Since his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft was first published in 1786, controversy has surrounded Immanuel Kant’s conception of matter. In particular, the justification for both his dynamical theory of matter and the related dismissal of mechanical philosophy are obscure. In this paper, I address these longstanding issues and establish that Kant’s dynamism rests upon Leibnizian, metaphysical commitments held by Kant from his early pre-Critical texts on natural philosophy to his major critical works. I demonstrate that, throughout his corpus and inspired (...) by Leibniz, Kant endorses the a priori law of continuity of alteration as a truth of metaphysics, according to which all alterations in experience must occur gradually through all intervening degrees. The principle thus legislates against mechanical philosophy’s absolutely impenetrable atoms, as they would would involve instantaneous changes of velocity in impact. This reveals the metaphysical incoherencies in mechanical philosophy and leaves Kant’s own dynamical theory of matter, grounded on material forces, as the only viable approach to physical explanation. Subsequently, I demonstrate that Kant nevertheless made conceptual space in his system for the theoretical consideration of mechanical explanations, which makes manifest one of the positive roles that the faculty of reason can play with respect to natural science. (shrink)

Isis, Vol. 105, No. 2 (June 2014) , pp. 432-434.

Kant's metaphysics of space periods is explored via his in both the pre-critical and critical relation to Leibniz, the incongruent counterparts argument, and the distinctive arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Sequentially, Heidegger's phenomenology of space from the period of Being and Time is explicated in terms of concepts like deseverance, directionality, region and equipmentality. The two analyses are found to overlap on several key points. These include: the priority of the whole over the parts, openness, and exteriority and thus non-discursivity. (...) The points of overlap we call 'spacing' . Through further analyses, it is discovered that the concepts of spacing are precisely the concepts required by these two philosophers even when they treat of subjects not normally considered essentially spacial. These subjects include the nature of temporal relations, of selfhood and self-constancy, and of the experience and significance of art. The importance of spacing for these subjects is individually discussed, as are possible reasons why the language of space should be required. (shrink)