Relationalism and unconscious perception

Analysis 76 (4):426-433 (2016)
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Relationalism holds that perceptual experiences are relations between subjects and perceived objects. But much evidence suggests that perceptual states can be unconscious. We argue here that unconscious perception raises difficulties for relationalism. Relationalists would seem to have three options. First, they may deny that there is unconscious perception or question whether we have sufficient evidence to posit it. Second, they may allow for unconscious perception but deny that the relationalist analysis applies to it. Third, they may offer a relationalist explanation of unconscious perception. We argue that each of these strategies is questionable.

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Author Profiles

Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp
Jacob Berger
Lycoming College

Citations of this work

Unconscious Perception Reconsidered.Ian Phillips - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):471-514.
Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions.Ori Beck - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1175-1190.
Fuzziness in the Mind: Can Perception be Unconscious?Henry Taylor - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):383-398.

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