Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency

New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.

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2009-01-28

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Nomy Arpaly
Brown University

Citations of this work

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