36 found
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  1. Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism: Between Gettier Cases and Saving Epistemic Appearances.Christos Kyriacou - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:27-44.
    I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). BSI can (...)
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  2.  56
    Semantic Awareness for Skeptical Pragmatic Invariantism.Christos Kyriacou - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):123-141.
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  3. Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity.Terence Cuneo & Christos Kyriacou - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  4. Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?Christos Kyriacou - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1351-1366.
    I argue that, at least on the assumption that if there are epistemic facts they are irreducible, the evolutionary debunking maneuver is prima facie self-debunking because it seems to debunk a certain class of facts, namely, epistemic facts that prima facie it needs to rely on in order to launch its debunking arguments. I then appeal to two recent reconstructions of the evolutionary debunking maneuver (Kahane (2011), Griffiths and Wilkins (2015)) and find them wanting. Along the way I set aside (...)
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  5.  70
    Assertion and Practical Reasoning, Fallibilism and Pragmatic Skepticism.Christos Kyriacou - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):543-561.
    Skeptical invariantism does not account for the intuitive connections between knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning and this constitutes a significant problem for the position because it does not save corresponding epistemic appearances (cf. Hawthorne (2004:131-5)). Moreover, it is an attraction of fallibilist over infallibilist-skeptical views that they can easily account for the epistemic appearances about the connections between knowledge, assertion, and practical reasoning (cf. Williamson (2000:249-255)). Call this argument ‘the argument from the knowledge norm’. I motivate and develop a Humean, (...)
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  6. From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points.Christos Kyriacou - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. I argue that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points (e.g. the factivity condition). To this effect, I show that the two basic reasons Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) offer in support of moral fixed points naturally carry over to epistemic fixed points. In particular, epistemic fixed (...)
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  7.  84
    Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism.Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.) - 2018 - Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book contains twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on metaepistemology, that is, on the nature, existence and authority of epistemic facts. One of the central divides in metaepistemology is between epistemic realists and epistemic anti-realists. Epistemic realists think that epistemic facts exist independently of human judgements and practices, and that they have authority over our judgements and practices. Epistemic anti-realists think that, if epistemic facts exist at all, they are grounded in human judgements and practices, and gain any (...)
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  8.  32
    Why Monarchy Should Be Abolished.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - Think 22 (65):39-44.
    Monarchy is a form of government that, roughly, dictates that the right to rule is inherited by birth by a single ruler. But monarchy (absolute or constitutional) breaches fundamental moral principles that undergird representative democracy, such as basic moral equality, dignity and desert. Simply put, the monarchs (and their family) are treated as morally superior to ordinary citizens and as a result ordinary citizens are treated in an unfair and undignified manner. For example, monarchs are respected, enjoy dignity, income, opportunity, (...)
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  9.  21
    How Not to Be a Fallibilist.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):423-440.
    I develop one partial explanation of the origins of our fallibilist intuitions about knowledge in ordinary language fallibilism and argue that this explanation indicates that our epistemic methodology should be more impartial and theory-neutral. First, I explain why the so-called Moorean constraint (cf. Hawthorne 2005, 111) that encapsulates fallibilist intuitions is fallibilism’s cornerstone. Second, I describe a pattern of fallibilist reasoning in light of the influential dual processing and heuristics and biases approach to cognition (cf. Kahneman 2011; Thaler and Sunstein (...)
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  10.  30
    Skepticism, Mental Disorder and Rationality.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1):1-30.
    I stipulate and motivate the overlooked problem of demarcating radical skeptics (perceptual and moral) from mentally disordered persons, given that both deny that they know ordinary Moorean propositions (e.g., that they have hands or that killing for fun is morally wrong). Call this ‘the demarcation problem’. In response to the demarcation problem, I develop a novel way to demarcate between mentally disordered persons and radical skeptics in an extensionally adequate way that saves the appearance that radical skeptics are not mentally (...)
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  11. Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):647-664.
    Cuneo and Shafer-Landau have argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive and non-vacuous in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. If the moral proposition ‘torturing kids for fun is pro tanto wrong’ is such a conceptual truth, it is because the essence of ‘wrong’ necessarily satisfies and applies to the substantive content of ‘torturing kids for fun’. In critique, Killoren :165–173, 2016) has revisited the old skeptical ‘why be moral?’ question and argued that the moral fixed (...)
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  12.  24
    Varieties of skeptical invariantism II.Christos Kyriacou - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12758.
    AbstarctIn the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science-based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science-based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge but still questions parts of our everyday knowledge on the basis of scientific reasons. In particular, we presented Frances’ (...)
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  13.  38
    (1 other version)Evolutionary Debunking: The Demarcation Problem.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (2):175-182.
    Recent literature has paid considerable attention to evolutionary debunking arguments. But the cogency of evolutionary debunking arguments is compromised by a problem for such arguments that has been somewhat overlooked, namely, what we may call ‘the demarcation problem.’ This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. In this paper, I present and explain why in the absence of such a regulative metaepistemic norm any (...)
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  14. Habits-Expressivism About Epistemic Justification.Christos Kyriacou - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):209 - 237.
    Abstract Although expressivist theories have been applied to many normative discourses (moral, rationality, knowledge, etc.), the normative discourse of epistemic justification has been somewhat neglected by expressivists. In this paper, I aspire to both remedy this unfortunate situation and introduce a novel version of expressivist theory: Habits-Expressivism. To pave the way for habits-expressivism, I turn to Allan Gibbard's (1990, 2003, 2008) seminal work on expressivism. I first examine Gibbard's (2003, 2008) late plan-reliance expressivism and argue that it faces certain problems (...)
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  15.  37
    Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered.Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.) - 2021 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    This collection of original essays explores the topic of skeptical invariantism in theory of knowledge. It eschews historical perspectives and focuses on this traditionally underexplored, semantic characterization of skepticism. The book provides a carefully structured, state-of-the-art overview of skeptical invariantism and offers up new questions and avenues for future research. It treats this semantic form of skepticism as a serious position rather than assuming that skepticism is false and attempting to diagnose where arguments for skepticism go wrong. The essays take (...)
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  16. Ought to Believe, Evidential Understanding and the Pursuit of Wisdom.Christos Kyriacou - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 383-406.
    It is almost an epistemological platitude that the goal of inquiry is to pursue truth-acquisition and falsity-avoidance. But further reflection on this dual goal of inquiry reveals that the two (sub)goals are in tension because they are inversely proportionate: the more we satisfy the one (sub)goal the less we satisfy the other and vice versa. I elaborate the inverse proportionality point in some detail and bring out its puzzling implications about the normative question of what one ought to believe. As (...)
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  17.  44
    Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, edited by Nathan Ballantyne and David Dunning.Christos Kyriacou - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):263-268.
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  18.  42
    Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II.Christos Kyriacou - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12739.
    I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent literature: two non‐traditional and one more traditional. On the non‐traditional side are fallibilist science‐based skepticism (which relaxes thestringencyof the (...)
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  19.  30
    The Moral Argument Against Monarchy (Absolute or Constitutional).Christos Kyriacou - 2024 - Res Publica 30 (1):171-182.
    I argue that monarchies, in any possible form (absolute or constitutional), should be abolished once and for all. This is because of the deeply immoral presuppositions such a system of government upholds (implicitly or explicitly). Call this _‘the moral argument against monarchy’_. I identify three basic moral principles that monarchy by definition breaches: ‘the basic moral equality principle’, ‘the basic dignity principle’ and ‘the basic moral desert principle’. Finally, I examine and reply to three objections, including the common objection that (...)
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  20.  33
    Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and COVID-19 irrationalities.Christos Kyriacou & Nicos Stylianou - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1037-1061.
    We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinfo...
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  21. Evolutionary Ruminations on 'the Value of Knowledge Intuition'.Christos Kyriacou - 2011 - In J. Hvorecky T. Hribek (ed.), Knowledge, Value, Evolution. College Publications. pp. 141-155.
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  22.  26
    Moral Fixed Points, Error Theory and Intellectual Vice.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1785-1794.
    Ingram (2015) has argued that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s (2014) ‘moral fixed points’ theory entails that error theorists are conceptually deficient with moral concepts. They are conceptually deficient with moral concepts because they do not grasp moral fixed points (e.g. ‘Torture for fun is pro tanto wrong’). Ingram (2015) concluded that moral fixed points theory cannot substantiate the conceptual deficiency charge and, therefore, the theory is defeated. In defense of moral fixed points theory, Kyriacou (2017a) argued that the theory is coherent (...)
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  23.  46
    Good Guys, Bad Guys: How to Reliably Tell Virtue from Schmirtue.Christos Kyriacou - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):775-786.
    Matti Eklund’s fascinating and wide-ranging Choosing Normative Concepts is an excellent contribution to metaethical debates (and beyond).1 Eklund’s professed di.
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  24.  24
    Is Spinoza's Ethics Metaethically Constructivist?Christos Kyriacou - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (2):131-146.
    Charles Jarrett and P. D. Zuk have argued on independent grounds that Spinoza's Ethics delineates a moral antirealist/constructivist position. I reconstruct their basic arguments, present their textual evidence, and suggest that the evidence is, in principle, compatible with moral realism. As I argue, Jarrett and Zuk have opted for an antirealist/constructivist interpretation of the adduced textual evidence because they tacitly rely on a mistaken metaethical assumption: that relational normativity entails moral antirealism/constructivism. I explain why this is not the case by (...)
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  25.  38
    Two arguments for the incoherence of non-teleological deism.Christos Kyriacou - 2022 - Manuscrito 45 (2):82-117.
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  26.  37
    Richard Rowland, The Normative and the Evaluative.Christos Kyriacou - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (1):82-84.
  27.  30
    (1 other version)Epistemic Contextualism. A Defense.Christos Kyriacou - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):128-135.
    Volume 28, Issue 1, February 2020, Page 128-135.
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  28.  21
    Epistemic justification puzzle.Christos Kyriacou - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    The thesis explores the semantics of epistemic justification discourse, a very important part of overall epistemic discourse. It embarks from a critical examination of referentialist theories to arrive at a certain nonreferential, expressivist approach to the semantics of epistemic justification discourse. That is, it criticizes the main referentialist theories and then goes on to argue for an expressivist approach on the basis of its theoretical capacity to outflank the problems referentialist theories meet. In the end, I also identify some problems (...)
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  29.  86
    How Not to Solve the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem.Christos Kyriacou - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (1-2):101-110.
    Ulrike Heuer (2011) has recently revisited ‘the wrong kind of reasons’ (WKR) problem for buckpassing accounts of value. She suggests that, insofar we want to avoid the problem, we have to abandon orthodox buckpassing accounts that incorporate a fitting attitude analysis of value. Instead, she proposes that we could do with a novel buckpassing account couched in terms of reasons for action. The aim of this paper is to show that the problem both remains in its original form, that is, (...)
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  30.  30
    New Waves in Metaethics – Michael Brady.Christos Kyriacou - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):875-878.
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  31.  43
    Plato, Necessity and Cartesian Scepticism.Christos Kyriacou - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiry 37 (1-2):121-137.
    While contemporary epistemologists consider Cartesian scepticism as a menacing problematic, it seems that Plato scarcely had any Cartesian doubts about knowledge of the extemal world. In this paper I ask why Plato had this cavalier attitude towards Cartesian scepticism. A quick first explanation is that Plato never conceived the challenge of Cartesian scepticism or at least, if he did, he missed the potential threat to empirical knowledge that such a challenge poses. I argue against this explanation and offer an altemative, (...)
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  32. Skeptical Invariantism Revisited.Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
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  33. Review of John MacFarlane. (2014). Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications. Oxford, Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Christos Kyriacou - forthcoming - Dialectica.
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  34.  20
    Matthieu Queloz, the Practical Origins of Ideas. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2021. ISBN: 9780198868705, £72, Hbk. [REVIEW]Christos Kyriacou - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-5.
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  35.  57
    Critical Discussion of David Velleman, Foundations for Moral Relativism, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2013. Pp. x +109. Price: £12.95. [REVIEW]Christos Kyriacou - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):209-214.
    Foundations for Moral Relativism consists of five self-standing, though loosely related, essays on the nature of agency and its metaethical foundations. The essays do not aspire to offer any grand theory of agency or metaethics, but only to lay out some of the foundations for such theories. These foundations portray how agency in general is constructed in the social context of a community, how moral agency in particular is constructed in the social context of a community, and how a derivative (...)
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  36.  39
    John MacFarlane, Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 362 pp., £30 , ISBN 9780199682751. [REVIEW]Christos Kyriacou - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):322-332.
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