This chapter contains sections titled: Aesthetic preservationism Aesthetic value The biophilia hypothesis What is an aesthetic response to nature? Perceiving nature as nature Positive aesthetics Mixed and influenced environments Conclusion.

I define "perfect realism" as a style of replicative sculpture: exact replicas of inanimate objects or humans. Differentiating perfect realism from "photo" or "super" realism, and from representation, I criticize various defenses of this type of art. I argue that to understand perfect realism we need a theory of replication, which I sketch. Part of the account involves X (a replica) causing the perceptual experience that it is a Y when it is not. Hence perfect realism turns on the generic (...) identities of things; it involves a metaphysical exploration of the way we constitute everyday reality. (shrink)

It is difficult to place jazz within a philosophy of music dominated by the concepts and practices of classical music. One key puzzle concerns the nature and role, if any, of musical works in jazz. I briefly describe the debate between those who deny that there are musical works in jazz (Kania) and those who affirm that there are such (Dodd and others). I argue that musical works are performed in jazz but that jazz performance of works is very different (...) from performance of classical music works. The first step toward resolving the puzzle is to embrace the descriptive concept of a musical work and reject inappropriate normative concepts of a musical work. In particular, I argue against the accounts of musical works by Kania and Goehr, each of which implies a no-works thesis for jazz performance. I contrast the norms governing work performance in classical music with the practices governing performances of works in jazz, which I call realization or staging. Finally, I propose a model of jazz appreciation that incorporates a role for jazz works and that differs from the appreciation of classical music. (shrink)

The last twenty years or so have seen a surge of interest in the philosophy of music. However there is comparatively little philosophical literature devoted specifically to songs, singing and vocal music in general. This new collection of essays on the philosophical aspects of song and singing includes articles on the relationship between words and music in songs, the ontology of songs and recordings, meaning in songs, the metaphysics of vocal music in opera and the movies, and the ethical challenges (...) raised in song performance. The essays discuss a large range of examples, including rock, lieder, jazz songs, blues, doo wop, and rap. New essays by leading philosophers of art, including Peter Kivy (on "realistic song" in film), Jerrold Levinson (on jazz singing), Lee B. Brown (on the "minstrel hypothesis" in popular music), and Ted Gracyk (on linguistic pragmatics and song meaning). Papers that offer ground-breaking theories of the appreciation of rock recordings, the ethical implications of popular songs, the ontology of ephemeral artworks, the ontological status of cover versions, and of how a genre of popular music can both express and be a function of its social context papers that challenge existing accounts of much-debated topics, including operatic metaphysics and of the ontology of recorded music. Interdisciplinary essays that cut across aesthetics, philosophy of music, cultural music studies and musicology. Essays that are clearly written and engaging. (shrink)

The question ‘Is it worth it?’, as originally applied to artworks by Tolstoy and here reintroduced by Sheila Lintott, opens a fruitful avenue for understanding land art. It is, however, a question...

Natural environments differ from artworks in two ways: (a) they are surroundings filled with objects, processes, and the observer, (b) they are natural, not intentionally created to be appreciated. I show that this serious problem for accounts of aesthetic appreciation of nature has led many thinkers in environmental aesthetics (e.g., Carlson and Rolston) to claim that appreciators should be actively engaged with a natural environment. But how? One suggestion has been that appreciators play the role of creative performers in the (...) arts. I explore this analogy, distinguishing three different kinds of performance. I argue that none is a good fit as a model of nature appreciation but that the analogy sheds considerable light on environmental art, especially the site-specific artworks of Andy Goldsworthy. (shrink)

Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas artificial intelligence is attempting to explain the knowledge (...) (competence) required to understand texts. Moreover, a dilemma is sketched for the argument: either Searle hasn't identified the appropriate subject of understanding or he may understand after all. Finally, I question the underlying assumption that the general definition of mental states requires a projectable‐by‐us first person point of view. (shrink)

Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas artificial intelligence is attempting to explain the knowledge (...) (competence) required to understand texts. Moreover, a dilemma is sketched for the argument: either Searle hasn't identified the appropriate subject of understanding or he may understand after all. Finally, I question the underlying assumption that the general definition of mental states requires a projectable‐by‐us first person point of view. (shrink)

The philosophy of chemistry has emerged in recent years as a new and autonomous field within the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. With the development of this new discipline, Eric Scerri and Grant Fisher's "Essays in the Philosophy of Chemistry" is a timely and definitive guide to all current thought in this field. This edited volume will serve to map out the distinctive features of the field and its connections to the philosophies of the natural sciences and general philosophy of science more (...) broadly. It will be a reference for students and professional alike. Both the philosophy of chemistry and philosophies of scientific practice alike reflect the splitting of analytical and continental scholastic traditions, and some philosophers are turning for inspiration from the familiar resources of analytical philosophy to influences from the continental tradition and pragmatism. While philosophy of chemistry is practiced very much within the familiar analytical tradition, it is also capable of trail-blazing new philosophical approaches. In such a way, the seemingly disparate disciplines such as the "hard sciences" and philosophy become much more linked. (shrink)

In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame (...) for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people’s willingness to attribute intentions to groups, and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of... (shrink)

This book reconstructs key aspects of the early career of Descartes from 1618 to 1633; that is, up through the point of his composing his first system of natural philosophy, Le Monde, in 1629-33. It focuses upon the overlapping and intertwined development of Descartes’ projects in physico-mathematics, analytical mathematics, universal method, and, finally, systematic corpuscular-mechanical natural philosophy. The concern is not simply with the conceptual and technical aspects of these projects; but, with Descartes’ agendas within them and his construction and (...) presentation of his intellectual identity in relation to them. Descartes’ technical projects, agendas and senses of identity shifted over time, entangled and displayed great successes and deep failures, as he morphed from a mathematically competent, Jesuit trained graduate in neo-Scholastic Aristotelianism to aspiring prophet of a systematised corpuscular-mechanism, passing through stages of being a committed physico-mathematicus, advocate of a putative ‘universal mathematics’, and projector of a grand methodological dream. In all three dimensions—projects, agendas and identity concerns—the young Descartes struggled and contended, with himself and with real or virtual peers and competitors, hence the title ‘Descartes-Agonistes’. (shrink)

There has been a surprising absence of a general philosophical overview of progress as a method of articulating human meaning. This book attempts to fill this gap.

Ethnic groups are universal and unique to human societies. Such groups sometimes have norms of behavior that are adaptively linked to their social and ecological circumstances, and ethnic boundaries may function to protect that variation from erosion by interethnic interaction. However, such interaction is often frequent and voluntary, suggesting that individuals may be able to strategically reduce its costs, allowing adaptive cultural variation to persist in spite of interaction with out-groups with different norms. We examine five mechanisms influencing the dynamics (...) of ethnically distinct cultural norms, each focused on strategic individual-level choices in interethnic interaction: bargaining, interaction-frequency-biased norm adoption, assortment on norms, success-biased interethnic social learning, and childhood socialization. We use Bayesian item response models to analyze patterns of norm variation and interethnic interaction in an ethnically structured Amazonian population. We show that, among indigenous Matsigenka, interethnic education with colonial Mestizos is more strongly associated with Mestizo-typical norms than even extensive interethnic experience in commerce and wage labor is. Using ethnographic observations, we show that all five of the proposed mechanisms of norm adoption may contribute to this effect. However, of these mechanisms, we argue that changes in relative bargaining power are particularly important for ethnic minorities wishing to preserve distinctive norms while engaging in interethnic interaction in domains such as education. If this mechanism proves applicable in a range of other ethnographic contexts, it would constitute one cogent explanation for when and why ethnically structured cultural variation can either persist or erode given frequent, and often mutually beneficial, interethnic interaction. (shrink)

Investigamos a lógica de Leonhard Euler com ênfase no papel dos “diagramas de Euler”. Concluímos que os referidos diagramas constituem um instrumento intuitivo, embora não sistemático, para determinar validade na silogística tradicional, isto é, a silogística munida de implicações conversacionais. Nisto, contrastam-se com os diagramas de Venn que constituem um instrumento sistemático, porém menos intuitivo, para determinar validade numa silogística mais voltada para os fundamentos da matemática moderna.: We investigate the logic of Leonhard Euler, giving emphasis to the role of (...) “Euler diagrams”. We conclude that these diagrams are an intuitive, non-systematic instrument for determining validity in the traditional syllogistic, that is, the syllogistic furnished with conversational implications. In this regard, they contrast with Venn diagrams which are a systematic, less intuitive instrument for determining validity in a syllogistic more appropriate for the foundation of modern mathematics. Keywords: History of Logic. Leonhard Euler. Euler Diagrams. Venn Diagrams. (shrink)

I argue that the denial of speakers' knowledge of language rules is based on conceptual confusion and in particular on a misanalysis of what it is to know a rule. I shall turn to the task of establishing this point after first providing the background for this issue: the difficulty of conceptualizing verbal behavior both under the hypothesis that speakers do, and under the hypothesis that speakers do not know the rules of grammar. I shall argue that this difficulty and (...) the dispute it has engendered are based on overly simple and inadequate views of rule knowledge. Our ordinary concept of knowing a rule has been radically ignored by theorists who have written on this issue. In consequence, they have operated with conceptual schemes too impoverished to allow for the knowledge that speakers do have. A more adequate analysis or account of rule knowledge will thus be the main concern of this paper with the problem of speakers’ knowledge of grammar being the motivation to attempt such an analysis. (shrink)

The address of the President to his colleagues at the Medieval Academy is an invitation to speak about a subject close to the heart. I was told by the aunt who met me at the boat when I returned from Persia at the age of fourteen — a typical Kipling child, leaving my family on the other side of the world and returning home to school — that when she asked me what I was going to do when I grew (...) up, I said firmly, “I am going to teach Chaucer.” Well, it has been my privilege to study and teach and edit and write about Chaucer for nearly half a century. So there is no subject that I could speak about closer to my heart. (shrink)