Huckleberry FInn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance"

In Michael Mckenna Randolph Clarcke & Smith Angela M. (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 141-156 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper argue that moral ignorance does not excuse. Nobody is off the hook for doing something bad simply because she did it believing ii to be right. The paper uses the Arpaly view that cases of Akrasia can be praiseworthy as one premise in the argument.

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Nomy Arpaly
Brown University

Citations of this work

Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.
The epistemic condition for moral responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Complex Akrasia and Blameworthiness.Anna Hartford - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:15-33.
Can morally ignorant agents care enough?Daniel J. Miller - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):155-173.

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