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  1. Socrates at the Wrestling School.Erik Kenyon - 2020 - In Heather L. Reid (ed.), Athletics, Gymnastics, and Agon in Plato. pp. 51-66.
  2. On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws.Nicholas Baima - 2017 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 20 (1):65-81.
    Plato’s attitude towards drunkenness (μέθη) is surprisingly positive in the Laws, especially as compared to his negative treatment of intoxication in the Republic. In the Republic, Plato maintains that intoxication causes cowardice and intemperance (3.398e-399e, 3.403e, and 9.571c-573b), while in the Laws, Plato holds that it can produce courage and temperance (1.635b, 1.645d-650a, and 2.665c-672d). This raises the question: Did Plato change his mind, and if he did, why? Ultimately, this paper answers affirmatively and argues that this marks a substantive (...)
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  3. 2. The Puzzles of Moderation.Chris Bobonich - 2013 - In Christoph Horn (ed.), Platon: Gesetze/Nomoi. De Gruyter. pp. 23-44.
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  4. The Implicit Refutation of Critias 1.Tad Brennan - 2012 - Phronesis 57 (3):240-250.
    Abstract At Charmides 163, Critias attempts to extricate himself from refutation by proposing a Prodicean distinction between praxis and poiēsis . I argue that this distinction leads him further into contradictions.
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  5. Wisdom, Moderation, and Elenchus in Plato's Apology.Christopher S. King - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (3):345–362.
    This article contends that Socratic wisdom (sophia) in Plato's Apology should be understood in relation to moderation (sophrosune), not knowledge (episteme). This stance is exemplified in an interpretation of Socrates' disavowal of knowledge. The god calls Socrates wise. Socrates holds both that he is wise in nothing great or small and that the god does not lie. These apparently inconsistent claims are resolved in an interpretation of elenchus. This interpretion says that Socrates is wise insofar as he does not believe (...)
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  6. Socrates and Protagoras on Σωφρoσυnη and Justice: "Protagoras" 333–334.Richard D. McKirahan - 1984 - Apeiron 18 (1):19 - 25.
  7. Sōphrosunē, Self, and State: A Partial Defense of Plato.Paul Eisenberg - 1975 - Apeiron 9 (2):31 - 36.
  8. Plato’s Doctrine of Temperance.John A. Mourant - 1932 - New Scholasticism 6 (1):19-31.
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