Le Discours de la Méthode oppose explicitement « faire voir » à «enseigner». À ce propos il s'agit ici de déterminer la fonction et la signification de ces verbes dans le contexte de la communication d'un savoir. Ce Discours, plutôt que de simplement transmettre des principes généraux, veut, par le truchement du tableau d'une vie présenté sous la forme d'une « histoire » ou d'une « fable », susciter chez le lecteur l'idée correspondante de la recherche et de la découverte (...) par soi-même. Aussi, sur le plan discursif, la première catégorie verbale, au lieu d'être une attribution est une attribution différée. Ce procédé sémiotique correspond à la thèse cartésienne selon laquelle l'acquisition d'une vérité implique examen et approbation de la part du destinataire.The Discours de la Méthode explicitely opposes "to show" to "to teach". In this connection, we want here to determine the function and the meaning of these verbs in the context of the transmission of knowledge. The Discours, instead of simply conveying general principles, endeavors, through the picture of a life displayed as a "history" or "fable", to give rise to the corresponding ideas of research and discovery in the reader himself. On the discursive level, the first verbal category, far from naming the ascription of an achieved state, must be understood as the delayed attribution of that state. This semiotic procedure corresponds to the Cartesian thesis according to which the acquisition of a truth involves examination and approval on the part of the addressee. (shrink)

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously (...) hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. (shrink)

This is an account of a reading project that began in February 2020. Australia was burning, a pandemic was simmering, the two of us were early in our PhD journeys at the Melbourne Law School. Already, we felt exhausted by critical theory which seemed to amplify the affects we felt all too intensely. Our reading project began as an attempt to find and inhabit texts that might move beyond critique, that might allow us to find wonder and vitality in legal (...) theory. Taking up the literary critic Rita Felski’s invitation to craft a post-critical reading practice, our reading list evolved iteratively to encompass themes and concerns that we identified as possibly correlating with said practice. It evolved too, in conversation with Melbourne, as the city journeyed through different stages of the pandemic. Constantly changing restrictions changed the ways in which we met and conversed, influencing in turn the texts we chose to read and the manner in which we read them. In this account, we pay attention to the time and place of our encounters with these interlocutors, and to the feelings these encounters generated. As such, this article takes the form of a series of (revised) diary entries: first written in 2020, then revisited in the corresponding months of 2021. What we hope emerges from these entries is a sense of how these theoretical texts train us to live in a world undergoing a compounding series of crises – and, perhaps, to imagine that world otherwise. In a more jurisprudential register, we hope that our experiment will identify the methods these texts might give us for (re-)engaging with law in a spirit of wonder and vitality. (shrink)

A bold and insightful departure from related texts, _Descartes_ goes beyond the categorical associations placed on the philosopher’s ideas, and explores the subtleties of his beliefs. An elegant, compelling and insightful introduction to Descartes' life and work. Discusses a broad range of his most scrutinized philosophical thought, including his contributions to logic, philosophy of the mind, epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of religion. Explores the subtleties of Descartes' seemingly contradictory beliefs. Addresses themes left unexamined in other (...) works on Descartes. (shrink)

ArgumentLudwik Antoni Birkenmajer (1855-1929), following along the paths pioneered by Leopold Prowe, Maximilian Curtze, Franz Hipler, and J. L. E. Dreyer, joined them as trailblazers of Copernican scholarship in the nineteenth century. Educated in the classics and mathematics, Birkenmajer began by examining more closely the Cracow background to Copernicus's development and studying his works and annotations in books he owned or read. Birkenmajer contributed many discoveries that eventually became common knowledge, and his studies loomed over Polish research on Copernicus into (...) the 1970s. Focusing on historical context and his original insights, the essay reminds readers of his contributions (sections 1–2), relates them to discussions of Copernicus's precursors (section 3), to the debate about Maragha precedents (section 4), his reading of theUppsala Notebook(sections 2 and 5), and his account of the origin of Copernicus's heliocentrism (section 6). By means of a more critical assessment of his interpretation, the essay revises earlier accounts, rescuing the original insights that mark Birkenmajer's most important contributions to current debates and his efforts to reconstruct Copernicus's path to heliocentrism. (shrink)

O Tratado da Felicidade (ou Tratado da Bem-Aventurança), escrito por Tomás de Aquino como parte de sua Suma de Teologia, procura determinar qual é o fim último da vida humana, ou seja, o bem supremo da vida humana, e quais são os outros bens que não podem ser isso de nenhum modo. Tomás mostra conhecer uma divisão tríplice dos bens do homem, que inclui os bens exteriores, os bens do corpo e os bens da alma. A estes Tomás acrescenta um (...) tipo de bem que podemos chamar de “intermediário”, na medida em que se situa acima do homem e abaixo de Deus, e consiste no universo e nos anjos. Certamente, Tomás se refere também a Deus. No entanto, há mais um tipo de bem que Tomás menciona neste Tratado. É o bem em comum, ou bem em geral. Neste artigo, procurarei mostrar como Tomás de Aquino trata desses seis tipos de bens no Tratado da Felicidade, e indicarei se esse tratamento confirma ou não algumas teses de alguns estudiosos de Tomás de Aquino, como, por exemplo, a tese de que o homem não tem nenhum fim último natural. (shrink)

Este ensaio examina quatro tradições sobre guerra e paz que se desenvolveram na história cristã. São elas: Pacifismo, Guerra Justa, Guerra Total, e Comunidade Mundial. O Pacifismo caracterizou os primeiros cristãos; a Guerra Justa apareceu no fim do quarto século e no quinto século; a Guerra Total, no século 11; e a Comunidade Mundial começou no século 16. Todas as quatro posições continuam hoje e são sustentadas por pessoas que sinceramente se chamam a si mesmas de cristãs.

The prelims comprise: Half Title Title Copyright Contents preface.

Neste artigo, pretendo expor o texto de um capítulo do livro Scholasticism and Politics, do filósofo francês Jacques Maritain (1882-1973). Este livro está em inglês e nunca foi traduzido ao português. O capítulo visado se chama “Christianity and earthly civilizations” - “Cristianismo e civilizações terrenas”. Ele é dividido em quatro seções: 1) A Igreja e o mundo, 2) Civilizações de origem pré-medieval, 3) Civilização Ocidental, e 4) Tentativas de novas civilizações. Farei a tradução ou uma paráfrase do texto, indicando seus (...) principais pontos e as conexões implícitas com outros textos de Maritain. Assim, facilitarei a leitura e a compreensão do sentido imediato do texto por leitores de língua portuguesa, o que é pré-requisito para uma avaliação crítica dele. A filosofia de Maritain é chamada por ele mesmo de filosofia cristã, isto é, uma filosofia que amplia seu escopo para considerar conceitos que são mais próprios da teologia cristã, principalmente no campo da filosofia moral e política. No século XX, Maritain teve muitos adeptos e admiradores brasileiros. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Half Title Title Copyright Contents preface.

The prelims comprise: Half Title Title Copyright Contents preface.

Visto em perspectiva histórica, o ensinamento de Santo Tomás sobre o desejo natural a Deus foi apenas um interlúdio na tradição agostiniana-escotista. Aqueles que continuam a falar da doutrina dele sobre um desejo natural pela visão "beatífica" dão testemunho da influência viva daquela tradição hoje. Embora ele não possa ser enquadrado na série que liga Santo Agostinho, São Boaventura, Duns Scotus e Domingo de Soto nessa questão, a posição dele não é menos cristã do que a da tradição com a (...) qual ele rompeu. A posição dele, entretanto, irá continuar a parecer incoerente e até mesmo contraditória, enquanto for colocada nos termos daquela tradição, em vez de nos seus próprios termos. (shrink)

Dans Logique du pire, Clément Rosset analyse une causalité conçue sans l’ombre d’une loi transcendantale, qui se fait par l’enchaînement des choses dans l’immanence actuelle. Rosset aperçoit cette causalité immanente dans la psychanalyse de Freud, non dans le concept lacanien du réel. Une telle conception de la causation recoupe celle du hasard, qui indique que les choses sont, tout simplement, sans raison d’être – ce en quoi consiste le tragique. Dans toute l’histoire de la philosophie, le philosophe qui a le (...) plus radicalement compris ce qu’est le hasard fut paradoxalement celui qui le définit comme nécessité absolue : Spinoza, « penseur tragique par excellence ». Nous énonçons et analysons les implications épistémiques et thérapeutiques qui découlent de cette compréhension. (shrink)

Os PCN e o Programa Educação para o Pensar podem colaborar singularmente para a prática do ensino de matemática, uma vez que objetivam desenvolver no aluno um espírito crítico e uma atenção ao contexto no qual se inserem.

The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...) introduces and asseses the philosophical puzzles posed by things persisting through time. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem it explores the following key topics and debates: mereology and identity, including 'Leibniz's Law' the constitution view of identity the 'relative identity' argument concerning identity temporary identity four-dimensionalism, counterpart and mulitiple counterpart theory supervenience the problem of temporary intrinsics the necessity of identity presentism ontological and epistemological criteria for persistence and the difference between them. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessement of the metaphysics of identity. (shrink)

Presenting a fascinating analysis of the idea of what can't be said, this book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion. The author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't be said. The first part looks at the question of whether ineffability is a coherent idea. Part two evaluates two families of arguments regarding whether ineffable states of (...) affairs actually exist: the argument from mysticism and the argument from epistemic boundedness. Part three looks more closely at the relation between mystic and non-mystic stances. In the fourth and final part the author distinguishes five qualitatively different types of ineffability. _Ineffability and Philosophy_ is a significant contribution to this area of research and will be essential reading for philosophers and those researching and studying the philosophy of language. (shrink)

David Bohm and the challenge of a fragmented society.

Why is it that forgetting moral knowledge, unlike other paradigmatic examples of knowledge, seems so deeply absurd? Previous authors have given accounts whereby moral forgetting in itself either is uniformly absurd and impossible (Gilbert Ryle, Adam Bugeja) or is possible and only the speech act is absurd (Sarah McGrath). Considering findings in moral psychology and the experimental philosophy of personal identity, I argue that the knowledge of some moral truths—especially those that are emotional, widely held, subjectively important, and contribute to (...) social relationships—cannot be forgotten because they’re too tightly tied to one’s true self. Moral knowledge at the level of individual propositions, when it does not have these attributes and so is not so tied to the agent’s identity, can sometimes be forgotten. I identify two such cases: (1) where the moral knowledge results partly from an emotional trigger that has been forgotten, and (2) where the moral knowledge results partly from a process of reflection that has been forgotten. (shrink)

This paper supports the contention that the general rules introduced by Hume in the Treatise on Human Nature (THN 1.3.15) are a selection mechanism for inductive inferences, which rejects two sources of inefficiency : (i) from emotional origin, which would reduce the uneasiness coming from a possible failure in the uniformity of nature ; (ii) from cognitive origin, which would tolerate the possible overflow of the imagination on judgment. A growing consensus in recent decades, which distinguishes between two kinds of (...) rules — extensive and corrective — is at the basis of this device. Whereas the extensive rules allow us to go beyond a singular experience and derive a wider range of inferences, the corrective rules, whose command opposes the philosopher to the vulgar, control and rectify the effects of extensive rules alone, so as to eliminate emotional and cognitive inefficiencies, and to make inferences that, borrowing the expression to Peirce, we will designate as abductive. (shrink)

Our reasoning evolved not for finding the truth, but for social bonding and convincing. This book highlights the consequences of these facts for scientific practice, and suggests how to correct the mistakes we still make.