ABSTRACT I argue against both neuropsychological and cognitive accounts of our grasp of numbers. I show that despite the points of divergence between these two accounts, they face analogous problems. Both presuppose too much about what they purport to explain to be informative, and also characterize our grasp of numbers in a way that is absurd in the light of what we already know from the point of view of mathematical practice. Then I offer a positive methodological proposal about the (...) role that cognitive science should play in the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s analysis of the concept of the natural numbers that we are taught in school yields a novel and axiomatically economical way of representing arithmetic in standard set theory—one that helps to answer Benacerraf’s objection from extraneous content as well as Wittgenstein’s objection from unsurveyability. After describing Kripke’s proposal in some detail, we examine it in the light of work by Quine, Steiner, Parsons, Boolos and Burgess. Although the primary aim of this paper is to present and explicate Kripke’s (...) view, we conclude by discussing some of the issues that are faced by Kripke’s proposal, so that the reader can get a sense of the geography of these issues. (shrink)

David Liebesman argues that we never count by identity. He generalizes from an argument that we don't do so with sentences indicating fractions, or with measurement sentences on their supposed count readings. In response, I argue that measurement sentences aren't covered by the thesis that we count by identity, in part because they don't have count readings. Then I use the data to which Liebesman appeals, in his argument that we don't count by identity using measurement sentences, in order to (...) rebut his argument that we don't count by identity using sentences indicating fractions. (shrink)

Extensive Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Representation and Epistemology.

Clarke and Beck's view that numbers are both second-order and sensible is based on an empirically dubious claim, which is required to show that what they call the “weak sensitivity principle” is satisfied. The explanatory benefits that they say are gained by positing a sensory relation to numbers are also gained by positing such a relation to multitudes of objects.

Technologic advances mean automated, wearable cameras are now feasible for investigating health behaviors in a public health context. This paper attempts to identify and discuss the ethical implications of such research, in relation to existing guidelines for ethical research in traditional visual methodologies. Research using automated, wearable cameras can be very intrusive, generating unprecedented levels of image data, some of it potentially unflattering or unwanted. Participants and third parties they encounter may feel uncomfortable or that their privacy has been affected (...) negatively. This paper attempts to formalize the protection of all according to best ethical principles through the development of an ethical framework. Respect for autonomy, through appropriate approaches to informed consent and adequate privacy and confidentiality controls, allows for ethical research, which has the potential to confer substantial benefits on the field of health behavior research. (shrink)

Marcus Giaquinto claims that finite cardinal numbers are sensible properties, and that the smallest ones are known by acquaintance. In this paper I compare Giaquinto’s epistemology to the Russellian one with which it invites comparison, before showing how it is subject to a version of Jody Azzouni’s “epistemic role” objection. Then I argue that the source of this problem is Giaquinto’s misconception that numbers, like quantities, are sensible properties. Finally, I offer a sketch of a theory of how we grasp (...) finite cardinals on the assumption that they are not sensible, and show why this is not subject to the epistemic role objection. (shrink)

How is metaphysics related to the empirical sciences? Should metaphysics in general be guided by the sources, methods and results of the sciences? And what about the special case of the metaphysics of the social world: should it likewise be guided by the sources, methods and results of the social sciences? In her paper “Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics?”, K. Hawley raises the question: If we are sympathetic to the project of naturalising metaphysics, how should we approach (...) the metaphysics of the social world? She proceeds by discussing three approaches to social metaphysics: inference to the best explanation from current social science, descriptive conceptual analysis, and normative, especially ‘ameliorative’ projects. At the end of her discussion, she reaches a rather pessimistic conclusion, especially as regards the IBE approach: “a number of phenomena indicate that the prospects for securely basing social metaphysics via inference to the best explanation from social science are currently faint. […] We need to look elsewhere if we are to develop a metaphysics of the social world.” In my comments on her paper, I try to re-animate the program of an inductive metaphysics by defending the idea that the method of inference to the best explanation should be the central method of justification for metaphysics in general and for social metaphysics in particular. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to make two main points. The first point is methodological: Instead of attempting to give a classical analysis or reductive definition of the term “expertise”, we should attempt an explication and look for what may be called symptoms of expertise. What this comes to will be explained in due course. My second point is substantial: I want to recommend understanding as an important symptom of expertise. In order to give this suggestion content, I begin to (...) develop an account of understanding. Finally, I will draw attention to some consequences of this approach. (shrink)

What are experts? Are there only experts in a subjective sense or are there also experts in an objective sense? And how, if at all, may non-experts recognize experts in an objective sense? In this paper, I approach these important questions by discussing Alvin I. Goldman's thoughts about how to define objective epistemic authority and about how non-experts are able to identify experts. I argue that a multiple epistemic desiderata approach is superior to Goldman's purely veritistic approach.

Mein Beitrag behandelt zentrale Probleme der Methodologie der Textinterpretation im Lichte der neueren Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie. Nach Vorbemerkungen zum Begriff der Interpretation wende ich mich den Methoden der Bildung und kritischen Prüfung von Interpretationshypothesen zu. Wie ist das Verhältnis von Daten und Hypothesen im Falle der Textinterpretation? Wie können Interpretationshypothesen epistemisch gerechtfertigt bzw. gestützt werden? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen untersuche ich die Anwendung der Hypothetisch-Deduktiven Methode und der Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung auf die Textinterpretation. Der Vergleich zeigt, (...) dass die Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung vorzuziehen ist. (shrink)

In this essay, the enlightenment is not considered as a bygone age, but as a systematic epistemological, moral and political program that can, in principle, be pursued at any time. Since Kant has done most to clarify this program, his philosophy may serve as a starting point for discussion of the questions: How do the leading ideas of the enlightenment hang together? How are they justified?

The paper aims at clarifying the relationship between philosophy of science, epistemology and metaphysics. I begin with a characterization of philosophy. Philosophy as a second order discipline differs from any of the individual sciences. Typically, it attempts to answer questions of the form "How is it possible that p?". Next I present the aims and tasks of epistemology, before, finally, I turn to the relationship between philosophy of science and epistemology. At this point, metaphysics enters the scene. It turns out (...) that philosophy of science includes three different projects that result from philosophy's being a second order discipline. Applied to the sciences, a second order discipline is possible in three different forms that complement one another. _German_ Ziel meines Aufsatzes ist es, das ungeklärte Verhältnis zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie, Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik zu klären. Dazu muss zunächst etwas über den Charakter der Philosophie gesagt werden. Philosophie ist als eine Disziplin zweiter Ordnung von jeder Einzelwissenschaft verschieden. Insbesondere versucht sie,,Was ist F?"-Fragen und,,Wie möglich?"-Fragen zu beantworten. Anschließend stelle ich die Ziele und Aufgaben der Erkenntnistheorie vor und gehe schließlich auf das Verhältnis zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie ein; dabei kommt die Metaphysik ins Spiel. Es zeigt sich, dass die Wissenschaftstheorie drei unterschiedliche Projekte umfaßt, die sich ganz folgerichtig aus dem Charakter der Philosophie als einer Disziplin zweiter Stufe ergeben. In Anwendung auf die Wissenschaften ist eine Disziplin zweiter Stufe in drei einander ergänzenden Formen möglich. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the nature of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic? I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and (...) to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the nature of the pictorial. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory. (shrink)

Most writing on informed consent in Africa highlights different cultural and social attributes that influence informed consent practices, especially in research settings. This review presents a composite picture of informed consent in Nigeria using empirical studies and legal and regulatory prescriptions, as well as clinical experience. It shows that Nigeria, like most other nations in Africa, is a mixture of sociocultural entities, and, notwithstanding the multitude of factors affecting it, informed consent is evolving along a purely Western model. Empirical studies (...) show that 70–95% of Nigerian patients report giving consent for their surgical treatments. Regulatory prescriptions and adjudicated cases in Nigeria follow the Western model of informed consent. However, adversarial legal proceedings, for a multiplicity of reasons, do not play significant roles in enforcing good medical practice in Nigeria. Gender prejudices are evident, but not a norm. Individual autonomy is recognized even when decisions are made within the family. Consent practices are influenced by the level of education, extended family system, urbanization, religious practices, and health care financing options available. All limitations notwithstanding, consent discussions improved with increasing level of education of the patients, suggesting that improved physician's knowledge and increasing awareness and education of patients can override other influences. Nigerian medical schools should restructure their teaching of medical ethics to improve the knowledge and practices of physicians. More research is needed on the preferences of the Nigerian people regarding informed consent so as to adequately train physicians and positively influence physicians' behaviors. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Philosophie de l'action *.

We show that the fundamental legal structure of a well-written financial contract follows a state-transition logic that can be formalized mathematically as a finite-state machine (specifically, a deterministic finite automaton or DFA). The automaton defines the states that a financial relationship can be in, such as “default,” “delinquency,” “performing,” etc., and it defines an “alphabet” of events that can trigger state transitions, such as “payment arrives,” “due date passes,” etc. The core of a contract describes the rules by which different (...) sequences of events trigger particular sequences of state transitions in the relationship between the counterparties. By conceptualizing and representing the legal structure of a contract in this way, we expose it to a range of powerful tools and results from the theory of computation. These allow, for example, automated reasoning to determine whether a contract is internally coherent and whether it is complete relative to a particular event alphabet. We illustrate the process by representing a simple loan agreement as an automaton. (shrink)