Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):287-302 (2015)

Authors
Keith Allen
University of York
Abstract
What are hallucinations? A common view in the philosophical literature is that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of perceptual experience. I argue instead that hallucinations are degenerate kinds of sensory imagination. As well as providing a good account of many actual cases of hallucination, the view that hallucination is a kind of imagination represents a promising account of hallucination from the perspective of a disjunctivist theory of perception like naïve realism. This is because it provides a way of giving a positive characterisation of hallucination—rather than characterising hallucinations in negative, relational, terms as mental events that are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2014.984312
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane & Craig French - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming.Cecily M. K. Whiteley - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2111-2132.
Sensible Over-Determination.Umrao Sethi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):588-616.

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