From the INTRODUCTION. The measurement of intelligence at the present time is a well recognized part of psychology. The growth of this work and the interest shown in it during the last three decades have been truly remarkable. We have witnessed the establishment of innumerable clinics and the appearance of the "mental tester." This growth has been characterized by the practical considerations of clinical examinations. The need for a psychological examination has been recognized and answers to practical situations have been (...) demanded before the psychologist has really had time to formulate his own conceptions of the whole problem. Theoretical considerations have lagged behind the practical application of mental tests. We have been measuring intelligence long before we have decided as to what intelligence really is. Far from being a drawback, as this at first sight would appear to be, it has in fact proved' to be of distinct advantage, since the measurement of this something, that we have been making, is leading us slowly but surely to a real knowledge of what can with profit be called "general intelligence." Only after considerable work with mental tests did psychologists arrive at the now generally accepted definition of intelligence, as enunciated by Stern, that "Intelligence is a general capacity of an individual consciously to adjust his thinking to new requirements: it is general mental adaptability to new problems and conditions of life." Although even this definition of intelligence may be modified in the future, it serves, at the present time, as a good working hypothesis for the selection of tests for mental measurement. Other conceptions of general intelligence are numerous and many are very similar. Binet, for example, says: "It seems to us that in intelligence there is a fundamental faculty, the alteration or the lack of which is of the utmost importance for practical life. This faculty is judgment, otherwise called good sense, initiative, the faculty of adapting one's self to circumstances. To judge well, to comprehend well, to reason well, these are the essential activities of intelligence." Meumann says general intelligence depends on two qualities, "(1) on the capacity for independent, productive thought (productive, synthetic thinking).... (2).the intensity of the whole mental life." Ebbinghaus makes intelligence include abstraction and the ability to compare and contrast. Burt says that the result of his work "strongly suggests that it is one feature or function of attentive consciousness which forms the basis of intelligence, namely, the power of readjustment to relatively novel situations by organizing new psycho-physical co-ordinations." And lastly Hart and Spearman look upon general intelligence as a "common factor" or "central tendency" not exactly definable, but entering into all sorts of mental activities to a greater or less degree. In addition to these hypotheses as to the nature of intelligence, theoretical considerations as to the growth of intelligence and the general distribution of the various grades of intelligence are arising as a direct result of the practical work being done. Questions as to the rate of increase in normal mentality are being raised, and the theoretical assumptions, upon which we base our classification of individuals into different groups, are being discussed. (shrink)

"Ist der Mensch in seinem Denken und Handeln ein geistig freies Wesen oder steht er unter dem Zwange einer rein naturgesetzlichen ehernen Notwendigkeit? Auf wenige Fragen ist so viel Scharfsinn gewendet worden als auf diese. Die Idee der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens hat warme Anhänger wie hartnäckige Gegner in reicher Zahl gefunden. Ein und dasselbe Ding wird hier gleich oft für das kostbarste Gut der Menschheit wie für die ärgste Illusion erklärt." Rudolf Steiner (Gröls-Klassiker - Edition Werke der Weltliteratur).

Available for the first time in 20 years, here is the Rudolf Carnap's famous principle of tolerance by which everyone is free to mix and match the rules of ...

Relying on Husserl as well as on the reflections by Merleau-Ponty on Cézanne, Henry on Kandinsky and Deleuze on Bacon, this essay sketches some basic problems that arise in a phenomenological account of non-figurative painting. An investigation of the distinction between phenomenological and pictorial perception, of the transposition of the painter’s mode of perception into a painted image, and of the expressive force of paintings inevitably confronts one with the enigma of the appearing of something invisible. The essay proceeds in (...) three steps. The first step describes pictorial perception in terms of a ‘seeing according to’. Such a mode of perception pays attention to visual ambiguities, to the ‘gaze of things’ and to the conditions of visibility that are ordinarily overlooked. The second step moves on to the issue of the transposition of a pictorial perception in a painted image. Deleuze’s account of “manipulated chance” proves to be very helpful here. In the final step, Henry’s and Deleuze’s emphasis on the painting’s expression of totally invisible ‘forces’ is discussed. (shrink)

APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...) (or premises)." Furthermore, all principles and theorems of inductive logic are analytic, and the entire system is to be constructed by means of symbolic logic and semantic methods. This means that the author confines himself to the formalistic procedures of word and symbol systems. The resulting sentence or language structures are presumed to separate off logic from all subjectivist or psychological elements. Despite the abstractionism, the claim is made that if an inductive probability system of logic can be constructed it will have its practical application in mathematical statistics, and in various sciences. 16-page bibliography. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In this illuminating study of Kant's theory of imagination and its role in interpretation, Rudolf A. Makkreel argues against the commonly held notion that Kant's transcendental philosophy is incompatible with hermeneutics. The charge that Kant's foundational philosophy is inadequate to the task of interpretation can be rebutted, explains Makkreel, if we fully understand the role of imagination in his work. In identifying this role, Makkreel also reevaluates the relationship among Kant's discussions of the feeling of life, common sense, and (...) the purposiveness of history. (shrink)

This is identical with the first edition (see 21: 2716) except for the addition of a Supplement containing 5 previously published articles and the bringing of the bibliography (now 73 items) up to date. The 5 added articles present clarifications or modifications of views expressed in the first edition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Since its publication fifty years ago, this work has established itself as a classic. It casts the visual process in psychological terms and describes the creative way one's eye organizes visual material according to specific psychological premises. In 1974 this book was revised and expanded, and since then it has continued to burnish Rudolf Arnheim's reputation as a groundbreaking theoretician in the fields of art and psychology.

From the contents: Philosophie, Politik und Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: zur Frage der Philosophie in Osterreich und Deutschland (B. Smith). - Facts, truths and the ontology of logical realism (H. Hochberg). - Franz Brentano und die Wiederentdeckung der Intentionalitat Richtigstellung herkommlicher Missverstandnisse und Missdeutungen (M. Antonelli). - Erneuerung der Philosophia Perennis: uber die ersten vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos (W. Sauer). - Confessions of a Meinongian logician (D. Jacquette). - Lewis and Sylvan on noneism (A. Witherall). - What is it to compose a musical (...) work (M.E. Reicher).". (shrink)

This volume provides a valuable discussion of Husserl's lifelong project of the critique of science which makes no attempt to conflate the pre-World War I ...

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Knapp sechs Jahre nach Rudolf Heinz' sechzigstem Geburtstag und dem auf dieses Ereignis ausgerichteten Erscheinen der Festschrift "Kontiguitäten. Texte-Festival für Rudolf Heinz" (Christoph Weismüller [Hg.] unter Mitarbeit von Ralf Bohn, Wien: Passagen 1997) folgt die Nachbearbeitung der "Kontiguitäten" und deren Produktion. Die Post-Skripts zum Texte-Festival für Rudolf Heinz setzen ein mit den Dokumenten der Feierlichkeit der Festschriftüberreichung: Laudatio, Geburtstagskomposition - inklusive Audio-CD -, Photographien der Festschriftübergabe. Unter dem topos Festschrift-Mechané folgt diesen Initialien die Korrespondenz von Heide Heinz (...) und Christoph Weismüller nebst notwendigen Paraphrasen und Hinweisen. Die Après nehmen einschlägige Kontiguitäts-Effekte auf, die mit der Fertigstellung der Festschrift, der Feierlichkeit der Übergabe, ihrer Distribution und ersten Nachbearbeitungen ihrer Konstitution einhergingen oder diesen folgten. Die Katamnese von Heide Heinz und Rudolf Heinz sowie weitere Korrespondenzen - Heide Heinz mit Ralf Bohn, Doris Dorner, Axel Schünemann; Rudolf Heinz mit Manfred Pohlen - finden sich als Zuträge ein. (shrink)

A portrait of scholastic approaches to a qualified disagreement of opinions, focusing on the antagonism of scholastic probabilism and anti-probabilism in the early modern era.

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

Rudolf Arnheim has been known, since the publication of his groundbreaking _Art and Visual Perception_ in 1974, as an authority on the psychological interpretation of the visual arts. Two anniversary volumes celebrate the landmark anniversaries of his works in 2009. In _The Power of the Center_, Arnheim uses a wealth of examples to consider the factors that determine the overall organization of visual form in works of painting, sculpture, and architecture. _The Dynamics of Architectural Form_ explores the unexpected perceptual (...) consequences of architecture with Arnheim's customary clarity and precision. (shrink)

Das Ziel: Konstitutionssystem der Begriffe Das Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchungen ist die Aufstellung eines erkenntnismäßig-logischen Systems der ...

In the fall of 1957 the University of California Press expanded Arnheim’s 1933 book _Film_ by four essays and brought that landmark work back into print as _Film as Art._ Now nearly fifty years after that re-edition, the book continues to occupy an important place in the literature of film. Arnheim’s method, provocative in this age of technological wizardry, was to focus on the way art in film was derived from that medium’s early limitations: no sound, no color, no three-dimensional (...) depth. (shrink)

'My endeavour in these pages is to explain the main features of the method of philosophizing which we, the Vienna Circle, use, and by using try to develop further. It is the method of the logical analysis of science, or more precisely, of the syntactical analysis of scientific language.... The purpose of the book -- as of the lectures -- is to give a first impression of our method and of the direction of our questions and investigations to those who (...) are not yet acquainted with them.' -- From the Preface. (shrink)

A basic system of inductive logic; An axiomatic foundation for the logic of inductive generalization; A survey of inductive systems; On the condition of partial exchangeability; Representation theorems of the de finetti type; De finetti's generalizations of excahngeability; The structure of probabilities defined on first-order languages; A subjectivit's guide to objective chance.

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Clear, comprehensive, intermediate introduction to logical languages, applications of symbolic logic to physics, mathematics, biology.