Abraham (Biblical patriarch); Muḥammad, Prophet, d. 632; Muslim scholars; Muslim leaders; biography; miscellaneous.

Abū al-Ḥajj¿j Yūsuf b. Muḥammad Ibn Ṭumlūs (Alhagiag Bin Thalmus, d. 620/1223) was a philosopher, physician and direct disciple of Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198), who lived and practiced rational sciences in Alzira and Marrakesh, a quarter of a century after the demise of his teacher. Ibn Ṭumlūs was not Ibn Rushd's only student who engaged in work on logic, but one of dozens of disciples, suggesting that the supposed simultaneous death of the latter's philosophy is "grossly exaggerated". As a (...) valuable window into the practice of logic in 13th century al-Andalus and the Maghreb, Ibn Ṭumlūs' Compendium on Logic (Al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-manṭiq) covers all the parts of "the expanded Organon", as it was known since al-F¿r¿bī (d. 339/951). The present volume offers a complete critical Arabic edition of this work, with an English and Arabic introduction, notes and indices. (shrink)

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of (...) the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding. (shrink)

Guidelines for a model bride in Islam based on Islamic teachings; includes stories of six exemplary Muslim wives during Prophet Muhammad's time.

Translator's introduction -- Mir Damad's introduction -- 1st qabas. On the kinds of creation (huduth) and the divisions of existence according to them, establishing the bases of judgment, and defining the area of dispute -- 2nd qabas. On the three kinds of essential antecedence and constructing the demonstration by way of essential priority (taqaddum bi'l-dhat) -- 3rd qabas. The two kinds of separate posteriority and constituting the demonstration by way of eternal priority -- 4th qabas. Quotations from the book of (...) god and the traditions of his messenger, and from the traditions of the lofty and pure imams -- 5th qabas. Concerning the mode of existence of the unqualified natures and the path of the demonstration by the mode of the existence of the nature -- 6th qabas. On the continuity of time and motion; setting up the course of the demonstration with respect to the continuity of the magnitude of time according to the natural system in two ways; establishing the finitude of extended continuous quantity; and invalidating a numerical infinity -- With respect to successive temporal creatures -- 7th qabas. A series of abridged arguments, unsound dialectical arguments, and criticism of certain syllogisms and controversial sophistical doubts according to the two extremes of the two groups -- 8th qabas. Inquiry into the power of God and his will after completing what remains in the care of the intellect, through the use of decisive utterance, to solve some of the difficulties and dilemmas caused by doubt and the confusions arising from idle fancies -- 9th qabas. On establishing the intelligible substances and the stages of the system of existence in the two chains of beginning and return -- 10th qabas. The decisive doctrine on the secret of predetermination (qada') and fate (qadar), how evil is related to predetermination, the colocynth of truth on prayer and its granting, and the return of the command to god in the beginning and the end -- Glossary-- Bibliography. (shrink)

jild-i 1. Ittiṣāf al-māhīyah bil-wujūd, al-tashkhkhus, Sarayān al-wujūd ajūbah al-masāʼil li-baʻḍ al-khallān, Shawāhid al-rubūbīyah, al-Mizāj -- jild-i 2. Ḥashar al-ashyāʼ, al-Ḥasharīyah, Khalq al-aʻmāl, al-Qaḍāʼ wa-al-qadar, al-Maʻād al-jismānī -- jild-i 3. Iksīr al-ʻārifīn fī maʻrifah ṭarīq al-ḥaqq wa-al-yaqīn al-wāridāt al-qalbīyah fī maʻrifah al-rubūbīyah -- jild-i 4. al-Ḥikmah al-ʻarshīyah, al-Masāʼil al-qudsīyah, al-Mashāʻir, Mathnawī --.

This paper examines narrativism’s claim that the historical past cannot be known once and for all because it must be continuously re-described from the standpoint of the present. We argue that this claim is based on a non sequitur. We take narrativism’s claim that the past must be re-described continuously from the perspective of the present to be the result of the following train of thought: 1) “all knowledge is conceptually mediated”; 2) “the conceptual framework through which knowledge of reality (...) is mediated changes with every new generation of historians”; therefore (narrativism’s claim) “the historical past changes with every new generation of historians”. The idea of an unchanging past, for the narrativist, requires denying premise 1 (all knowledge is conceptually mediated”) and therefore rests on a problematic commitment to the chimerical notion of the past as it is in-itself, wie es eigentlich gewesen. We argue that the narrativist’s conclusion does not follow unless one adds a further premise, namely 3) “it is not possible to view reality through the categorial framework of historical agents”. If one asserts the possibility of grasping reality through the categorial framework of others, be they contemporary or past agents (as much philosophy of history written in an idealist key does), then one no longer has to accept the narrativist’s inference that since the past cannot be known in-itself or independently of conceptual mediation, then it cannot be known as it always was for the historical agents. Narrativism’s inference that the past cannot be known as it always was does not follow from premises 1 and 2 unless one smuggles in another problematic premise, premise 3. In this paper we defend the claim that the past can be known as it always was (not as it is in-itself) by invoking a different conception of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge, one which assumes the possibility of viewing reality through the categorial framework of others. This notion of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge is prevalent in the idealist tradition but, in the interest of brevity, we will defend this notion of mediacy by specific reference to the idealist philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (shrink)

The Church of England By Law Established, in incidental payment for secular privilege, has submitted to the bonds of established clichá, in particular to the reproach that its rulers seem more concerned with the external or practical working of Anglican faith and ritual than with their intellectual definition and justification. This intellectual looseness remained unimportant in practice as long as a forceful anti–Roman spirit blew all waves of opinion in one practical direction. In time, however, that wind gradually lost force (...) and positive cross–currents of Anglican belief came to the public surface. The legislators of the sixteenth century had formulated the positive rules of the Thirty–Nine Articles and the Prayer Book in tolerantly broad language. They left no decisive teaching authority to explain their texts and to meet the challenge of shifting ritual and speculative doubt. Time has subjected both instruments to an everwidening range of individual interpretation especially since the early nineteenth century, when the Anglican monopoly of political, social and educational institutions was disputed by fresh tides of Protestant dissenters, renascent Catholics and nascent agnostics. To–day, as Mr. Cockshut wryly comments: “to throw doubt on the Anglican formularies is itself part of the Anglican tradition”. (shrink)