This article aims to present a detailed analysis of the “Christian natural philosophy” elaborated by the German humanist philosopher and theologian Otto Casmann (1562–1607) in his various works. To this end, Casmann’s general idea of philosophia Christiana is discussed and critically evaluated. Regarding natural philosophy, or physics, attention is paid mainly to topics such as cosmogony and cosmology, which Casmann promised to have developed biblically and independently of the pagan (namely Aristotelian) tradition. However, when Casmann’s natural philosophy is analyzed in (...) detail, his resolute emphasis on the literal reading of the Bible, the cornerstone of his entire concept, turns out to be problematic. Similarly, despite his resolutions, his natural‑philosophical views are, to a considerable extent, still dependent on Aristotelian terms and concepts. (shrink)

The Natural Philosophy of Jan Bayer The main focus of this study is a reconstruction of the natural philosophy of the early modern Prešov's scholar Jan (Johannes) Bayer (1630–1674), with special regard to its Mosaic profile. After a critical reading of the research done on Bayer up to this point, the author concludes that Bayer’s natural-philosophical work, as such, has not yet been satisfactorily analyzed, nor has its connection to its supposedly two most important sources, Francis Bacon and Jan Amos (...) Comenius, been sufficiently explored. The study therefore concentrates on a critical analysis of Bayer’s interpretation of creation and his natural history, which are then both situated in the philosophical context of their time. The author then notes that although Bayer’s project of erecting an original and on the (especially Aristotelian) tradition independent Mosaic natural philosophy ended in failure, the thinker’s work can be assessed as a valuable attempt to synthesize Baconian and Comenian motifs while at the same time reflecting broader intellectual contexts of the period. (shrink)

The paper deals with the work Philosophia Sacra: Or The Principles of Natural Philosophy. Extracted from Divine Revelation, published in 1753 by the relatively unknown English clergyman Samuel Pike (circa 1717 – 1773). This work falls within the tradition of the so-called Mosaic physics, a specific Early Modern endeavor to build natural philosophy based on a literal reading of the Holy Scriptures, particularly the first chapters of the book of Genesis attributed to Moses – hence the term “Mosaic.” For this (...) reason, at the beginning of the paper, the author seeks to introduce the fundamental ideas of this movement as expressed by its key proponents, namely L. Daneau, O. Casmann, and K. Aslakssøn. In the subsequent analysis of Pike’s natural-philosophical conception, the author highlights its specific features, including obvious Newtonian influences on the one hand (Pike’s work was written about a century and a half later than the texts of the ‘founding fathers’ of Mosaic physics and must have been influenced by the contemporary discourse). On the other hand, Pike’s work exhibits strong, albeit implicit, similarities with the ideas of J. A. Comenius, another thinker associated with Early Modern Mosaic physics (and often considered its most significant representative, which are explored in the concluding part of the text. It can be said that Pike’s work appears as a remarkable and highly original culmination of the Mosaic natural philosophy tradition, combining a range of seemingly unexpected, if not outright contradictory, motifs. (shrink)

Since the very beginning of modern Comenius studies there have been attempts to examine the relationship of the Czech philosopher, theologian, and educational reformer Jan Amos Comenius to the English philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon. A study dealing with the efforts of both philosophers to reform philosophy is, nevertheless, still lacking. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to introduce Comenius’s relationship to the work of Francis Bacon in this regard. In the first part, the author presents an overview of (...) Comenius’s references to Bacon. The following section focuses on a description and comparison of the structure and fundamental concepts held by both Comenius and Bacon in their works relevant for the topic. In the last part of the paper, the reader will find the characteristics of both philosophers’ projects of the restoration of knowledge. The author concludes that although both Comenius and Bacon directed their intellectual powers towards restoring the original immaculate knowledge of Adam, they approached its implementation in their own unique and original ways. © Filosofia, 2017. (shrink)

This study deals with the concept of natura as it is presented in Comenius’s Pansophia. Since Comenius’s concept of nature is inseparable from his anthropological views, the paper discusses also his anthropology. Man is considered here an integral part of the material world which, however, through his immortal mind and its three infinite components surpasses the material world and rises above it. Man, especially in his limitlessness and freedom of human will, resembles God. The human individual thus becomes not only (...) the creation of God, but the partner and collaborator of God, insofar as the process of completing the work of Creation is concerned. The outcomes of human activity are called the world of human creation, the world of morality and the world of the spirit, in which nature is brought to perfection. The final part of the study focuses on the concept of natura humana which is important in the whole Consultatio catholica, not only in the Pansophia. Despite all difficulties in interpretation, Comenius’s concept of human nature can be reconstructed. According to Comenius the basis of human nature is the openness of human existence founded on the free and unrestricted will. © FILOSOFIA, 2014. (shrink)

Cílem této studie je představit základní rámec filozofického díla anglického volnomyšlenkáře Anthonyho Collinse (1676–1729) v kontextu britského osvícenského myšlení konce 17. a první poloviny 18. století. Prostřednictvím analýzy jednotlivých spisů je vyloženo Collinsovo chápání rozumu jako nástroje nepostradatelného nejen v oblasti poznání profánního, ale také divinálního. Studie dále sleduje Collinsovu obhajobu naprosté volnosti myšlení i formy jeho vyjádření. Významný prostor je věnován rovněž autorově filozofii náboženství. Studie dokládá, že Collins nebyl izolovaným myslitelem, ale že ve svém díle těžil jak z (...) předcházející (Spinoza, Herbert z Cherbury a především John Locke), tak i současné filozofické diskuze (zejména John Toland). (shrink)

Cílem této studie je představit základní rámec filozofického díla anglického volnomyšlenkáře Anthonyho Collinse (1676–1729) v kontextu britského osvícenského myšlení konce 17. a první poloviny 18. století. Prostřednictvím analýzy jednotlivých spisů je vyloženo Collinsovo chápání rozumu jako nástroje nepostradatelného nejen v oblasti poznání profánního, ale také divinálního. Studie dále sleduje Collinsovu obhajobu naprosté volnosti myšlení i formy jeho vyjádření. Významný prostor je věnován rovněž autorově filozofii náboženství. Studie dokládá, že Collins nebyl izolovaným myslitelem, ale že ve svém díle těžil jak z (...) předcházející (Spinoza, Herbert z Cherbury a především John Locke), tak i současné filozofické diskuze (zejména John Toland). (shrink)

Text John Toland a jeho Křesťanství bez mystérií sestává ze dvou provázaných částí. První část představuje stručné biografické pojednání o Johnu Tolandovi (1670–1722), v němž se mimo jiné snažíme předložit obecný úvod do jeho myšlení. Druhá část pak nabízí první český překlad předmluvy k Tolandovu nejznámějšímu spisu Christianity not Mysterious (1696), který je považován za základní impulz deistické diskuze na Britských ostrovech.

The paper aims to introduce the encyclopaedic project presented by the reformed philosopher and theologian Johann Heinrich Alsted and study it as one of the possible sources of the pansophism of the Czech philosopher, theologian and educational reformer Jan Amos Comenius. For this reason, the author first briefly describes the genesis, development and structure of Alsted’s encyclopaedic work with a special focus on his mature and monumental Encyclopaedia septem tomis distincta. The crucial part of the paper is devoted to comparing (...) Alsted’s and Comenius’s conceptions of metaphysics, physics and other important fields of their shared interest. The author concludes that Comenius was undoubtedly influenced by Alsted in structural and terminological matters; furthermore, that both Alsted and Comenius inclined to base their philosophy of nature on so-called Mosaic physics and tended to understand metaphysics as a primary science not only in view of its dignity, but also with regard to its place in the system of sciences and in the curriculum. (shrink)

Some early modern scholars believed that Scripture provided more certain knowledge than all secular authorities – even Aristotle – or investigating nature as such. In this paper, I analyse one such attempt to establish the most reliable knowledge of nature: the so-called Mosaic physics proposed by the Reformed encyclopaedist Johann Heinrich Alsted. Although in his early works on Physica Mosaica Alsted declares that his primary aim is proving the harmony that exists between various traditions of natural philosophy, namely between the (...) Mosaic and the Peripatetic approaches, and despite the fact that his biblical encyclopaedia of 1625 was intended to be based on a literal reading of the Bible, he never truly abandoned the Aristotelian framework of physics. What is more, in his mature encyclopaedia of 1630, he eventually openly preferred Aristotle to other natural-philosophical traditions. I argue, therefore, that Alsted’s bold vision of Mosaic physics remained unfulfilled and should be assessed as an unsuccessful project of early modern natural philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) (151 E-152C); as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils (152C-160D). Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken. (shrink)

In this paper I want to do the following things. First I want to show that in the part of the Theaetetus where the relationship between knowledge and perception is examined, the concept of knowledge that is in question is very clearly characterized. We are left in no doubt as to what is to count as knowing. Secondly I want to unravel in some detail the case that Socrates puts on Protagoras’ behalf where he draws on what Protagoras actually wrote (...) ; as opposed to what he may have taught secretly to his pupils. Thirdly I wish to argue that if we let the dialogue speak for itself, it is manifest that this case put up on Protagoras’ behalf at 151 E-152C is not overthrown; it is not even shaken.In that part of the dialogue where the question is under examination whether or not knowledge and perception are the same, Socrates uses an idealized concept of knowledge. That is, he restricts the use of the word by setting down what he will consider to be the essential characteristics of knowledge, the sufficient and necessary conditions of its being instantiated. An excellent piece of philosophical procedure. (shrink)

Because anticipated and retrospective regret play important roles in practical deliberation and motivation, better understanding them can illuminate the contours of human agency. However, the possibility of self-ignorance and the fact that we change over time can make regret—especially anticipatory regret—not only a poor predictor of where the agent will be in the future but also an unreliable indicator of where the agent stands. Granting these, this paper examines the way in which prospective and, particularly, retrospective regret can nevertheless yield (...) important insight into the sorts of creatures we are, both generally and individually. The experience of retrospective regret can show a person she values something in a way she did not know or that she is (or was) a different person than she had thought, insights which can factor into forward-looking, or prospective, deliberation. Such instances of revelatory regret reveal something to the agent about herself as agent. I examine two cases of agential self-ignorance. In the first, the experience of regret reveals what the agent values, not only to others but even to the agent himself. In the second, the agent anticipates experiencing regret for an action but does not experience the regret, suggesting that the agent did not value the rejected alternative in the way she thought. Anticipatory regret is forward-looking and can play an important role in practical deliberation. But insofar as anticipatory regret flows from one’s imperfect judgment and prospection about oneself, retrospective regret can be an important corrective in helping the agent understand her own standpoint. (shrink)

In his newly updated version of The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case, Alan F. Westin provides a documentary portrait of historically important constitutional law case, 'Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, ' from its rise in a bargaining dispute in the steel industry during 1952 to the aftermath of its decision by the United States Supreme Court. Westin has added to his classic book additional materials and personal commentaries collected since the work was first published. The new information (...) covers what went on within the Truman administration, what went on within the Supreme Court when analyzing and resolving issues that come before it. Westin includes selections from transcripts, briefs and other official proceedings, adds notes describing each phase of the constitutional process, and a section of commentary and questions relating this case to others. (shrink)

Comenius’s vision of the universal emendation of human affairs attracts attention both of scholars and of the general public for long decades. It is no wonder that there have been plenty of papers or monographs pointing out to Comenius’s emendation endeavour and quite often appreciating its exceptionality and topicality for a man living in the present. We can encounter the interpretations of Comenius as an anticipator of the United Nations organization or of a seer of the European integration project. According (...) to other interpretations, Comenius has just in his time predicted possible negative consequences of Baconian and Cartesian understanding of nature, and therefore he can be seen as a predecessor of the ecological philosophy of the 20th century. However, if we accept such updating, we should on the other hand admit that Comenius’s project of emendation evinces a large amount of problematic aspects. In this light, Comenius could be compared to the authors of the most famous utopian works. Furthermore, there could be also arisen a Popperian question, whether Comenius was not one of the enemies of the open society. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to reflect on the method of the historical research, primarily on the difficulties emerging from the anachronous interpretation not only of the work of John Amos Comenius, but of the intellectual history of the 17th century at all. (shrink)

This book maps the entire development of Comenius’s considerations on man, from his earliest writings to his philosophical masterwork. Although this book primarily offers an analysis and description of the conception of man in Comenius’s work, it may also serve the reader as a more general introduction to his philosophical conception. The author shows that, in spite of the fact that Comenius has received no small amount of academic attention, funded studies or monographs in English language remain in single figures. (...) Thus, a range of Comenius’s remarkable ideas are still unknown to the wider public. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present a systematic reconstruction of the development of the pansophic idea in the work of Jan Amos Comenius. The concept of pansophia, rooted already in the ancient philosophical thinking, became a very popular topic of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discussions, and it is one of the central topics of Comenius’s philosophy. It is assumed that Comenius elaborated the formulation of the pansophic program—i.e., the program for creating a universal science incorporating the findings of both (...) the profane and the divine—at the end of 1630s. This study therefore aims to analyse all relevant Comenius’s treatises and attempts to identify the individual development phases of Comenius’s pansophic idea until its transformation into the idea of the universal reform, panorthosia. The analysis of Comenius’s treatises is complemented with a reflection on Comenius’s correspondence, which facilitates the understanding of the author’s more private motives. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with Comenius’ philosophical view of man. In Comenius’ late writings, man is presented as a being determined by its own unique nature, at the core of which lies an existential openness founded on a free and limitless will. Comenius defines man as a being that creates itself endlessly and in infinite ways and presents a well-thought out argument to the effect that the defining feature of man is the God-given mind, conceived of as a trinity of (...) crucial dispositions – will, reason and agentive faculties. The will is set to be the central part of the mind. However, this concept is not characteristic for all writings by Comenius. In his earlier treatises, we can see that Comenius preferred reason over will. This paper tries to illustrate the genesis of Comenius’ conception and also to give a general overview of Comenius’ anthropology. Last but not least the paper aims to put Comenius’ philosophy of man into context of Renaissance and Early modern philosophy. (shrink)

Protože česká komeniologie a intelektuální historie dosud postrádají komplexnější monografické pojednání o vztahu Komenský – Bacon, je cílem této knihy přiblížit koncepci reformy (respektive obnovy) vědění obsaženou v dílech obou jmenovaných osobností – českého teologa, filozofa a pedagogického reformátora Jana Amose Komenského (1592–1670) a anglického filozofa a státníka Francise Bacona (1561–1626). Zatímco v první části knihy jsou cesty obou myslitelů k vrcholné podobě jejich vizí sledovány odděleně, druhá část se soustředí na zodpovězení především těch otázek, které oba autory spojují: V (...) čem spočívá jádro projektu reformy vědění u Komenského a v čem u Bacona? Jaká je struktura a koncepce jejich projektů? Jedná se o projekt obnovy, nebo o vizi pokroku vědění? Jak si Komenský a Bacon představovali realizaci svých záměrů? Jakou metodu k tomu zvolili? Do jaké míry byl Komenský Baconem ovlivněn? Co je pojítkem obou projektů? Na základě odpovědí na tyto otázky se autor v závěru knihy pokouší rozřešit dlouhodobý interpretační spor o povaze Komenského vztahu k Baconovi: Byl Komenský významným pokračovatelem a propagátorem Baconova díla? Nebo byl naopak myslitelem, který Baconův odkaz zjednodušil a zvulgarizoval? Anebo byl Komenský vskutku svébytnou filozofickou osobností, jež byla inspirována spíše jen duchem Baconova díla? (shrink)

Our aim in this study is to examine the attitude to violence expressed in the works of two leading figures in the history of Czech philosophical thought. Several scholars in the field of Comeniology have expressed the belief that not only clear parallels but also direct continuity can be traced between the views of Petr Chelčický and those of Jan Amos Comenius. To make a proper judgement as to whether Comenius and Chelčický shared identical attitudes to the question of the (...) legitimacy of violence, we focus first on Comenius’s climactic work, in which his point of view is most fully expressed. Subsequently we analyse Chelčický’s views and compare them with Comenius’s attitude. A comparison of the works of the two thinkers leads to the conclusion that on the one hand Comenius’s key opinions are much more comprehensively founded; on the other, he does not restrict himself to a critique of physical violence but also deals with the spiritual struggle. Any analogy between Chelčický and Comenius’s attitude to violence can therefore be related only to the early works of Comenius in which his concept of universal tolerance was not yet thoroughly thought through. The study therefore focuses on the issue of the development of Comenius’s concept of tolerance as well. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of the relation between Francesco Patrizi and John Amos Comenius, especially in the regard to the metaphysics of light and its concept panaugia. It is without doubt that Comenius adopted the basic principles of his conception of the metaphysics of light from Patrizi. The light is crucial not only for the metaphysics of both authors; it also figures as a central part of their epistemological conceptions, which are de facto identical. Although Patrizi and Comenius (...) deal with the concept panaugia and understand the metaphysics of light in the same sense, they differ in their further handling of it. While Patrizi focuses on the natural-philosophical aspect of panaugia, Comenius further elaborates the epistemological and panorthotical aspect of the metaphysics of light. (shrink)

The study aims to analyze the importance of analogy in the writings of the Czech theologian, philosopher and educational reformer John Amos Comenius. Analogy is clearly invaluable for Comenius as it plays a key role in the introduction of a third, particularly reliable method – syncrisis that allows us to see an image of something invisible (uncreated) on visible (created) things. For Comenius, this method became an integral supplement to analysis and synthesis, with all three forming the basis of all (...) his studies. Syncrisis is principally applied to theological matters, for instance to the study of man, the living image of God that reflects the creator. The analogy of the micro- and macrocosm that Comenius uses is integral to both his epistemology and metaphysics. If a man (the microcosm) attains self-knowledge, he is able to know other humans, the entire material world (the macrocosm), and also his very archetype – God. For Comenius though, man is not only a microcosm but also a little God (mikrotheos), a faithful imprint of God's perfection. Man, created as the culmination of the material world, becomes God's partner in maintaining and completing the entire universe. Human creativity, analogous to God's creative power, plays a decisive role in the creation of other worlds – the World of Human Artifice, the Moral World and the Spiritual World. Ultimately, the collaboration of man and God is an inherent prerequisite to the culmination of creation – the last world, the Eternal World. (shrink)

It is not quite as easy to see that there is in fact no formula of this modal language having the same truth conditions (in terms of S5 Kripke semantics) as (1). This was rst conjectured by Allen Hazen2 and later proved by Harold Hodes3. We present a simple direct proof of this result and discuss some consequences for the logical analysis of ordinary modal discourse.

In recent years, there has been a heated debate about how to interpret findings that seem to show that humans rapidly and automatically calculate the visual perspectives of others. In the current study, we investigated the question of whether automatic interference effects found in the dot-perspective task (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010) are the product of domain-specific perspective-taking processes or of domain-general “submentalizing” processes (Heyes, 2014). Previous attempts to address this question have done so by implementing inanimate (...) controls, such as arrows, as stimuli. The rationale for this is that submentalizing processes that respond to directionality should be engaged by such stimuli, whereas domain-specific perspective-taking mechanisms, if they exist, should not. These previous attempts have been limited, however, by the implied intentionality of the stimuli they have used (e.g. arrows), which may have invited participants to imbue them with perspectival agency. Drawing inspiration from “novel entity” paradigms from infant gaze-following research, we designed a version of the dot-perspective task that allowed us to precisely control whether a central stimulus was viewed as animate or inanimate. Across four experiments, we found no evidence that automatic “perspective-taking” effects in the dot-perspective task are modulated by beliefs about the animacy of the central stimulus. Our results also suggest that these effects may be due to the task-switching elements of the dot-perspective paradigm, rather than automatic directional orienting. Together, these results indicate that neither the perspective-taking nor the standard submentalizing interpretations of the dot-perspective task are fully correct. (shrink)

Are we witnessing progress or regress in the recent increasing popularity and electoral success of populist politicians and parties in consolidated democratic nations? ... Is the innovative use of popular referendum in Great Britain to settle fundamental constitutional questions a progressive or regressive innovation? ... Similarly, is the increasing use of constituent assemblies to change constitutions across the world evidence of progress in democratic constitutionalism, or, a worryingly regressive change back toward unmediated popular majoritarianism? ... This paper reflects on some (...) of the perils and promise of framing such questions with the conceptual couplet of progress and regress. It considers four compelling critiques of the use of ‘progress’ and its cognates in sociopolitical theory, as well as arguing that such concepts are nevertheless ineliminable for our normative theories. The paper concludes by suggesting that we can avoid the most serious problems by employing only conceptions of political progress and regress that are piecemeal, pragmatic, and processual. (shrink)