Authors
Boyd Millar
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
A perceptual experience of a given object seems to make the object itself present to the perceiver’s mind. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) provides a better account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience than does the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way). But the naïve realist account of this phenomenology has a conspicuous shortcoming: it explains the phenomenological directness of veridical perceptual experiences but not of hallucinations. Conversely, I maintain that a particular variety of the content view provides a unified account of the phenomenological directness of both veridical and hallucinatory experiences. If so, then contrary to what is often assumed, the phenomenological facts concerning perceptual experience are explained better by the content view than by naïve realism, and consequently, we have a compelling reason to prefer the content view to naïve realism.
Keywords Perception  Perceptual Phenomenology  Content View  Relational View  Naïve Realism  Disjunctivism  Hallucination
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00620.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences Are Transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.
The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.

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