Dissertation, University of Miami (
2014)
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Abstract
My dissertation contributes to a central and ongoing debate in the philosophy of perception about the fundamental nature of perceptual states. Such states include cases like seeing, hearing, and tasting, as well as cases of merely seeming to see, hear, and taste. A central question about these states arises in light of misperceptual phenomena. While a commonsensical view of perceptual states construes them as simply relating us to the external and mind independent world, some misperceptual cases suggest that these states fall short of such world-contact. The result is that perceptual states are either thought to fundamentally consist in a highest common factor that falls short of perceptual contact with the world, or are thought to be disjunctive in nature, with some cases involving perceptual contact, and others receiving a different analysis. Contrary to these views, I argue that no misperceptual cases compromise perceptual contact with the world. So perceptual starts should be thought in terms of a relation to the external and mind-independent world. I call this view I defend 'pure relationalism', and the view of misperceptual cases that makes pure relationalism possible 'illusionism'.