Uvodno poglavje je pregled razprav o svobodi spod peresa določenih nevrofiziologov iz Nemčije. V tem okviru lahko pridemo do zaključka, da ni potrebna vrzel v vzročnosti narave, da bi lahko obstajalo nekaj takega kot svoboda. V tem oziru so Libetovi eksperimenti nekonsistentni. Svoboda je v bistvenem smislu prostost od določenosti volje po volji drugega. In svoboda ima enako kot človekova zavest bistveno družbeno formo. To pa še ne pomeni, da lahko podamo oris naravne zgodovine svobode, zgodovine, v kateri bi neizogiben (...) razvoj človeškega bitja in neomejena svoboda gibanja predstavljala bistveni razvojni fazi. Pričujoči članek je tako poskus razumevanja svobode v perspektivi zgodovine evolucije.In an introductory chapter I canvass a discussion concerning freedom which has been introduced, in Germany, by certain neurophysiologists. I conclude, with regard to this discussion, that no gap in the causality of nature is required in order for there to be freedom. In this respect, then, the Libet experiments prove inconclusive. Freedom is, essentially, freedom from the determination of one’s will by the will of others. And like human consciousness, freedom has an essentially social form. This, however, does not preclude that we may make a sketch of the natural history of freedom, a history in which the unfettered development of a living being and an uninhibited freedom of movement represent essential stages. This essay makes a case for placing the social and political understanding of freedom in the perspective of the history of evolution. (shrink)

In the opening of this paper I argue, contrary to a notion commonly found in the humanities and social sciences above all, and ironically yet not any less resolutely for all that, that in fact nature still exists. Subsequently I criticize the arguably more prevalent conviction that culture stands in opposition to nature. In contrast I argue for the thesis that culture is nothing more or less than a specific form of life that can only develop within nature. More than (...) this: it can only ever develop as nature; and it can only accomplish this with nature. This is shown by examples for the case of technology, which was decisive for the emergence of culture. Every technology can only start by using natural means. Hence we can show that we can only ever understand culture as a part of nature that differentiates itself, like all parts of nature, according to the external and internal conditions of that particular life. Thus culture is one of the countless evolutionary products of nature. (shrink)

The basis for the secrecy is equally apparent, being furnished by Kant a bit later: it could, he suggests, damage the repute of governments to take counsel in foreign affairs from their “subjects.” As a consequence, what can only be publicly executed ought to be agreed on previously in strict secrecy. The state may thus only “tacitly... summon its citizens” to “publicly discuss the general maxims of warfare and peacemaking”. Quite superfluously, a few lines later Kant expressly concedes that “no (...) particular agreement... in this particular point” is needed, corresponding as it does to the imperative of general “human reason.” The public status here openly endowed with secrecy thus has as its object nothing less than something morally and legally self-evident. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Reason as an Organ of the Body The Body as the Instrument of Reason The Paradox of Aesthetic Concepts Hatred of the Body The Meaning of the Body The Living Body and its Ego An “Unknown Wise Man” between Body and Ego.

Philosophisches Jahrbuch, Bd.2/2021, 128. Jahrgang.