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This essay starts by accepting Cécile Fabre's argument in her book Spying through a Glass Darkly that intelligence work, including using incentives and pressures to encourage betrayal and treason, can be morally justified based on the criteria of necessity, effectiveness, and proportionality. However, while assessments of spying tend to be based on Cold War notions, I explore it here in the messier reality of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and “new wars.” In addition, I suggest a methodological expansion: adding a sociological perspective to (...) the ethical discussion by exploring the wider effects on society, over longer periods, of the operation of informers. Based on these shifts in perspective and context, I identify additional social harms generated by espionage that should lead to a more restrictive view of ethical espionage than the one emerging from Fabre's work. I argue that many of these social harms are created by the mass recruitment of informers, in asymmetrical conflicts where governments have leverage over suspected communities, and given the (often mistaken) belief that everyone recruited to act as informer is an “asset,” primarily providing advantages. I argue, therefore, that the decisive issue is one of scale: many of the ethical problems created by espionage in these contexts result from the widespread systematic recruitment of informers, while small-scale, targeted, ad-hoc recruitment can more easily avoid such problems. (shrink)

Crowdsourced regulation has been discussed to date by legal and social science scholars mainly in the context of legislation and rulemaking, without paying sufficient attention to non-legislative regulatory functions. This article provides a richer theory of crowdsourced regulation which extends to all regulatory functions, focusing on monitoring and enforcement. Regulatory agencies worldwide harness the power of the public using digital platforms to carry out monitoring and enforcement tasks in regulated markets and sectors. For example, agencies operate online complaint databases that (...) invite the public to report mistreatment of consumers and environmental nuisances by regulated firms. Agencies also publish information concerning corporate misbehavior to publicly shame companies into compliance. Crowdsourcing regulatory monitoring and enforcement can help minimize some prominent ailments of the regulatory task, such as poor resources, diminishing deterrence, declining legitimacy, and capture. It can also promote goals and values such as public participation, increased transparency, public trust in regulators, administrative efficiency, and effectiveness in achieving regulatory objectives. However, crowdsourcing regulatory monitoring and enforcement is subject to a new set of legal, administrative, and democratic failures that need to be acknowledged and addressed. The article develops a theory of crowdsourced regulation that supplies justifications and rationales for crowdsourced regulatory monitoring and enforcement, points out its main pitfalls, and normatively evaluates law and policy implications. (shrink)

Incivility in online commenting sections can create a hostile environment and result in the silencing of vulnerable voices. Accordingly, content websites and social media platforms have an ethical responsibility—one that aligns with their strategic interests—to minimize users' exposure to uncivil content. To this end, platforms invest great effort and budget in automatic and manual filtering mechanisms. Yet, these efforts create a competing ethical quandary, as they often come at the expense of free expression, particularly in cases where comments do not (...) explicitly infringe on stated guidelines but might nevertheless be interpreted as offensive. In this paper, we examine an alternative moderation approach, based on comment reordering as opposed to deletion of uncivil comments. Specifically, we show that exposure to uncivil (vs. civil) comments located in the head or at the bottom of a list of comments increases subsequent commenters' likelihood of posting uncivil comments themselves. Exposure to uncivil comments in the middle of a list, however, does not significantly enhance commenters' likelihood of commenting uncivilly. These results offer new theoretical insight into how incivility is transferred between users in online environments. Our results also suggest a straightforward technological solution for mitigating online incivility, which is more ethical and practical than current industry standards. This involves placing civil comments at the beginning and end of the comment thread, with uncivil comments located in the middle. (shrink)