Tziporah Kasachkoff received her doctorate in philosophy from New York University, teaches at The City University of New York, and has been a visiting professor at Ben Gurion University in the Negev, in Israel. Dr. Kasachkoff has published widely in applied philosophy and, since 1986, has been the editor of the American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy.

This practical guide for teaching philosophy brings together essays by two dozen distinguished philosophers committed to pedagogy. Addressing primarily practical issues, such as how to motivate students, construct particular courses, and give educational exams, the essays also touch on theoretical issues such as whether moral edification is a proper goal of teaching ethics.

PHILOSOPHICAL defenses of the intelligibility of religious utterances, and of the tenability of religious beliefs, have come more and more to appeal to the Wittgensteinian claim that concepts must be understood in terms of the forms of life which give rise to them.

PHILOSOPHICAL defenses of the intelligibility of religious utterances, and of the tenability of religious beliefs, have come more and more to appeal to the Wittgensteinian claim that concepts must be understood in terms of the forms of life which give rise to them.

Discussion concerning the meaning and analysis of “punishment” has centered, in large measure, on claims for a logical connection between “punishment” and “guilt.” However, more and more in the literature focus has shifted from guilt as the defining feature of “punishment” to guilt as only one of many constitutive conditions satisfaction of which is necessary for standard cases with allowance made for other correct, though secondary, uses of the term.

Here, two dozen distinguished philosophers share their insights and practical suggestions on a diverse range of pedagogic issues with essays on how to motivate students, constructing syllabi for particular courses, teaching particularly complex concepts, and constructing creative examinations.

THERE have been several attempts in recent philosophical discussion to present criteria for determining which words have ontological implications. I am going to concern myself with one attempt. The paradigm case argument has been appealed to in philosophical disputes ranging over such wide problem-areas as ‘other minds’, ‘freedom and determinism’ and ‘epistemological scepticism’. Reference has been made to paradigm cases in answering philosophers’ claims that ‘I can never know that another person is in pain’, ‘There are no acts of free-will’ (...) and ‘I can never know anything for certain’. (shrink)

Part of the ‘Studies in Philosophical Psychology’ series, Sense and Delusion is a little book which is surprising, enjoyable, interesting and, at times, disappointing. It consists of five brief essays, three by Ilham Dilman and two by D Z Phillips. The theme of the first two essays, a theme usually associated with ‘existential thought’ but not so usually treated by those philosophers of the so-called ‘analytic’ school, is ‘What is the meaning of life?’ along with the attendant issues ‘What is (...) it to question the meaningfulness of a person’s life?’ and ‘What is it to question and/or be mistaken about the meaningfulness of one’s own life?’. The succeeding two chapters ask what is involved in the notion of self-deception as it applies to the worth-whileness of one’s existence. And the last chapter devotes itself to a discussion of what it means to take a moral stance, have moral opinions, and be merely concerned. (shrink)

Online social networks (OSN) have become a part of our daily lives whether they are used for socialization and communication or to promote business interests. OSN have become an important tool for businesses to advertise, create brand awareness, and promote their products and services. Business use of OSN for advertising purposes is highly reliant on targeted ads which display advertisements to OSN users based on their demographics and use of OSN, apps, and websites. Thus, one of the most valuable commodities (...) of OSN is the population of users and the information they share. To investigate the relationship between OSN site use, use of privacy settings, and how they relate to profile disclosure, a model is built based on the theory of reasoned action and the privacy calculus model. To validate the model, a survey is conducted and the results are analyzed with partial least squares. Risk and benefit were both shown to be significant antecedents of attitude. Both attitude and subjective norm, from the theory of reasoned action model, significantly affected OSN site use, while omitting intentions. OSN site use was significantly related to both profile disclosure and use of privacy settings. Last, use of privacy settings significantly affected profile disclosure. These results imply that use of privacy settings does not decrease the rate of disclosure. Giving users tools to protect their private information is important in protecting the privacy of OSN users, and it will lead to increases in safe disclosure of information helping OSN target ads effectively. (shrink)

TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF’S most welcome and valuable attack on D Z Phillips’ ‘internalist’ defence of his strange forms of fideism closes with these words.

An explanation of how to organize and teach a course in recent continental thought, including treatments of the major figures in critical theory, hermeneutics, structuralism, deconstruction, psychoanalytic feminism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and postmodernism. Reprint from *In the Socratic Tradition: Essays on Teaching Philosophy*, ed. Tziporah Kasachkoff (Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).

Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) critique the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), but the model that they critique is a stripped-down version that should be called the “possum” model. They make three charges about the possum model that are not true about the social intuitionist model: that it includes no role for reasoning, that it reduces social influence to compliance, and that it does not take a developmental perspective. After I defend the honor of the social intuitionist model, I raise (...) two areas of legitimate dispute: the scope and nature of moral reasoning, and the usefulness of appealing to innate ideas, rather than to learning and reasoning, as the origin of moral knowledge. I present three clusters of innate moral intuitions, related to sympathy, hierarchy, and reciprocity. (shrink)