In this paper, I explore the question of agency in spontaneous action via a phenomenology of musical improvisation, drawing on fieldwork conducted with large con- temporary improvising ensembles. I argue that musical improvisation is a form of ‘participatory sense-making’ in which musical decisions unfold via a feedback pro- cess with the evolving musical situation itself. I describe how musicians’ technical expertise is developed alongside a responsive expertise, and how these capacities complicate the sense in which habitual action can be viewed (...) as pre-conscious or ‘automatic.’ Nevertheless, I shall argue that the self-awareness required for expert improvisation does not amount to highly reflective deliberation, arguing instead that the practice of musical improvisation involves an exercise of practical rationality, akin to what Aristotle called phronēsis. Musical decisions – as an expressive form of sense-making – are guided by feelings of ‘rightness’ that are experienced directly and intuitively, responding to the norms and reasons that are embedded in the instruments, sounds, and practices of a particular (sub)culture. (shrink)

This paper urges contemporary Business Ethicists to reconsider the relationship between habit and virtue in the light of recent debates between contemporary philosophers and scientists. Synthesizing insights from current Neuroscience, from twentieth century American Pragmatism and from nineteenth century French Aristotelianism, this emergent intellectual tradition proposes a dynamic account of habit’s embodiment which we will first describe and then advocate. Two recurring suggestions within this habit renaissance are of particular relevance to Business Ethicists: firstly, that there is a ‘plastic’ structure (...) pertaining to habit and, secondly, that there is a processual ‘double-law of habituation’. Taken together, these accounts of habit and habituation provide virtue ethicists with a basis for claiming analytic and pragmatic authority within applied ethics debates in general and within Business Ethics debates in particular. We develop this argument in three steps. Firstly, we elaborate upon why habits are said to be plastic and why the process of habituation is said to be characterised by a double-law. Secondly, we distinguish this account of habit’s relationship to virtue from, and where necessary defend it against, the influential articulations of the habit: virtue relationship provided by situationism, by deontology and by communitarianism, respectively. Finally, we draw practical lessons from the initial elaborations made in the argument’s first step, and the subsequent clarifications provided in its second step, by announcing seven characteristics of highly effective virtue habituation projects. (shrink)

Despite many twenty-first century efforts to minimize corporate corruption, initiatives taken by local governments, global organizations, academic institutions, or the corporate world itself, it is clear that corporate corruption is perpetuating itself. In this paper, I apply the Aristotelian concept of “akrasia” (moral weakness) in order to provide an interpretation of corporate corruption as an act of moral failure and misapprehension of the right thing to do, if not an act of wickedness, which originates with lack of integrity. By utilizing (...) Aristotle’s philosophical framework, I attempt a redefinition of integrity not only with reference to the Aristotelian moral and intellectual virtues but also with a combination of theoretical and practical wisdom, that is, a connection between theory and action, definitive of moral consistency. Through this interpretation, I also wish to further emphasize the need for a philosophical background of contemporary managerial practices for a more effective countering of corporate corruption. (shrink)

Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because (...) they are guided by automatic yet rational, propositional processes. Others still suggest that habits guide intelligent behaviour without involving propositional states by shaping perception in action-soliciting ways. We develop an alternative fourth answer based on John Dewey’s pragmatist account of habit. We argue that habits promote intelligent behaviour by shaping perception, by forming an interrelated network among themselves, and by cooperating with the environment. (shrink)

The habitual action is not only undertaken on a regular basis but also is personalized which has moral significance when we evaluate action and personality. For Aristotle, inculcating virtues through habitual action could develop a moral character. The naturalistic or behaviouristic perspective and the non-naturalistic perspective are two ways to interpret this Aristotelian theoretical position. The naturalistic thesis maintains that habit and character formation is inherently present in the form of disposition in human beings and could be causally related to (...) the neurophysiological function of the brain process. On the other hand, the non-naturalistic thesis upholds a teleological account of the formation of moral character which is grounded in the power of will. This paper, which delves into Aristotle’s notion of habit and its role in the formation of moral character, examines these two theoretical perspectives in order to substantiate the relationship between habits and moral character formation. It also analyses the logical relationship between habits and moral character to show how the moral character is developed by strengthening the power of will. (shrink)

What role does habit formation play in the development of sport skills? We argue that motor habits are both necessary for and constitutive of sensorimotor skill as they support an automatic, yet inherently intelligent and flexible, form of action control. Intellectualists about skills generally assume that what makes action intelligent and flexible is its intentionality, and that intentionality must be necessarily cognitive in nature to allow for both deliberation and explicit goal-representation. Against Intellectualism we argue that the habitual behaviours that (...) compose skilful action are accompanied by their specific, non-cognitive form of intentionality: this is motor intentionality, which is purposive and adaptive while involving no explicit deliberation or goal representation. Our account of habit based on Motor Intentionality explains why the formation of motor habits can sometimes act as the sole basis of skilful acquisition: Motor Intentionality is inherently purposeful because it is an embodied source of sensorimotor anticipation, pre-reflective motivation, and pragmatic know-how. Skill development through exercise always builds on a motor intentional component even when it is guided by Deliberate Practice to the point that, pace Intellectualism, Deliberate Practice is disclosed, not constrained, by habit formation. As suggested by the fact that repetitive exercises can play a major role in the development of flexible and intelligent sport skills, automatism is not a drawback for strategic control and improvisation but rather their pragmatic foundation. (shrink)

Las actuales circunstancias políticas y culturales nos sumergen en una realidad paradojal, por un lado se exaltan la subjetividad, la autonomía, la independencia y al mismo tiempo se constriñen las libertades pretendiendo reducir todas las voluntades a una masa informe pero obediente al mandato de una conciencia colectiva omnipresente. Para una cabal comprensión de la realidad y alcances de la libertad humana se hace imprescindible entonces remitirnos a los horizontes de comprensión que nos brinda la Antropología, particularmente la Antropología Trascendental, (...) pues emerge como una respuesta clara, profunda y a grandes interrogantes de nuestro tiempo. (shrink)