Moral responsibility and the concept of agency

In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy (2011)
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Abstract

This chapter argues for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. The real reason why determinism and moral responsibility are inconsistent is not moral, but metaphysical. The real reason is that determinism is inconsistent with agency, which is a necessary condition of moral responsibility.

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2013

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10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0010

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Helen Steward
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

I-‘Actual Instead’.Sarah Broadie - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):1-19.

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