RESUMEN Aún no se ha explorado si el potencial comunicativo del principio humeano de simpatía se limita al intercambio de sentimientos y emociones o si permite también compartir creencias. Mostraremos que Hume considera esta última posibilidad tanto a partir de la universalidad de la naturaleza humana y del carácter inherentemente social del hombre, como de la existencia de una interconexión entre pensamientos y sentimientos. Contrariamente a la opinión de diversos autores, afirmamos además que la experiencia propia no es condición de (...) posibilidad para poner en acto el principio de simpatía, sino que podemos recibir los sentimientos y creencias de los demás aunque no contemos con experiencia similar. ABSTRACT It has not yet been explored whether the communicational power of the Humean principle of sympathy is limited to conveying feelings and emotions or it also allows sharing beliefs. I will show that Hume considers the latter possibility both by means of the universality of human nature and the inherently social character of man, and the interconnection between thoughts and feelings. Contrary to the opinion of several authors, I will also argue that our personal experience is not a necessary condition to start up the principle of sympathy, but we can receive feelings and beliefs from other people even though we do not have previous similar experience. (shrink)

The paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, by examining a conflict regarding the vivacity of the self in his writings about sympathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy supposes that self is the liveliest perception of thought, when we consider sympathy through the perspective of the ‘desire of company’, we find that self lacks vivacity and, without alterity, it would be in reality nothing. Our objective is to present the conflict and show that, far (...) from being a contradiction in Hume's thinking, it is consistent with how the philosopher conceives personal identity as a product of imagination, that is, a perception that, like any other, exists within the flow of perceptions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A restricted interpretation of Humean methodology understands his experimentalism solely in terms of reducing epistemic statements to private sensory impressions accessible via introspection. My aim is to revise this interpretation by means of criticizing the connection it establishes between the maxim of not going beyond experience and the copy principle. I will show that this interpretation is inconsistent with the way Hume conceives the experimental method, since there is textual evidence to affirm that experience should not be understood in (...) terms of sensory impressions only, and that the science of human nature is not restricted to the study of the mental contents only, but it is nourished in the same way by the observation of social interaction. Finally, I will argue that the method Hume proposes does not prevent intersubjective verification of the empirical evidence, since the principle of sympathy enables the communication of mental states, which makes them devoid of their private character. (shrink)

Sympathy is a powerful principle in human nature, which can change our passions, sentiments and ways of thinking. For the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, sympathy is a working mechanism accountable for a wide range of communication: the ways of interacting with the others’ affections, emotions, sentiments, inclinations, ways of thinking and even opinions. The present paper intends to find a systematic reading of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature from the point of view of what the mechanism of sympathetic (...) communication implies in terms of strengthening our action of understanding, of being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of others. Hume’s description of the sympathetic mechanism appears to suggest that sympathetic passions come upon us purely by natural means in a passive manner, without the active use of any of our faculties. Consequently, scholarly attention is drawn to the mechanistic character of the sympathetic process; its automatic nature is emphasized to such an extent that some experts even find it to be completely void of any reflective process. The current study investigates to what extent the sympathetic process can actively be modified and in what manner sympathetic feelings can be generated as described in Hume’s system of emotions. The paper identifies at which points the otherwise mechanically and passively operating process of sympathetic feelings is open to be modified by actively altering or strengthening certain skeletal points of the mechanism. I argue that the alterations can be initiated by the person who receives the sympathetic feelings and also by the person whose passions are transmitted, moreover even by a third party. In a seemingly mechanic model, there is room for altering or at least amplifying one’s sympathetic feelings. (shrink)