The article aims at resolving the issue whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has an exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to resolve disputes between Member States, stemming from provisions of an international treaty, a party to which is the EU. This problem is especially relevant in cases when a mixed international agreement envisages independent institutions of dispute resolution. The position of the CJEU is expressed in the (...) case of Mox Plant. The European Commission applied to the CJEU against Ireland, because it considered that Ireland, which started an arbitration procedure against United Kingdom under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has infringed the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU under Article 344 of the TFEU. The EU is also a Contracting Party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore according to the consistence case practice of the Court, the provisions of the Convention that fall under the competence of the Union constitute an indivisible part of the EU legal system. Only in such case when a provision of a treaty is attributed to exclusive competence of the Member States, the jurisdiction of the CJEU regarding that provision can be negated. Thus, when deciding on the issue of exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU in principle, a problem of attribution of the EU and Member States’ competences arises. (shrink)

World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement includes the Annex 2 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that reveals with WTO dispute settlement rules and procedures. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures. The article analyses the problematic issues of the direct effect of the DSB decisions in the European Union (EU) legal order. ECJ concluded that an individual does not have the right to challenge, the incompatibility of Community measures with WTO rules, even if the DSB (...) had previously declared the EU legislation to be incompatible with those rules. The position of the ECJ is based on the WTO dispute settlement system specifics—the importance of the negotiation between the parties, even after the DSB decision-making and lack of reciprocity, which means that major commercial partners of the EU does not recognize the direct effect of DSB decisions. (shrink)

From the point of the EU law, the CJEU has the exclusive competence to interpret the EU legal norms and decide upon validity of the legal acts adopted by the EU institutions because it is the most effective method to ensure the unilateral interpretation of the EU law and to prevent its fragmentation. Thus, it can be presumed that all disputes between the Member States regarding the EU law must be solved by the CJEU. The paper aims at finding the (...) answer to the question whether international courts under the international law must refuse their jurisdiction in cases where disputes of the Member States relate with the EU law. With the view of this aim, arguments arising from the international law (for instance, prohibition of intervening into affairs of another legal system, prohibition of abuse of laws), on the basis of which an international court should decline its jurisdiction, and applicability of such arguments to the situation discussed is assessed and an independent approach is formulated. (shrink)

After coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon it is acknowledged that better control and respect of the principle of subsidiarity is one of the most important and innovative goals of the Treaty. To achieve this goal, the Treaty introduces a mechanism which, apart from checking compliance of draft legislative acts with that principle, may eventually lead to a draft act to be deleted from the legislative agenda of the European Union on grounds of violation of subsidiarity. Within this (...) mechanism, crucial role is attributed to the national parliaments of the Member States. In this article, the reasons for overall inclusion of national parliaments in the European Union (hereinafter EU, the Union) activities are analysed. The role of national parliaments in the EU according to the specific provisions of the EU treaties is also discussed and the largest part of the work is devoted to the ex ante subsidiarity principle control mechanism (the Early Warning System), which gives the right for the national parliaments to influence the EU legislative process. (shrink)