Results for 'moral responsibility'

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  1. Against Moral Responsibility.Bruce N. Waller - 2011 - MIT Press.
    In Against Moral Responsibility, Bruce Waller launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. Waller argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, he contends, leaves no room (...)
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  2. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.) - 2003 - Ashgate.
    This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility.
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  3. Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Many Hands.Ibo van de Poel, Lambèr Royakkers & Sjoerd D. Zwart - 2015 - New York: Routledge.
    When many people are involved in an activity, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint who is morally responsible for what, a phenomenon known as the ‘problem of many hands.’ This term is increasingly used to describe problems with attributing individual responsibility in collective settings in such diverse areas as public administration, corporate management, law and regulation, technological development and innovation, healthcare, and finance. This volume provides an in-depth philosophical analysis of this problem, examining the notion of (...)
     
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  4.  44
    Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community: Power and Accountability from a Pragmatic Point of View.Marion Smiley - 1992 - University of Chicago Press.
    This book has three goals. The first is to demonstrate that the modern, distinctly Kantian, notion of moral responsibility is incoherent by virtue of the way it fuses free will and blameworthiness. The second is to develop an alternative notion of moral responsibility that separates causal responsibility from blameworthiness and views both as relative to the boundaries of our moral community. The third is to establish a framework for arguing openly about our moral (...)
  5. Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes.Paul Russell - 2022 - In Dana K. Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York City, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 519-543.
    We might describe the philosophical issue of human freedom and moral responsibility as an existential metaphysical problem. Problems of this kind are not just a matter of theoretical interest and curiosity: They address issues that we care about and that affect us. They are, more specifically, relevant to the significance and value that we attach to our lives and the way that we lead them. According to the orthodox view, there is a tidy connection between skepticism and pessimism. (...)
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  6.  23
    The moral responsibility account of liability to defensive killing.Michael Otsuka - 2016 - In Christian Coons & Michael Weber (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    Some are blameless for posing a threat to the live of another because they are not morally responsible for being a threat. Others are blameless in spite of their responsibility. On what has come to be known as the "moral responsibility account" of liability to defensive killing, it is such responsibility, rather than blameworthiness, for threatening another that renders one liable to defensive killing. Moreover, one's lack of responsibility for being a threat grounds one's nonliability (...)
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  7.  33
    Moral responsibility and persons.Eugene Schlossberger - 1992 - Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
    Schlossberger contends that we are to be judged morally on the basis of what we are, our "world-view," rather than what we do.In Moral Responsibility and ...
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  8. Reconciling Moral Responsibility with Multiplicity in Conway’s Principles.Hope Sample - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    Anne Conway’s commitment to the moral responsibility of creatures, or created beings, is seemingly in tension with her unique metaphysics. Conway is committed to individual moral responsibility. Conway insists that an innocent person ought not be punished for someone else’s sin. Interesting recent work highlights a unique aspect of Conway’s position that creatures are multiplicities: not only are creatures integrated into the larger whole of creation, but also their parts are mutually integrated into one another. The (...)
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  9. Moral responsibility in collective contexts.Tracy Isaacs - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Intentional collective action -- Collective moral responsibility -- Collective guilt -- Individual responsibility for (and in) collective wrongs -- Collective obligation, individual obligation, and individual moral responsibility -- Individual moral responsibility in wrongful social practice.
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  10.  34
    Moral Responsibility: An Introduction.Matthew Talbert - 2016 - Malden, MA: Polity.
    Most people would agree that a small child, or a cognitively impaired adult, is less responsible for their actions, good or bad, than an unimpaired adult. But how do we explain that difference, and how far can anyone be praised or blamed for what they have done? In this fascinating introduction, Matthew Talbert explores some of the key questions shaping current debates about moral responsibility, including: What is free will, and is it required for moral responsibility? (...)
  11. When Moral Responsibility Theory Met My Philosophy of Disability.Shelley L. Tremain - forthcoming - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly.
    In this article, I aim to demonstrate that moral responsibility theory produces, legitimates, and even magnifies the considerable social injustice that accrues to disabled people insofar as it implicitly and explicitly promotes a depoliticized ontology of disability that construes disability as a naturally disadvantageous personal characteristic or deleterious property of individuals rather than identifies it as an effect of power, an apparatus. In particular, I argue that the methodological tools of “analytic” philosophy that philosophers of moral (...) theory employ to establish the philosophical domain in which they engage have distinctly detrimental effects on disabled people. (shrink)
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  12. Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?Michael J. Zimmerman - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):247-263.
    Many philosophers endorse the idea that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and thus hold that such responsibility is essentially interpersonal. In this paper, various interpretations of this idea are distinguished, and it is argued that no interpretation of it captures a significant truth. The popular view that moral responsibility consists in answerability is discussed and dismissed. The even more popular view that such responsibility consists in susceptibility to the (...)
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  13.  1
    The moral responsibility of firms.Eric W. Orts & N. Craig Smith (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Whether firms can be said to be moral agents and to have the capacity for moral responsibility has significant practical consequences. In most legal systems in the world, business firms are recognized as persons with the ability to own property, to maintain and defend lawsuits, and to self-organize governance structures. To recognize that these business persons can also act morally or immorally as organizations, however, would justify the imposition of other legal constraints and normative expectations on organizations. (...)
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  14.  88
    Moral responsibility and tourette syndrome.Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106–123.
    Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual’s tic as on a moral par with others’ actions. In this paper, I examine the options (...)
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  15.  51
    Moral Responsibility : An Introduction.Matthew Talbert - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  16. Moral Responsibility, Forgiveness, and Conversation.Brandon Warmke & Michael McKenna - 2013 - In Ishtiyaque Haji Justin Caouette (ed.), Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 189-2-11.
    In this paper, we explore how a conversational theory of moral responsibility can provide illuminating resources for building a theory about the nature and norms of moral forgiveness.
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  17. Strawson, Moral Responsibility, and the "Order of Explanation": An Intervention.Patrick Todd - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):208-240.
    P.F. Strawson’s (1962) “Freedom and Resentment” has provoked a wide range of responses, both positive and negative, and an equally wide range of interpretations. In particular, beginning with Gary Watson, some have seen Strawson as suggesting a point about the “order of explanation” concerning moral responsibility: it is not that it is appropriate to hold agents responsible because they are morally responsible, rather, it is ... well, something else. Such claims are often developed in different ways, but one (...)
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  18. Collective moral responsibility.David T. Risser - 2009 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  19. Moral Responsibility and Subverting Causes.Andy Taylor - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Reading
    I argue against two of the most influential contemporary theories of moral responsibility: those of Harry Frankfurt and John Martin Fischer. Both propose conditions which are supposed to be sufficient for direct moral responsibility for actions. (By the term direct moral responsibility, I mean moral responsibility which is not traced from an earlier action.) Frankfurt proposes a condition of 'identification'; Fischer, writing with Mark Ravizza, proposes conditions for 'guidance control'. I argue, using (...)
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  20. An essay on moral responsibility.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1988 - Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
    This superbly crafted account of the notion of moral responsibility and of its relations to freedom, control, ignorance, negligence, attempts, omissions, compulsion, mental disorders, virtues and vices, desert, and punishment fills that gap. The treatment of character and luck is particularly sophisticated and well-argued.
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  21. Moral responsibility and unavoidable action.David P. Hunt - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227.
    The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), making the ability to do otherwise a necessary condition for moral responsibility, is supposed by Harry Frankfurt, John Fischer, and others to succumb to a peculiar kind of counterexample. The paper reviews the main problems with the counterexample that have surfaced over the years, and shows how most can be addressed within the terms of the current debate. But one problem seems ineliminable: because Frankfurt''s example relies on a counterfactual intervener to preclude (...)
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  22.  57
    Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action.Keith Wyma - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):57 - 70.
  23. Karma, Moral Responsibility and Buddhist Ethics.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 7-23.
    The Buddha taught that there is no self. He also accepted a version of the doctrine of karmic rebirth, according to which good and bad actions accrue merit and demerit respectively and where this determines the nature of the agent’s next life and explains some of the beneficial or harmful occurrences in that life. But how is karmic rebirth possible if there are no selves? If there are no selves, it would seem there are no agents that could be held (...)
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  24.  40
    Moral Responsibility is Not Proportionate to Causal Responsibility.Huzeyfe Demirtas - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):570-591.
    It seems intuitive to think that if you contribute more to an outcome, you should be more morally responsible for it. Some philosophers think this is correct. They accept the thesis that ceteris paribus one's degree of moral responsibility for an outcome is proportionate to one's degree of causal contribution to that outcome. Yet, what the degree of causal contribution amounts to remains unclear in the literature. Hence, the underlying idea in this thesis remains equally unclear. In this (...)
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  25. Moral responsibility without alternative possibilities.Eleonore Stump - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 139--158.
  26. Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal? A Reply to Zimmerman.Benjamin De Mesel - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (3):309-333.
    According to Michael Zimmerman, no interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal captures a significant truth. He raises several worries about the Strawsonian view that moral responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes and claims that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. He outlines three problems. First, the existence of self-reactive attitudes may be incompatible with the interpersonal nature (...)
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  27. Moral responsibility and free will: A meta-analysis.Adam Feltz & Florian Cova - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30 (C):234-246.
    Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. (...)
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  28.  36
    Corporate moral responsibility and the moral audit: Challenges for refuse relief inc. [REVIEW]S. Andrew Ostapski & Camille N. Isaacs - 1992 - Journal of Business Ethics 11 (3):231 - 239.
    Much debate has occurred as to whether or not moral responsibility should be ascribed to corporate entities. The present study advances the theory that moral responsibility is a self-imposed or attributable aspect of corporate operations which extends beyond the parameters established by law.In this context, the corporation must consciously endeavor to discharge its moral responsibility to avoid, minimize, eliminate and compensate for the potential or actual harm which its operations cause. To achieve this objective, (...)
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  29.  68
    Epistemic Conditions of Moral Responsibility.Tom Yates - 2022 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    What conditions on a person’s knowledge must be satisfied in order for them to be morally responsible for something they have done? The first two decades of the twenty-first century saw a surge of interest in this question. Must an agent, for example, be aware that their conduct is all-things-considered … Continue reading Epistemic Conditions of Moral Responsibility →.
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  30. Moral responsibility and "moral luck".Brian Rosebury - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):499-524.
    This paper argues that "moral luck", understood as a susceptibility of moral desert to lucky or unlucky outcomes, does not exist. The argument turns on the claim that epistemic inquiry is an indissoluble part of moral responsibility, and that judgment on the moral decision making of others should and can adjust for this fact; test cases which aim to isolate moral dilemmas from epistemic consideration misrepresent our moral experience. If the phenomena believed by (...)
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  31. Moral responsibility and ignorance.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1997 - Ethics 107 (3):410-426.
  32. Situationism and Moral Responsibility: Free Will in Fragments.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - In Tillman Vierkant, Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will. New York: Oxford UP.
    Many prominent accounts of free will and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the first half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such (...)
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  33. Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.
    I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can (...)
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  34. Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman.Benjamin De Mesel - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (1):77-92.
    Michael Zimmerman has recently argued against the twofold Strawsonian claim that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and that, as a result, moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. I offered a number of objections to Zimmerman’s view, to which Zimmerman responded. In this article, I respond to Zimmerman’s responses to my criticisms.
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  35. Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism.Randolph Clarke - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):121-137.
    This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of a feeling (...)
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  36. Moral Responsibility and Merit.Matt King - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-18.
    In the contemporary moral responsibility debate, most theorists seem to be giving accounts of responsibility in the ‘desert-entailing sense’. Despite this agreement, little has been said about the notion of desert that is supposedly entailed. In this paper I propose an understanding of desert sufficient to help explain why the blameworthy and praiseworthy deserve blame and praise, respectively. I do so by drawing upon what might seem an unusual resource. I appeal to so-called Fitting-Attitude accounts of value (...)
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  37.  71
    Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.
    Many theorists writing about moral responsibility accept that voluntary control is necessary for responsibility. Call such theorists volitionists. Recently, volitionism has been called into question by theorists I call nonvolitionists. Yet neither volitionists nor nonvolitionists have carefully articulated a clear volitionist thesis, nor have they sufficiently explained the concept of voluntary control that somehow seems connected to volitionism. I argue that attempts to explain the volitionist thesis, voluntary control, and their relation are more problematic than have previously (...)
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  38. Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):167-184.
    This article’s guiding question is about bullet biting: When should compatibilists about moral responsibility bite the bullet in responding to stories used in arguments for incompatibilism about moral responsibility? Featured stories are vignettes in which agents’ systems of values are radically reversed by means of brainwashing and the story behind the zygote argument. The malady known as “intuition deficit disorder” is also discussed.
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  39.  33
    Moral Responsibility: Beyond Free Will and Determinism.Nicole A. Vincent, Ibo van de Poel & Jeroen van den Hoven (eds.) - 2011 - Springer.
    This book'¬"s chapters deal with a range of theoretical problems discussed in classic compatibilist literature '¬ ; e.g. the relationship between ...
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  40. Moral responsibility and history revisited.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.
    Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed.
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  41. The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
  42. Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study.Matthew R. Broome, Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli - 2010 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2):179-187.
    Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes, the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent (...)
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  43.  1
    Moral Responsibility Beyond Our Fingertips: Collective Responsibility, Leaders, and Attributionism.Eugene Schlossberger - 2021 - Lanham: Lexington Books.
    We are responsible not only for what we think and feel but for what others do and for what we would have done. This book expands and updates the original attributionist theory of responsibility and applies it to pressing contemporary issues such as collective responsibility, leaders’ responsibility for their followers’ acts, and addiction.
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  44.  86
    Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Acting on One’s Own.Bradford Stockdale - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (1):27-40.
    Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) have famously served as counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). The fine-grained version of the flicker defense has become one of the most popular responses to FSCs. Proponents of this defense argue that there is an alternative available to all agents in FSCs such that the cases do not show that PAP is false. Specifically, the agents could have done otherwise than decide on their own, and this available alternative is robust enough to ground (...) responsibility. In this paper, I argue that, when relying on definitions of ‘on one’s own’ within the literature on FSCs, a case can be constructed in which the agent could not have done otherwise than make a decision on his own. Insofar as this new case is successful, it will be able to avoid arguments about robustness while showing that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities of the type argued for by proponents of the fine-grained version of the flicker defense. (shrink)
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  45.  92
    Moral responsibility and the continuation problem.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.
    Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.
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  46.  10
    Moral Responsibility, Justice, and Freedom.Jonathan Smith - 2020 - Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1).
    Freedom, and in particular, the freedom of human beings, is a hot topic within the field of metaphysics. In this paper, instead of arguing for the truth of a particular position on freedom, I explore whether a particular position, compatibilism, might be consistent with the existence of moral responsibility and retributive justice. To alleviate ambiguity, I construct a model by which the four primary positions on freedom might be clearly understood. I then distinguish between what I call ‘common-sense’ (...)
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  47. Bringing moral responsibility down to earth.Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.
    Thought experiments have played a central role in philosophical methodology, largely as a means of elucidating the nature of our concepts and the implications of our theories.1 Particular attention is given to widely shared “folk” intuitions – the basic untutored intuitions that the layperson has about philosophical questions.2 The folk intuition is meant to underlie our core metaphysical concepts, and philosophical analysis is meant to explicate or sometimes refine these naïve concepts. Consistency with the deliverances of folk intuitions is a (...)
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  48. Moral Responsibility and Consciousness.Matt King & Peter Carruthers - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):200-228.
    Our aim in this paper is to raise a question about the relationship between theories of responsibility, on the one hand, and a commitment to conscious attitudes, on the other. Our question has rarely been raised previously. Among those who believe in the reality of human freedom, compatibilists have traditionally devoted their energies to providing an account that can avoid any commitment to the falsity of determinism while successfully accommodating a range of intuitive examples. Libertarians, in contrast, have aimed (...)
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  49. Moral Responsibility and the Relevance of Alternative Possibilities.Daniel James Speak - 2002 - Dissertation, University of California, Riverside
    My dissertation is a systematic defense of the moral relevance of alternative possibilities. As such, it constitutes an attack on semi-compatibilism. ;To begin, then, I defend alternative possibilities against three related but independent lines of criticism. The most prominent of these is Harry Frankfurt's now famous counterexample strategy in which cases are constructed that purport to show that a person can, in fact, be responsible even when he cannot do otherwise. Another line of criticism is John Fischer's "flicker of (...)
     
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  50.  15
    What Moral Responsibility Requires.William Simkulet - unknown
    The primary goal of this dissertation is to articulate and defend a robust commonsense libertarian theory of moral responsibility; that moral agents are the causes, and owners, of their actions, and in virtue of this it is appropriate to hold them praiseworthy or blameworthy for what they do. Here, I critique and defend two commonsense principles concerning moral responsibility - the control principle, and the principle of alternate possibilities. In recent years these principles have come (...)
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