The notion of a correct appreciation of nature, like the one put forward in Carlson’s environmental account, has been rejected by many other authors in the aesthetics of the natural environment. Their critics challenge the idea that only scientific cat- egories can ground the aesthetic appreciation of nature as nature, and they hold that there is not a correct way of appreciating nature. However, they may share with Carlson the idea of correctness under an objectivist paradigm of aesthetic appreciation, according (...) to which correctness means the adequation of the experi- ence to properties of the object. My aim in the article is to claim that it is necessary to endorse an aesthetic standard of correctness that takes into consideration the subjective character of aesthetic appreciation. An aesthetic standard of correct- ness implies universal assent, or validity for everyone in Kantian terms, in place of an objectivist notion. This notion of correctness permits the inclusion of expressive perception of nature as an essential form of aesthetic appreciation. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v38-perez.

Frente al moralismo moderado, este ensayo defiende una forma de autonomismo moderado. Reconoce que en ocasiones la obra de arte excita emociones moralmente inadecuadas sin que ello impida su comprensión, y que esto podría contribuir a la clarificación de nuestra vida mental. El autonomismo moderado sostiene que el carácter autónomo de la obra de arte, representacional o ficcional, permite relajar nuestras exigencias morales. Sólo cuando la falsedad perjudica la verosimilitud se puede producir el fracaso de la obra: no por provocar (...) emociones moralmente inadecuadas, sino al presentar como verdadero en la ficción algo falso o incoherente con la verdad en realidad. /// Against modérate moralism, the essay defends a version of moderate autonomism. It claims that works of art sometimes provoke morally inadequate emotions without preventing the understanding of the work, and that they may serve to clarify mental life. Moderate autonomism holds that the autonomous nature of works of art, as representational or fictional, permits relaxing moral commitment. Only in case of falsehood obstructing verisimilitude, may the work fail, and then, not because of provoking morally wrong responses, but as a result of displaying as truth in fiction something plainly false or incoherent in life. (shrink)

The following article analyzes the development of education plans in home economics and home education between 1920 and 1960 in the case of Chile. From this perspective, it is interesting to investigate the impact on female pedagogical training of the manuals and education programs in home economics and home education between 1920 and 1960, promoted by the different Chilean governments of the period. The results show that these plans and programmes enhanced the training of women in domestic work, contributing to (...) this task from primary, secondary and later university education, it is also noted that the educational policies promoted in the period contributed to strengthen a naturalizing discourse on the relationship. (shrink)

Advocates of the ethical criticism of art claim that works' ethical defects or merits have an impact on their aesthetic value. Against ethical critics, autonomists claim that moral criteria should not be part of the considerations when evaluating works of art as art. Autonomism refers to the view that an artwork's aesthetic value is independent from its ethical value. The purpose of this paper is to examine how autonomism has been defended in the contemporary discussion in analytic aesthetics. I present (...) three versions of autonomism: Richard Posner's radical autonomism, James C. Anderson and Jeffrey T. Dean, and James Harold's moderate autonomism, and Francisca Pérez Carreño's robust autonomism. I argue that robust autonomism offers a stronger argument against the ethical critic. However, I point to some difficulties for Pérez Carreño's account and conclude by suggesting how further work in autonomism might go around them. (shrink)

This study aimed to explore the role of two models of well-being in the prediction of psychological distress during the COVID-19 pandemic, namely PERMA and mature happiness. According to PERMA, well-being is mainly composed of five elements: positive emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning in life, and achievement. Instead, mature happiness is understood as a positive mental state characterized by inner harmony, calmness, acceptance, contentment, and satisfaction with life. Rooted in existential positive psychology, this harmony-based happiness represents the result of living in (...) balance between positive and negative aspects of one's life. We hypothesized that mature happiness would be a more prominent protective factor during the present pandemic than the PERMA composite. A total of 12,203 participants from 30 countries responded to an online survey including the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21), the PERMA-Profiler, and the Mature Happiness Scale-Revised (MHS-R). Confirmatory factor analyses indicated that PERMA and mature happiness were highly correlated, but nonetheless, they represented two separate factors. After controlling for demographic factors and country-level variables, both PERMA Well-being and MHS-R were negative predictors of psychological distress. Mature happiness was a better predictor of stress, anxiety, and general distress, while PERMA showed a higher prediction of depression. Mature happiness moderated the relation between the perceived noxious effects of the pandemic and all markers of distress (depression, anxiety, stress, and total DASS-21). Instead, PERMA acted as a moderator in the case of depression and stress. These findings indicate that inner harmony, according to the mature happiness theory, is an essential facet of well-being to be taken into consideration. The results of this study can also orient policies aimed to alleviate the negative effects of the pandemic on mental health through the promotion of well-being. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has subjected most of the world’s population to unprecedented situations, like national lockdowns, health hazards, social isolation and economic harm. Such a scenario calls for urgent measures not only to palliate it but also, to better cope with it. According to existential positive psychology, well-being does not simply represent a lack of stress and negative emotions but highlights their importance by incorporating an adaptive relationship with them. Thus, suffering can be mitigated by, among other factors, adopting an (...) attitude of positive reframing, maintaining hope, existential courage, life appreciation, engagement in meaningful activities, and prosociality. The conglomerate of these elements has been recently denominated as meaning-centered coping. In this study, we evaluated the protective role of this type of coping on mental health. A sample of 12,243 participants from 30 countries across all continents completed measures of Meaning-Centered Coping Scale, depression, stress, anxiety and stressful COVID-19 related conditions they experienced. Results indicated that meaning-centered coping was strongly associated with diminished symptoms of stress, anxiety, and depression. Moreover, it moderated various relationships between vulnerability factors and markers of psychological distress, especially in the case of depression. These findings call for attention to meaning-centered coping approaches in the context of hardship, such as the current COVID-19 health crisis. In these difficult times, decision-makers and health organizations may integrate these approaches into their guidelines. (shrink)

In this paper I will put forward a simple case of a dynamical system which can exhibit both the indeterminism linked to escape to infinity and that linked to self-excitation. The case depends neither on the gravitational interaction between particles nor on their mutual collisions, and thus reveals the existence of a new kind of constraint that Newton's laws lay on the predictive power of classical dynamics.

In this short note I argue that, using the type of configurations put forward in a recent paper by Laraudogoitia in this same journal, new paradoxes of infinity of a completely different nature can be formulated.

Originally motivated by a sophism, Pardo's discussion about the unity of mental propositions allows him to elaborate on his ideas about the nature of propositions. His option for a non-composite character of mental propositions is grounded in an original view about syncategorems: propositions have a syncategorematic signification, which allows them to signify aliquid aliqualiter, just by virtue of the mental copula, without the need of any added categorematic element. Pardo's general claim about the simplicity of mental propositions is developed into (...) several specific thesis about mental propositions: a) it is not judgement which gives its unity to mental propositions, but judicative acts always follow some previous apprehensive act that is simple in its own right; b) this simplicity is compatible with a certain kind of complexity, that can be explained in terms of the "causal history" of the acts of knowing; c) traditional conceptions about subject and predicate must be recast, while keeping their usual explicative power concerning logical properties; d) of course, the traditional conception about the copula has been modified, giving rise to a fully innovative conception of the nature of mental propositions. Nevertheless, this innovative conception of mental language seems still infected by certain "common sense" prejudices, which lead Pardo to propose also a provocative conception of vocal language, which I consider unnecessary. (shrink)

Participation of end users in decision-making on science is increasingly practiced, as witnessed by the growing body of scientific literature on case evaluations. In the biomedical field, however, end-user participation in decision-making is rare. Some scholars argue that because patients are stakeholders and relevant experts, they could also provide important contributions to decision-making within the field of biomedical research. But what strategies could be used to effectively implement patient participation in decision-making on biomedical research? In this article, we analyze strategies (...) for patient participation and conclude that these can hardly be regarded effective because they do not ensure patients' structural influence on decision-making. We identify obstacles for effective patient participation, which seem to reflect a resilience of the current biomedical decision-making network. We subsequently elaborate on the concept of transition management in the search for clues on how to breach this resilience and change the network toward the inclusion of patients. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample to Bivalence. (...) The motivation for this research is also very specific. We are interested in the apparent violation of Bivalence introduced by vague predicates, and in particular we want to respond to a family of arguments put forward by T. Williamson in support of the idea that allowing for exceptions to Bivalence would be incoherent. We have focused on these arguments for two reasons. On the one hand, what is allegedly threatened by a denial of Bivalence is no less than the very “nature of truth or falsity”. On the other hand, Aristotle is explicitly mentioned as one of the defendants of this “natural” conception of truth, and we are reminded about the connection between Aristotle’s theory and Tarski’s semantic conception. These arguments, therefore, give us an occasion to explore Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of truth and falsity, and to examine its connection with the Tarskian conception of truth. In particular, we would like to question the assumption, which has become a commonplace in the field of analytical philosophy, that Aristotle’s notion of truth can be encoded in the pair of disquotational biconditionals that derive from Tarski’s “T schema”. (shrink)

This paper shows that the general homogeneous solution to equations of evolution for some infinite systems of particles subject to mutual binary collisions does not depend on a single arbitrary constant but on a potentially infinite number of such constants. This is because, as I demonstrate, a single self-excitation of a system of particles can depend on a potentially infinite number of parameters. The recent homogeneous solution obtained by Atkinson and Johnson, which depends on a single arbitrary constant, is only (...) a particular case. (shrink)

En el tercer milenio, en medio de una conciencia generalizada de crisis como resultado de los espectaculares cambios habidos en las dinámicas sociales, en las formas de relacionarse, en los perfiles de las ideologías y hasta en la disposición del hecho religioso, no es extraño que se asuma la vivencia de vacío abierto y lábil. Se han disociado las grandes "certezas" que han dirigido el desarrollo de la humanidad durante los últimos siglos -"la verdad os hará libres" se está transformando (...) en "la libertad os hará la verdad"-, se han disipado los límites y las referencias guía. Son las dinámicas emergentes, encriptadas y por lo general confusas las que vienen a ocupar ese vacío imponiendo sus propios códigos y reglas. Dinámicas que pueden generar desarrollo personal y scial, o, por el contrario, propiciar sufrimiento y vacío existencial. (shrink)

En este trabajo presento dos líneas de argumentación que desembo-can en la tesis eliminativista, una proveniente de consideraciones relativas a la re-lación entre nuestra psicología de sentido común y la ciencia psicológi-ca/neurociencia madura, y otra proveniente de consideraciones metafísicas acerca de la naturaleza de los fenómenos mentales y su interacción causal con el mundo físico, y trato de mostrar la inadecuación de ambas líneas argumentativas. En se-gundo lugar, menciono tres líneas de crítica a los intentos eliminativistas, mos-trando sus debilidades. Finalmente, (...) ofrezco una línea argumentativa alternativa para sostener la implausibilidad del eliminativismo basada en consideraciones acerca de los alcances de un posible cambio conceptual radical en nuestros con-ceptos mentalistas ordinarios que el eliminativismo parece suponer.In this paper I outline two lines of argumentation which lead to the eliminativist thesis, one of them based on a peculiar understanding of the rela-tionship between common sense and scientific knowledge, and the other one based on metaphysical ideas about the nature of mental phenomena and their causal interaction with the physical world. I try to show the inadequacy of both kinds of arguments. In the second place, I review three critics to the eliminativist thesis, showing their flaws. Finally, I offer my own reasons for rejecting elimina-tivism considering the difficulties that a radical conceptual change of our mental-istic concepts like the one supposed by the eliminativist pose. (shrink)

In this paper I shall offer a reconsideration of three main arguments in the current debate on the mind-body problem, on the light of a peculiar way of conceiving mental concepts: I shall defend the view that mental concepts have to be considered as natural kind concepts. In the first part, I shall develop this proposal and in the second part I shall examine Kripke´s arguments against the identity theory, the zombi´s argument against functionalism and Churchland´s argument for eliminativism. I (...) conclude the paper with an sketchy answer to the mind-body problem, in the middle of the road between functionalism and the identity theory. (shrink)