Deliberative democracy is often celebrated and endorsed because of its promise to include, empower, and emancipate otherwise oppressed and excluded social groups through securing their voice and granting them impact in reasoned public deliberation. This article explores the ability of Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy to accommodate the demands of historically excluded social groups in democratic plural societies. It argues that the inclusive, transformative, and empowering potential of Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy falters when confronted with particular types of historical (...) injustices. It falters because it pays little attention to the historical dimension of injustices and the demands to which it gives rise. The historical dimension of longstanding injustices, it is argued, gives rise to a set of distinctive demands, such as collective memory of exclusion, acknowledgement of historical injustices, taking responsibility, and offering apology and reparations for causing these injustices, which go beyond the type of democratic inclusion that is often offered by deliberative democracy. Yet, the solution is not to abandon the model of deliberative democracy. Quite the contrary, it remains a valuable basis for forward-looking political decision making. The article concludes that in order to achieve inclusive, empowering and transformative deliberation in consolidated democracies that have experienced historical injustices, the politics of reconciliation is indispensable. (shrink)

Beim eingeschränkten Fokus auf Wahrheit und dem Hervorbringen von „Beweisen“ im Kontext der türkischen Leugnung des Genozids an den ArmenierInnen wurde einem wesentlichen ethischen Problem bisher keine sonderliche Beachtung geschenkt: Dass innerhalb dieser sozial situierten, kooperativen Praxis der Etablierung von Wissen über die historischen Tatsachen – also darüber, was passiert ist und wie diese Geschehnisse zu interpretieren sind – Ungerechtigkeiten im Hinblick darauf entstehen können, wen man als glaubwürdige epistemische Akteure anerkennt. Gemäss dieser Überlegung soll dieser Beitrag zeigen, inwiefern Nachfahren (...) von Genozidopfern durch institutionalisierte Genozidleugnung einer erneuten Dehumanisierung zum Opfer fallen, nämlich der epistemischen Ungerechtigkeit. Diese besagt, dass den Nachfahren der Opfergruppe die Glaubwürdigkeit und damit epistemische Autorität auf der Grundlage ihrer sozialen Zugehörigkeit abgesprochen wird. In diesem Sinne kann die Genozidleugnung als eine fortgesetzte Unterdrückung und Delegitimierung der Opfergruppe, respektive Herabwürdigung ihrer Mitglieder verstanden werden, diesmal im Gewand einer Aberkennung ihrer essentiellen menschlichen Fähigkeit, Wissen zu generieren und weiterzugeben, sowie ihre Unrechtserfahrungen sich und andern intelligibel zu machen. (shrink)

Reprinted with modification and permission from Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. The phenomenon of medical overtesting in general, and specifically in the emergency room, is well-known and regarded as harmful to both the patient and the healthcare system. Although the implications of this problem raise myriad ethical concerns, this chapter explores the extent to which overtesting might mitigate race-based health inequalities. Given that medical malpractice and error greatly increase when the patients belong to a racial minority, it is no surprise (...) that the mortality rate similarly increases in proportion to white patients. For these populations, an environment that emphasizes medical overtesting may well be the desirable medical environment until care evens out among races and ethnicities; additionally, efforts to lower overtesting in conjunction with a high rate of racist medical mythology may cause harm by lower testing when it is actually warranted. Furthermore, medical overtesting may help to assuage racial distrust. This paper ultimately concludes that an environment of medical overtesting may be less pernicious than the alternative. (shrink)

En este trabajo respondo una objeción a la tesis de que la teoría de Rawls debe atender problemas relacionados a la injusticia histórica. Esta objeción sostiene que dicha teoría está justificada en no considerar problemas de injusticia histórica debido a su supuesto carácter exclusivamente prospectivo. La objeción tiene dos presentaciones diferentes. Primero, como la idea de que hay razones internas a la propia teoría de Rawls que justifican dicho carácter exclusivamente prospectivo —tales como el problema de elección modelado en la (...) posición original y el hecho de que la justicia-como-equidad debe ser una concepción de justicia no-comprehensiva. Segundo, como la idea de que hay razones externas a la teoría de Rawls —en concreto, la supuesta existencia del así llamado problema de la no-identidad, que justifican el carácter exclusivamente prospectivo no sólo de los principios de justicia rawlsianos sino de cualquier otra concepción de justicia distributiva. Trataré de mostrar que esta objeción, tanto en su presentación interna como externa, es equivocada. (shrink)

The ‘structural injustice’ framework is an increasingly influential way of thinking about historical injustice. Structural injustice theorists argue against reparations for historical injustice on the grounds that our focus should be on forward-looking responsibility for contemporary structural injustice. Through the use of a case study – the Caribbean Community 10-Point Plan for reparations from 2014 – I argue that this reasoning is flawed. Backward-looking reparations can be justified on the basis of state liability over time. The value of backward-looking reparations (...) is that they ensure that historical perpetrators do not evade their reparative obligations and that affected communities are taken seriously. However, I argue that this backward-looking approach should be supplemented by a forward-looking structural injustice approach and the ‘social connection model’ of responsibility, which can expand the scope of responsible agents and forms of injustice that warrant repair and explain how citizens living now can be expected to pay for crimes of the past. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the role that victim groups and organizations may have in framing and supporting an accountability agenda, as well as their potential for endorsing a distributive justice agenda. The article explores two empirical cases where victims' rights have been introduced and applied by victim organizations to promote accountability—Colombia and Peru. It will be argued that if transitional justice in general and victim reparations in particular are to embark in a quest for distributive justice, (...) it cannot do so without considering victims as political actors, and putting forward demands in terms of victims’ rights. (shrink)

En este artículo se plantea si es posible en un proceso de negociación de un gobierno con un grupo rebelde proponer una amnistía o el perdón jurídico de crímenes internacionales. De un lado, el derecho internacional penal ha hecho posible sancionar los crímenes más graves mediante la intervención de tribunales internacionales. Pero de otro lado, si en la negociación se busca someter a los miembros del grupo rebelde a tribunales nacionales o internacionales, la paz les puede parecer demasiado costosa. Preferirán (...) seguir en la guerra a aceptar unas condiciones en los diálogos que sean absolutamente contrarias a sus intereses. (shrink)