From the point of the EU law, the CJEU has the exclusive competence to interpret the EU legal norms and decide upon validity of the legal acts adopted by the EU institutions because it is the most effective method to ensure the unilateral interpretation of the EU law and to prevent its fragmentation. Thus, it can be presumed that all disputes between the Member States regarding the EU law must be solved by the CJEU. The paper aims at finding the (...) answer to the question whether international courts under the international law must refuse their jurisdiction in cases where disputes of the Member States relate with the EU law. With the view of this aim, arguments arising from the international law (for instance, prohibition of intervening into affairs of another legal system, prohibition of abuse of laws), on the basis of which an international court should decline its jurisdiction, and applicability of such arguments to the situation discussed is assessed and an independent approach is formulated. (shrink)

The contemporary State power is concentrated in the hands of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, which is traditionally referred to as the principle of the division of State power. The separation of State power and the attribution of the function of the interpretation and application of statutory law to courts were like “letting the genie out of the bottle”. Having started with a mechanical application of the statutory law, the courts, armed with various doctrines on interpretation of law, have (...) in the meantime started creating rules themselves and turned into rivals to the legislator. In addition to having started making the law, the courts have also begun exerting control over both the legislative (constitutional justice) and the executive (administrative justice) powers. The acknowledgement of the fact that by interpreting and applying the law, the court is simultaneously making it, gives rise to a host of questions, e.g.: if the court is the guardian of law, who is the guardian of the court? How to separate the interpretation of law from its creation? If the court acts as a lawmaker, then maybe in future, the court will turn into a sole lawmaker?, etc. (shrink)

The article provides an analysis on how much the standard court proceedings can be regarded as the research, which is performed by investigating by what manner and measures the justice in a procedural sense is implemented. It is generally acknowledged that the court, as a subject, solving a legal dispute, implements justice only in the case, when it ensures the impartiality towards all persons. The appropriate legal proceedings form a constituent part of the constitutional right to apply in the court. (...) The article aims at introducing certain aspects of the implementation of the principle of justice in the court proceedings of Lithuania. It is indicated that the lack of legal methodology results in different arguments of the rendered decisions and their unpredictability, therefore, it does not encourage to opt for the legal peace. The article is topical in a sense that it has not provided an analysis, on which the aspects of impartiality reveal themselves in the nowadays case law in particular cases and how it produces an effect on the approach to justice. In Lithuania, doctrinal presumptions were created for the freedom of the courts, upon which the courts started to formulate new procedural regulations. The freedom of the actions of judges is based on the aim to ensure a stronger safety in regard to the rights pertaining to one of the public groups, i.e. to disallow the domination of certain subjects over the others by eliminating inequality between the parties. The freedom of the actions of judges is also justified by the aim to render the right decision. However, the formulation of the new regulations according to the actual situation by too freely interpreting the norm of the proceedings, without having the doctrinal basis for that, causes the legal confusion, thus inconsistency in the case law appears, the inner contradictions arise and, in addition to that, there is a failure to follow the standard of impartiality. The individualisation of each legal dispute pursuant to the newly established procedural regulations creates the presumptions for legal instability. Upon the absence of doctrinal substantiation for the newly formulated procedural regulations, the risk arises for the courts to unduly avail of the competence granted to them, thus there will be no implementation of the justice attained. The approach, based on the demand for an individual safety, encourages to refuse the regulations, which are universally applied. Such conception of justice is characteristic for legal individualism, which is grounded in consumerism, by means of which the standard court proceedings are refused, while the extended sympathy theory becomes the starting point. The comprehension and observance of the legal methodology is one of the conditions for the development of the consistent case law. The presence of a clear method in the case law will allow to prevent from pursuing different legal conceptions, i.e. different reasoning of a court decision upon the similar circumstances, as well as it will prevent from speculating on the accepted legal position by refusing the legal argument. (shrink)

A practising lawyer is not always aware of the fact that case decisions are more determined by legal doctrine – attitudes of authoritative lawyers and scientific legal discussion of other forms – than by changes in positive law. Regulations of specific case decisions are directly reliant on the ideas and statements of legal discussions – as one of the factors influencing the decisions of the courts. During the twenty years of independence, the form, content and argumentation of the Lithuanian court (...) judgments has fundamentally changed, especially with regard to the understanding of the courts (the judiciary) in terms of how unrestrained they are when interpreting a legal text and making decisions. The judicial discretion to interpret a legal text is treated diversely in various legal traditions and within the scope of the western legal tradition itself. In common law countries, the competence of a judge to deviate from a legal text or to create their own legal framework is treated with much greater understanding. In civil law tradition, the attempts of judges to take over the functions of the legislature are usually considered more critically. Even the representatives of comparative law emphasise that judges in civil law tradition countries tend to call the creation of legal rules differently – mostly as interpretation of the law. The discussion on the power of judges to create law through its interpretation has been taking place everywhere and at all times. Judicial discretion in decision-making is not due to individual factors such as era, social structure, cultural background, but is determined by some other factors that are not easy to identify. The interpretative activity of the courts is also influenced by the prevailing doctrinal regulations of judicial activity. It is the changes of the Lithuanian legal doctrines that could have encouraged the courts to determine the scope of their activity in the direction of its growth. After the restoration of independence, the Lithuanian legal community began an active discussion on whether legal positivism was the correct form of legal understanding. Studies appeared, in which legal positivism was seen exclusively negatively, reminding that it was specifically this legal concept that had eliminated values from law and was likely to be blamed for the ills of humanity such as the Holocaust or genocide. Numerous publications emerged calling judges to be active and reminding them to check every rule of law in accordance with its consistency with the principles of law and to disapply any rule of law that did not meet this requirement. Almost universally, lawyers (and especially the courts) were encouraged to move from mechanical (a priori improper) application of the law to the creative (a priori the best and aspirational) one. The courts were encouraged: they started to freely interpret legal rules, under which the legislature established their competence; although court judgments have become more reasoned, this did not prevent them from applying speculative or ambivalent arguments; criticism could be expressed to courts due to lengthy processes that are, objectively looking, not required, and for low activity in exercising their powers to prevent abuse of law. Respect for the legislature directly responsible for creating legal rules and taking care of legal protection, judicial recognition that a court should deviate from the legal text or otherwise create new rules only when it is objectively inevitable, and lawyers’ societal openness to discussion on various issues – these can become conceptual prerequisites for higher confidence in the courts. (shrink)

The boundary between interpretation and creation of law is sometimes so subtle and intangible that the court judgments may give rise to discussions about judges having taken the role of lawmakers. This article reveals the concept of ‘precedent’ in the Lithuanian legal system as the influence of the common law has increased on the continental law and ideas of stare decisis have been transferred to the Lithuanian legal system. The start for this was a famous judgment of 28 March 2006 (...) by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, where the court held that courts adopting decisions in cases of corresponding categories are bound by their own decisions in analogous cases; the courts of lower instance are bound by the decisions of the courts of higher instance in cases of the same categories. The notion of precedent has been widely used in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Lithuania. Thus, the term “precedent” has become almost as common as ‘judicial decision’. However, it is important to note that in the jurisprudence of Lithuanian courts and legal literature the notion of precedent has a different meaning than in the common law countries. It is, obviously, due to the different principles of the formation of the two systems: the common law and the continental law. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to determine how can new interpretations of old institutes change the status of the taxpayers and tax administrators and to suggest what can the Ministry of Finance do to solve the problem – it can try setting a uniform interpretation of tax institutes. It deals with two findings of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic concerning two institutes described in Tax Administration Act: time-limits for tax assessment and tax inspection; and one finding of (...) the Highest Administrative Court concerning local taxes. Court interpretation is only one of several possibilities of interpretation. Continental system of law differs from the Anglo-American system and we should search for information in the acts, and court practice should be used only alternatively. (shrink)

Starting from 2009, national courts of the EU Member States for the first time gained a “real” right to request the EU Court of Justice for preliminary rulings in asylum matters. First judgments of this Court demonstrate equivocal tendencies: some are blaming the Court for incompetence in asylum matters, others believe that the adoption of authoritative decisions at the European level will assist in developing consistent practice of applying asylum law in the European Union, something that failed at international level (...) due to absence of a single authoritative body to provide guidance on interpretation and application of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Considering that the judgments of the EU Court are part of the EU law, the Member States should develop their national asylum law with due regard being taken to those judgments. By the beginning of 2012, the Court has issued eight judgments on the interpretation of various problematic issues of EU asylum law. This Article analyses the jurisprudence of the EU Court in asylum cases, related to the granting of refugee status and subsidiary protection. It also provides a critical evaluation of those judgments. The main objective of the Article is to familiarise the relevant Lithuanian institutions and lawyers with the first judgments of the EU Court in asylum cases and encourage discussions concerning the application of rules established by the Court in the Lithuanian context. Due to limited size, this Article presents the analysis of two EU Court judgments adopted on interpretation of the 2004 Qualification Directive: Elgafaji v. The Netherlands (2009) dealing with granting of subsidiary protection, and Abdulla and others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2010), dealing with cessation of refugee status. The value of those judgments first of all lies in the guidance they provided to the Member States on such concepts as: protection in a situation of an armed conflict, agents of protection, effectiveness of protection; as well as determination of a relationship between refugee status and subsidiary protection, relationship of the Qualification Directive with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), also cessation of protection. Elgafaji decision, while quite liberal with regard to persons seeking international protection, is not so liberally applied in the Member States’ practice and does not in itself guarantee positive outcome of the application of a concrete individual fleeing from an armed conflict, or a liberal approach to granting subsidiary protection in the Member States. Based on Elgafaji judgment it is clear that: Art. 15(b) of the Qualification Directive correspond to Art. 3 ECHR, while Art. 15(c) provides additional protection and in that it expands the Member States’ obligations beyond the ECHR to provide protection to persons fleeing in situations of armed conflict. While not every person arriving from an armed conflict situation would automatically fall under the granting of subsidiary protection, in certain exceptional situations indiscriminate violence may amount to individual threat without invoking personal circumstances. The EU Court departed from the individualisation requirement applied by the European Court of Human Rights in Art. 3 cases and did not also rely on international humanitarian law, by introducing a “sliding scale” formula for establishing an individual threat in armed conflict situation instead. This formula addressed the alleged internal discrepancy between “individual threat” and “indiscriminate violence”. The Abdulla decision brought in the human rights and law enforcement perspectives to the interpretation of cessation clauses, however it represents a rather superficial approach in the context of the analysed concepts (e.g. towards effectiveness of protection provided by the multinational armed forces) and is likely to be incompatible with the latest legislative trends in the EU asylum instruments (e.g. determination of refugee status and subsidiary protection by means of a single procedure) and the recent jurisprudence under the ECHR (e.g. failure to ensure a minimum standard of living may violate the ECHR). (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo sistematiza informações sobre a implementação do Programa Jovem de Futuro, PJF, na rede estadual de ensino no Pará, considerando suas implicações para o Direito Humano à Educação, DHE, de acordo com o proposto no Pacto Internacional sobre os Direitos Econômicos, Sociais e Culturais- PIDESC, que demarca quatro indicadores da ação estatal para a asseguramento do direito à Educação. São eles: Disponibilidade, Acessibilidade, Aceitabilidade, Adaptabilidade e, ainda, Controle Social incorporado na matriz de pesquisa. Em diálogo com tais (...) indicadores, coletamos informações em páginas oficiais da Secretaria Estadual de Educação do Pará e do ator privado responsável pela implementação do Programa, o Instituto Unibanco. Procedemos análise de documentos oficiais localizados nas referidas páginas, além de consultar a produção nacional sobre o PJF, com ênfase à sua consolidação no estado do Pará, no período de 2011-2018. A pesquisa de tipo qualitativa, apoiada em revisão bibliográfica, análise documental e coleta de dados de fontes primárias e secundárias, possibilitou a constatação de forte influência do setor privado na educação pública paraense, que direcionou a adoção de modelos de gestão empresarial para a obtenção de melhores resultados educacionais, com controle e monitoramento em todas as etapas do PJF, com sérias consequências ao DHE. Palavras-chave: Direito Humano à Educação; Jovem de Futuro; Instituto Unibanco; Privatização. The Jovem de Futuro program in Pará and the implications for the Human Right to Education – DHE Abstract: The article systematizes information about the implementation of the The Youth with a Future Program - PJF in the state education in Pará, considering its implications for the Human Right to Education - DHE, in accordance with what is proposed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - ICESCR, which outlines four indicators of state action to ensure the right to education. They are: Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, Adaptability and accountability incorporated in the research matrix. Related with these indicators, we collected information on official pages of the Pará State Department of Education and on the private actor responsible for implementing the Program, Instituto Unibanco. We proceeded to the analysis of official documents located on the referred pages, in addition to consulting the national academic production on the PJF, with emphasis on its consolidation in the state of Pará, in the period 2011-2018. Qualitative research, supported by a bibliographic review, document analysis and data collection from primary and secondary sources, made it possible to verify the strong influence of the private sector on public education in Pará, which led to the adoption of business management models to obtain better results. educational institutions, with control and monitoring at all stages of the PJF, with serious consequences for the DHE. Key-words: Human Right to Education; Future Youth; Unibanco Institute; Privatization. Programa Joven del Futuro en Pará y sus implicaciones al Derecho Humano a la Educación – DHE Resumen: La presente investigación sistematiza informaciones sobre la implementación del Programa Joven del Futuro – PJF en la red estatal de enseñanza de Pará, considerando sus implicaciones al Derecho Humano a la Educación – DHE, de acuerdo con lo propuesto en el Pacto Internacional sobre los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales – PIDESC, que demarca cuatro indicadores de acción estatal para el aseguramiento del derecho a la Educación. Son ellos: Disponibilidad, Accesibilidad, Aceptabilidad, Adaptabilidad y, aún, Control Social incorporado en la matriz de investigación. En diálogo con tales indicadores, reunimos informaciones en páginas web oficiales de la Secretaria Estadual de Educação do Pará y del actor privado responsable por la implementación del Programa, el Instituto Unibanco. Procedemos el análisis de documentos oficiales localizados en las referidas páginas, así como consultamos la producción nacional sobre el PJF, con énfasis a las consolidaciones en Pará, en el período de 2011 hasta 2018. La investigación de tipo cualitativa, apoyada en revisiones bibliográficas, análisis documentales y recopilación de datos de fuentes primarias y secundarias, posibilitó la constatación de fuerte influencia del sector privado en la educación pública paraense, que direccionó la adopción de modelos de gestión empresarial para la obtención mejores resultados educacionales, con control y monitoreo en todas las etapas del PJF, con serias consecuencias al DHE. Palabras-clave: Derecho Humano a la Educación; Joven del Futuro; Instituto Unibanco; Privatización. Data de registro: 02/05/2022Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the concept of African communitarianism and reflect on its potential value for ecojustice education as a localised response to the wider ecological crises that i...