In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism (1027a30–32). There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

As M. Loux has recently reminded us, there are two basic strategies for explaining the character of particular objects, the ‘relational approach’ and the ‘constituent approach’. The prime example of a constituent approach would be Aristotelian hylomorphism. This article reveals three things. First, it gives a roadmap towards what the author considers to be the exegetically correct reconstruction of Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory. Second, it provides a presentation of the basic claims of a neo-Aristotelian hylomorphic theory, the one argued for by (...) M. Johnston. Finally, it argues that regardless of whatever shortcomings it may have, Aristotle’s theory has an advantage over that proposed by Johnston. Unlike Johnston’s theory, it may give us a complete account of the character of a particular object. (shrink)

In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism . There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

In Metaphysics E. 3. 1027a29–30 Aristotle states that there are some causes, the incidental ones, that are generable and destructible but they have no coming to be. Furthermore, he asserts that if we deny this thesis, then we will have to give into determinism (1027a30–32). There are three persistent puzzles surrounding this chapter. First, what does it mean to say that a cause is generable and destructible but it has no coming to be? Second, what exactly is the connection between (...) this claim and determinism? And third, if we accept that in Metaphysics E. 3 Aristotle deals with incidental causation, then how is this discussion related to the treatment of incidentalness in E. 2? This article puts forward answers for these puzzles. I argue that there is textual evidence in Physics II. 5 that shows that the claim in Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is meant to capture the non-teleological nature of incidental causation. Moreover, I argue that this same textual evidence indicates that the thesis expressed at Metaphysics 1027a29–30 is in effect Aristotle’s response to teleological determinism. Finally, I suggest that it is plausible to suppose that chapter 3 does not quite belong with the rest of Metaphysics E. (shrink)

Politikoje I 2 Aristotelis pateikia kontroversišką teiginį, kad polis pagal prigimtį turi pirmumą prieš individą. Straipsnyje siekiama rekonstruoti šį teiginį. Pastarojo meto tyrimai siūlo du būdus suprasti prigimtinį pirmenybiškumą Aristotelio veikaluose. Jį galima interpretuoti kaip „egzistencinį pirmumą“ arba kaip „pirmumą būtyje“. Teigiama, kad pirmasis variantas kelia problemų; jis neatveria priimtinos šio teiginio skaitymo Politikoje I 2 perspektyvos. Antroji alternatyva teikia patikimą prieigą prie šios mįslės. Taip pat teigiama, kad šios siūlomos teiginio iš Politikos I 2 (1253a18–27) interpretacijos egzegetinis tikėtinumas dar (...) labiau išauga, jei atkreipiame dėmesį į tai, kad Aristoteliui polis yra tam tikra hilomorfinės visumos rūšis. (shrink)

This paper examines Della Rocca’s critique of Aristotle’s conception of substance. The key point of the paper is that Aristotle’s homonymy principle and concept of enformed matter undermine Della Rocca’s claim that Aristotle is subject to a John Wayne moment. (To undergo a John Wayne moment is to propose an unilluminating or empty explanation, as in Wayne’s statement ‘A man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do’.).

Many commentators suppose that Anaximander subscribes to a multiple worlds thesis. In particular, they assume that: either Anaximander accepts that there are innumerable co-existent worlds, or he accepts that there are innumerable successive worlds. The first of these interpretations has been shown to be problematic. In this discussion note I present two new arguments against the multiple successive worlds reading of Anaximander, with the intent to buttress a single world reconstruction of his cosmology.

One of the unresolved issues in Aristotle’s hylomorphism is the part-whole puzzle. Some scholars suppose that in Metaphysics Z 17, 1041b11-33 he endorses non-mereological hylomorphism. This kind of interpretation, however, has been challenged by K. Koslicki who argues that if the evidence in Metaphysics Z 17 is combined with some related textual and conceptual considerations, then a convincing case can be made for a mereological construal of Aristotelian hylomorphism. This paper does four things. First, it scrutinizes these opposing approaches to (...) Aristotle’s theory. Second, it suggests that to adjudicate the dispute at hand one ought to determine how Aristotle deals with what has come to be known as ‘Ackrill’s problem’. It is proposed that if we consider Aristotle’s theory in light of some distinctions drawn in contemporary discussions of hylomorphism, then it transpires that he does have a solution to Ackrill’s problem. Third, it is shown that his solution to this problem suggests a particular way of settling the debate over the part-whole puzzle. And finally, it is argued that the suggested reconstruction of Aristotelian hylomorphism is consistent with the textual evidence in Metaphysics Z 17 and its associated texts. (shrink)

The goal of perception is to infer the most plausible source of sensory stimulation. Unisensory perception of temporal order, however, appears to require no inference, since the order of events can be uniquely determined from the order in which sensory signals arrive. Here we demonstrate a novel perceptual illusion that casts doubt on this intuition: in three studies (N=607) the experienced event timings are determined by causality in real-time. Adult observers viewed a simple three-item sequence ACB, which is typically remembered (...) as ABC (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2016), in line with principles of causality. When asked to indicate the time at which events B and C occurred, points of subjective simultaneity shifted so that the assumed cause B appeared earlier and the assumed effect C later, despite full attention and repeated viewings. This first demonstration of causality reversing perceived temporal order cannot be explained by post-perceptual distortion, lapsed attention, or saccades. (shrink)

Combining philosophical and political analysis, this study offers a comprehensive reassessment of Castoriadis' contribution to critical theory in and through his critical confrontation with both the crisis of the traditional Left and the crisis of modern capitalist societies. The key concepts of 'crisis' and 'critique' are considered throughout the text and Castoriadis' ideas are situated in a critical debate with other radical thinkers, such as Lefort, Pannekoek, Arendt, Althusser, Axelos, Papaioannou and Marx. The study supplies an extensive analysis and explores (...) the contemporary relevance of Castoriadis' views regarding the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the events of May 1968 in France. It argues for a re-radicalization of his thought in light of the current capitalist crisis and seeks to trace his radical alternative to crisis by critically examining and further elaborating his positions with respect to socialism, autonomy and revolution. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 128-135.

An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.

Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on what Carter and Chrisman call “the core expressivist maneuver.” That is, instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value, we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical, and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work in cognitive psychology can shed light on how (...) the core expressivist maneuver operates at the cognitive level and that this: raises worries about the aptness of the expressivist question substitution and supports an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are usually run in favor of expressivism, this creates an obvious puzzle for expressivists. I wrap up by briefly responding to the objection that the debunking argument against expressivism overgeneralizes and, therefore, should be rejected. (shrink)