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Red, bitter, good

In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications (1998)

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  1. Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):41-56.
    ABSTRACT A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the (...)
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  • Moral Realism and the Existence of God: Improving Parfit’s Metaethics.Martin Jakobsen - 2020 - Leuven, Belgia: Peeters.
    Can there be an objective morality without God? Derek Parfit argues that it can and offers a theory of morality that is neither theistic nor naturalistic. This book provides a critical assessment of Parfit's metaethical theory. Jakobsen identifies some problems in Parfit’s theory – problems concerning moral normativity, the ontological status of morality, and evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs – and argues that theological resources can help solve them. By showing how Parfit’s theory may be improved by the help (...)
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  • Moral value, response-dependence, and rigid designation.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):71-94.
    Furthermore, moral facts do seem to bear an intimate relationship to our moral attitudes and capacities. It is perhaps inconceivable that, at the end of moral deliberation and inquiry, fully rational human beings invested with our moral concepts could be radically incorrect in their moral beliefs. Moral properties seem to be essentially knowable. We hope that the fundamental truths of physics are epistemically available to us, but our conception of the physical world certainly does not guarantee it. However implausible, it (...)
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  • Realism, projectivism and response-dependence: On the limits of 'best judgement'.Christopher Norris - 2002 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2):123-152.
    This essay offers a critical appraisal of some claims recently advanced by Crispin Wright and others in support of a response-dispositional (RD) approach to issues in epistemology, ethics, political theory, and philosophy of the social sciences. These claims take a lead from Plato's discussion of the status of moral value-judgements in the Euthyphro and from Locke's account of 'secondary qualities' such as colour, texture and taste. The idea is that a suitably specified description of best opinion (or optimal response) for (...)
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  • Dictatorship of the Professoriat? Antiobjectivism in Anglo-American Philosophy.Christopher Norris - 2007 - Common Knowledge 13 (2-3):281-314.
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  • What evolves when morality evolves?Neil Levy - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (3):612-620.
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  • What evolves when morality evolves?Neil Levy - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (3):612-620.
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  • Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence.Mark Lebar - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):175-211.
    Response-dependent accounts of value claim that to understand what we are saying about the objects of our value judgments, we must take into account the responses those objects provoke. Recent discussions of the proposal that value is response-dependent are obscured by dogmas about response-dependence, that (1) response-dependency must be known a priori, (2) must hold necessarily, and (3) the terms involved must designate rigidly. These “dogmas” stand in the way of formulating and assessing a clear conception of value as response-dependent. (...)
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  • An Expected Error: An Essay in Defence of Moral Emotionism.Justin J. Bartlett - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (2):271-289.
    This work draws an analogical defence of strong emotionism—the metaethical claim that moral properties and concepts consist in the propensity of actions to elicit emotional responses from divergent emotional perspectives. I offer a theory that is in line with that of Prinz. I build an analogy between moral properties and what I call emotion-dispositional properties. These properties are picked out by predicates such as ‘annoying’, ‘frightening’ or ‘deplorable’ and appear to be uncontroversial and frequent cases of attribution error—the attributing of (...)
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  • Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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