The aim of this article is to present a new witness of Averroes' reception in the Muslim world, in the years that immediately followed his death. Indeed Abū al-Ḥağğāğ al-Miklātī is an Ašʿarite theologian, who was born in Fez. He is the author of a Quintessence of the Intellects in Response to Philosophers on the Science of Principles in which he aims at refuting the Peripatetic philosophers in their own field, using their own weapons. This article will first attempt to (...) draw the portrait of this atypical theologian. It will then focus on showing that al-Miklātī – although he never mentions his name – is a reader of Averroes and in particular, of his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, of which he makes various and unexpected uses. A close look at these uses will enable us to better define the nature of al-Miklātī's work. More importantly, this article will try to prove that al-Miklātī provides us with a key passage of Averroes' lost treatise On the Prime Mover. At the heart of the Rushdian criticism of Avicenna's “metaphysical” proof, this passage should throw new light on Averroes' precise understanding of this proof.L'objectif de cet article est de présenter un nouveau témoin de la réception d'Averroès dans le monde musulman, dans les années qui suivirent immédiatement sa mort. En effet, Abū al-Ḥağğāğ al-Miklātī est un théologien ašʿarite, né à Fès. Il est l'auteur d'une Quintessence des intellects en vue de répondre aux philosophes en matière de science des fondements, où il entreprend de réfuter les philosophes – les Péripatéticiens en premier lieu – sur leur terrain et avec leurs propres armes. Cet article cherchera dans un premier temps à dresser le profil de ce théologien atypique. Il s'attachera ensuite à montrer qu'al-Miklātī – bien qu'il ne mentionne pas une seule fois son nom – est un lecteur d'Averroès et en particulier de son Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, dont il fait des usages variés et inattendus. L'examen de ces usages permettra de mieux définir le statut de l'œuvre d'al-Miklātī. Enfin, et surtout, cet article tentera de prouver qu'al-Miklātī nous fournit un passage clé d'un traité perdu d'Averroès: le Traité sur le Premier Moteur. Au cœur de la critique rushdienne de la preuve “métaphysique” d'Avicenne, ce passage devrait apporter un éclairage nouveau à la compréhension qu'Averroès pouvait avoir de cette preuve.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. 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If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. AL-MIKLĀTĪ, A TWELFTH CENTURY AŠʿARITE READER OF AVERROESVolume 22, Issue 2Yamina Adouhane DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S095742391200001XAvailable formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the notion that medieval philosophy was characterized by strict adherence to authority. In particular, I argue that to the contrary, self-consciously critical reflection on authority was a widespread intellectual virtue in the Islamic world. The contrary vice, called ‘taqlīd’, was considered appropriate only for those outside the scholarly elite. I further suggest that this idea was originally developed in the context of Islamic law and was then passed on to authors who worked within the philosophical (...) tradition. (shrink)

Many later thinkers in the Islamic world pick up on, and further expand, the idea of intuition (ḥads) as they react to Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). Focusing on figures from the twelfth–thirteenth century, in this paper we will focus especially on the following points of debate: (1) Avicenna’s idea that intuition is distingiushed from normal (discursive) thought by lacking ‘motion’, (2) The question of how and why different individuals differ in the extent of their intuition, (3) The role of intuitive thought (...) in grounding knowledge: is intuition needed every time a certain item of knowledge is grasped for the first time, and hence without a teacher; and further, is intuition needed as an ultimate justification for all non-intuitive knowledge? (shrink)

This article is about Avicenna’s account of syllogisms comprising opposite premises. We examine the applications and the truth conditions of these syllogisms. Finally, we discuss the relation between these syllogisms and the principle of non-contradiction.

Avicenna’s ground-breaking view of logic as both a tool for other sciences and a science in its own right has already attracted scholars’ attention and has been studied in several different respects. The present paper aims to address a specific issue entailed by considering logic as a science in its own right: that is, assessing the relation in which logic as a science stands to the other sciences, and particularly to metaphysics and psychology. The inquiry will focus on a fundamental, (...) yet tricky, passage of chapter I.4 of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Madḫal, the opening work of his most comprehensive philosophical summa, the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (Book of Healing). Due to the obscurity of some of Avicenna’s references, chapter I.4 “on the subject-matter of logic” has stimulated numerous attempts at interpretation from the Middle Ages to today. In this paper, I will attempt to provide a new reading of the chapter in light of Avicenna’s definition of the epistemological status of science in Burhān II.7. (shrink)

The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell’s own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-related fields. The contributions are new work by highly respected figures, several of whom are among the key figures in their fields. Some examples: in foundations of maths and logic ; analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and decision theory and foundations of economics. (...) Most articles are contributions to current philosophical debates, but contributions also include some new mathematical results, important historical surveys, and a translation by Wilfrid Hodges of a key work of arabic logic. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the metaphorical use of medical terms in philosophy. Three examples selected from distinct philosophical contexts demonstrate that such terms have been employed as metaphors both to describe the practice of philosophising and historically to diagnose philosophical positions. The selected examples are (i) the title of Avicenna’s main philosophical work, The Book of Healing, (ii) the criticism of medical metaphors in Enlightenment philosophy, and (iii) recent historical diagnoses in philosophy. The underlying epistemological assumptions of all three contexts (...) are reconstructed to critically analyse the medical metaphors. Through this tripartite synopsis, I arrive at a normative conclusions medical metaphors, such as the “healing of the soul” or “pathology of reason”, do not stand up to the critique of Enlightenment and are obsolete against the theoretical background of my reference texts. (shrink)

This paper examines al-Fārābī's logical thought within its Arabico-Islamic historical background and attempts to conceptualize what this background contributes to his logic. After a brief exposition of al-Fārābī's main problems and goals, I shall attempt to reformulate the formal structure of Arabic linguistics (AL) in terms of the ontological and formal characteristics that Arabic logic is built upon. Having discussed the competence of al-Fārābī in the history of AL, I will further propose three interrelated theses about al-Fārābī's logic, in terms (...) of which I will attempt to redefine it: the logico-linguistic conception, the project of logicization, and nuclear logic. The final question that will arise is how Aristotle's logic could be built upon AL, which has a nature contrary to logic. The present paper also contributes to examining our traditional research habits in Arabic studies. (shrink)

Avicenna introduces the primary propositions as the most fundamental principles of knowledge. However, as far as we are aware, Avicenna’s primaries have not yet been independently studied. Nor do Avicenna scholars agree on how to characterize them in the language of contemporary philosophy. It is well-known that the primaries are indemonstrable; nonetheless, it is not clear what the genealogy of the primaries is, how, epistemologically speaking, they can be distinguished from other principles, what their phenomenology is, what the cause of (...) the assent to them is, how to explain the relationship between the ‘innate [nature] of the intellect’ and the primaries and, finally, back to their indemonstrability, in what sense they are ‘indemonstrable’. We will try to fill this gap. As a corollary, we will explain why Gutas’s view [Gutas, Dimitri.... (shrink)

Elucidating a metaphysics of medicine is vital for framing a coherent medical ethics. In this paper, I examine the historical case of Avicenna, the eleventh century physician-philosopher. Avicenna radicalizes the dissective power of reason using a logicized Aristotelian metaphysics to clarify concepts at the metaphysical level, which I call his anatomy of being. One of the practical consequences of Avicenna’s metaphysics is a dehumanizing eschatology of death. I outline the main elements of Avicenna’s thought that constitute his anatomy of being. (...) Through an examination of his logic, metaphysics, and psychology, I show how Avicenna develops a dissective logic. I conclude that one’s epistemology, as a method of knowing, entails a metaphysics, and, in turn, results in an ethical stance to the object of knowledge. For Avicenna, mental dissective logic applied to humans results in dehumanization, thereby destroying the humanistic impulse of medicine. (shrink)

RésuméCet article vise à établir que la place centrale d'Avicenne dans l'histoire intellectuelle de l'Islam ne se limite pas aux disciplines de la philosophie théorique, mais que cet auteur a eu aussi une influence profonde et forte sur la conception de la philosophie pratique jusqu'aux temps modernes. J'analyserai l'impact de la conception avicénienne de la philosophie pratique en étudiant les différentes classifications de la philosophie pratique proposées par Avicenne tout au long de sa carrière ainsi que les facteurs motivant sa (...) négligence de la philosophie pratique dans ses sommes philosophiques, sur la base de sa conception des relations entre philosophie etšarīʿa. Pour établir ma thèse concernant l'influence de cet auteur sur la conception de la philosophie pratique dans la tradition islamique, j'étudierai des œuvres majeures concernant la classification des sciences ainsi que les commentaires et gloses relatifs aux deux sommes philosophiques les plus importantes et les plus largement diffusées dans la tradition philosophique post-avicénienne, que sont lesHidāyat al-ḥikmad'al-Abharī's et lesḤikmat al-ʿaynd'al-Kātibī's. (shrink)

We record the advances made by the eleventh century Persian logician Ibn Sina—known in the West as Avicenna—away from a purely cognitive view of proofs and towards a more computational view, and the kinds of consideration that led him to these advances. Some of Ibn Sina’s new logics, which stand somewhere between Aristotle’s categorical syllogisms and modern first-order logic, can serve as a kind of laboratory for testing what are the differences between Aristotelian and modern logic, and where these differences (...) come from. (shrink)

The ancient virtue of practical wisdom has lately been enjoying a remarkable renaissance in management literature. The purpose of this article is to add clarity and bring synergy to the interdisciplinary debate. In a review of the wide-ranging field of the existing literature from a philosophical, theological, psychological, and managerial perspective, we show that, although different in terms of approach, methodologies, and justification, the distinct traditions of research on practical wisdom can indeed complement one another. We suggest a conciliatory conception (...) of the various features of practical wisdom in management. This we take as a point of departure for a discussion of the significant implications of the subject for the theory and practice of management and for the direction of further research in the field. (shrink)

Al-Ghazālı̄ famously claims in the Incoherence of the Philosophers that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are unbelievers because they hold philosophical positions that conflict with Islam. What is less well-known, however, is that Averroës claims in the Decisive Treatise that al-Fārābī and Avicenna are not unbelievers; rather, al-Ghazālı̄ is the true unbeliever for writing the Incoherence of the Philosophers. In this paper, my aim is to present a sustained reconstruction of Averroës’ legal and philosophical argument for why al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever. The (...) crux of Averroës’ argument is that al-Ghazālı̄ has expressed false allegorical interpretations of scripture to unqualified persons, which has led them into unbelief. By being causally responsible for other people’s unbelief, al-Ghazālı̄ is an unbeliever as well. (shrink)