The significance of absolute space and absolute motion in the Critical philosophy is clarified by analysis of relevant passages in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Newton's absolute space is rejected in favor of absolute space conceived of as an idea of reason serving to unify the infinity of possible relative kinematic spaces. On the other hand, something like newton's concept of absolute motion (e.g., in the case of rotation) is accepted by Kant under the heading of real - as (...) opposed to illusory - motion. (shrink)

Current discussions of science—both popular and philosophical—often represent the development of science in our civilization as a gradual process of purification from superstitious, religious, and metaphysical elements. This purification is usually presumed to be complete by now—although there may be occasional lapses on the part of individual scientists. That science has changed in character over the centuries is a truism; that it has increasingly loosened ancient ties with magic, religion, and speculative philosophy is an easily substantiated historical thesis. This much (...) admitted, however, an interesting question remains over for discussion: is science by its very nature independent of philosophy? This question has only as much meaning as its two key words. According to one common view, “science” would signify some cumulative heritage of methods, principles, and results, while “philosophy” would signify a certain tradition of writings in which the later constantly refer to the earlier, but which otherwise exhibit no discernible uniformity of methods, principles, or results. On this view, then, science is essentially monistic while philosophy is essentially pluralistic. (shrink)

In this paper I shall attempt to illustrate the way in which philosophical principles diversify scientific theories. By this I mean that alternative philosophical views may inspire and even form part of the basis of alternative scientific theories of the same phenomena, e.g., gravitation. I shall make no attempt, however, to explain the mode of logical connection between a set of philosophical principles and a correlated scientific theory—a question which I consider extremely difficult and perhaps not even amenable to a (...) unique answer. I shall expound two pairs of conflicting theories concerning the motion of the earth. Although each pair possesses its own intrinsic interest I believe they also illuminate one another in striking ways when placed in juxtaposition. (shrink)

What strikes one first about two recent books in philosophy of science is that they seem to be polar opposites in all important respects. Bridgman, of course, typifies the hard-headed and skeptical physical scientist, whose interest in the broad “philosophic” questions of scientific methodology stems largely from current problems in theoretical physics, but he is, nevertheless, very much concerned to extend the salutary effects of operational analysis to other intellectual disciplines. Jung, on the other hand, not only is a psychiatrist—and (...) therefore professionally committed to a certain gullibility about mental phenomena—but he also is deeply convinced of the importance for science of such subjects as astrology and alchemy; and Pauli, although a distinguished physicist in his own right, has clearly been influenced by Jung's conception of archetypal ideas in the collective unconscious. (shrink)

Mathematically, the fusion of space and time may be explained as follows. In pre-relativity physics, space was envisaged as a three-dimensional Euclidean continuum. Such a continuum is homogeneous and isotropic, and its metrical character can be specified by the definition of the distance between any two points in the continuum: s2 = 2 + 2 + 2. Now, while it is possible to speak of a four-dimensional continuum in pre-relativity physics by adding the time-coordinate to the three space-coordinates, there is (...) no way, corresponding to the definition of s, to define the spatio-temporal "separation" or "interval" between any two points in this new four-dimensional continuum. Thus, while it makes sense from the classical point of view to ask for the distance between two points in space, it does not make sense to ask for the spatio-temporal interval between two events occurring in different places at different times. The spatio-temporal interval between non-simultaneous, spatially separated events is simply not defined in pre-relativity physics. Another way of putting it is that in classical physics space and time are measured in entirely disparate units and no method is provided for making these units comparable with one another. In relativity physics, on the other hand, light--or rather the velocity of light--provides the means for making the results of spatial and temporal measurement comparable quantities: one simply multiplies the time-like intervals by c, the fixed velocity of light, in order to obtain space-like intervals. The interval between any two events is defined as: s2 = 2 + 2 + 2 - c22. Interval, so defined, is an invariant, whereas spatial and temporal "separation" are now relative to the state of motion of the observer. The geometry of the four-dimensional continuum characterized by this formula is called "semi-Euclidean". (shrink)