concept, the difference between culpable and exculpating ignorance suggests a connection between epistemology and theories of responsibility that has gone relatively unexplored. The following work explores this connection and argues that incorporating epistemological theories will help provide a robust (...)
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