The notion of linguistic correction with which Augustine of Hippo introduced his Ars pro fratrum mediocritate breuiata seems central to the philosopher's grammatical discussion, not only because of the various examples that Augustine offers about the definitions of barbarism and soloecism at the end of this treatise, but also because the subject of correction and, consequently, of the deviations of language, are also presented in other non-grammatical works: The confessions, De ordine and De doctrina Christiana. In this article, we propose (...) to evaluate the conceptual outlines of the notions of barbarism and solecism in the work of Augustine, considering, on the one hand, the definitions present in the Ars breuiata, and, on the other, the way in which Augustine also presents them in his philosophical work. We propose that the normative orientation contained in the text of ars must be relativised by ethical questions that arise from the comments present in the Confessions, the De ordine and the De doctrina Christiana. (shrink)

It is often said that one cannot be held responsible for something one cannot help. Indeed, Ted Honderich, Paul Edwards, and C. A. Campbell have suggested that it is obtuse, barbaric, or a solecism to think otherwise 1. Thus, if (contra Sartre and others) one cannot help feeling one's emotions, one is not responsible for one's emotions. In this paper I will argue otherwise; one is responsible for one's emotions, even if one cannot help feeling them. 2 In particular, (...) I will define a rather special sense of the word 'responsible', one that is closely tied to our ordinary notion of moral worth. We are, in that special sense of the word, 'responsible' for our emotions. I will then argue that my limited sense of 'responsibility' is sufficient to warrant morale valuation of individuals, and can be used as the basis for a theory of punishment. (shrink)

In his poem ‘The Last Hours of Cassiodorus’, Peter Porter has the Christian sage ask: ‘After me, what further barbarisms?’. Yet, Cassiodorus himself accepted, even valorized, at least one form of barbarism that had been rejected by earlier rhetoricians: sardismos, the mixture of multiple languages in close proximity. In its earliest attestation, Quintilian classified it as a type of solecism. By contrast, five centuries later Cassiodorus in his Commentary on the Psalms used the term three times to praise the (...) mixture of Greek, Hebrew and Latin in the Latin Psalter. This reversal, from vice to virtue of speech, illustrates some significant changes in attitudes toward language and multilingualism that developed as Christianity reshaped Roman literary culture. For one, Christian preachers, modelling themselves on the plain style of the Gospels, embraced forms of speech that had been regarded as low and stigmatized. In the words of Augustine : ‘better you understand us in our barbarism than to have been deserted in our eloquence’.1 Secondly, Hebrew now entered the linguistic consciousness of the Roman literary elite as one of the three languages of Scripture. Even if in-depth knowledge remained rare, it was worthy of being mentioned alongside Greek and Latin, just as it had appeared with them in the inscription on Jesus’ cross. Lastly, linguistic variety itself came to be positively valued since it reflected the diversity of a church coming together out of many peoples. Commenting on the bride's appearance in Psalm 45, both Augustine and Cassiodorus saw the variegated adornment of her robe as a reference to the diversity of Christian languages. (shrink)

In this commentary I argue that Byrne & Hilbert commit a number of philosophical solecisms: They beg the question of “realism,” they take the phenomenon and the theoretical model to be the same thing, and they surreptitiously substitute data sets for the life-world.

Crispin Wright’s “Unified Strategy” for addressing some familiar sceptical paradoxes exploits a subtle distinction between two different ways in which we can be related to a proposition: (full-blown) belief and (mere) acceptance. The importance of the distinction for his strategy stems from his conviction that we cannot acquire any kind of evidence, either empirical or a priori, for the “cornerstones” of our cognitive projects, i.e., for those basic presuppositions of our inquiries that we must be warranted to endorse if we (...) are to claim warrant for any of the beliefs formed as a result of such inquiries: regarding the idea of a non-evidential warrant to believe a proposition as a kind of “conceptual solecism”, he doesn’t set himself the task of showing that we are evidentially warranted to believe such presuppositions, but only that of showing that we are non-evidentially warranted to accept them. In the present paper, I argue that such choice involves a fatal departure from a basic principle governing doxastic commitment—a principle that requires that we regard cornerstones propositions as propositions we are rationally committed to believe, not just entitled to accept. I press the point by presenting the Acceptance Argument, a sceptical paradox whose consideration leads to the conclusion that the Unified Strategy is caught between the Scylla of incoherently invoking a rather dubious form of epistemic alchemy and the Charybdis of placing an unexpected and apparently ad hoc restriction on the doxastic commitments we undertake by believing the things we believe. My final suggestion is that the Unified Strategy might be spared this dilemma only by undergoing a rather radical revision—a revision that would require setting aside the distinction between belief and acceptance to re-conceptualise its goal unabashedly in terms of (non-evidentially) warranted belief. (shrink)

What is commonly called a right has since about 1980 increasingly come to be called a subjective right. In this paper the origin and rise of this solecism is investigated. Its use can result in a lack of clarity and even confusion. Some aspects of rights-concepts and their history are also discussed. A brief postscript introduces Leibniz's Razor.

There are two ways in which the text as it stands has been construed: Cypris came sweet and smiling ; sweet Cypris also came smiling . Of these is at least grammatical. The order of words, too, can be paralleled . But what I think cannot be paralleled is this curious conjunction of adj. and partic. is frankly ungrammatical. Yet Legrand adopts it, adding: ‘Il faut reconnaitre une construction incorrecte au moins dans ces quatre passages: 1. 95…; 1. 109 ραîος (...) ξδωνις ; 4. 49 οικον τ λαγωβΌλον ; 29. 33 τàν γνυν νδρειαν . Of the last three we can with confidence say that ραîος and νδρειαν are to be taken as predicative; in 4. 49 Legrand himself now accepts the emendation τι for τΌ, as he does in the similar 15. 145 passage. There is not, in fact, sufficient, or indeed any, evidence to convict Theocritus of this solecism. Emendation has been rife, but unhappy. ‘Nescio an ipse rem acu tetigerim, legens νӨ γε μν, νíα δ, καì K. γ.,’ writes Briggs. We think he has not. (shrink)

Miss Steuart, in her recent edition of the Annals of Ennius, prints the notorious line, ‘O Tite, tute, Tati, tibi tanta tyranne tulisti,’ among the fragmenta spuria, and shows that the attribution of it to Ennius is late and uncertain. That it is old is shown by the fact that it is quoted in the Ad Herennium. Miss Steuart classes it among the ‘freak’ lines by which Hardie thought Lucilius illustrated his hundred kinds of Solecism.

κάτοπτρον, which is in all the manuscripts, was emended by Canter to κάτοπτον, and this emendation, or Headlam's κατόπτην, has been received by subsequent editors. Those who read κάτοπτον have been in the habit of taking the word to mean here ‘looking down upon’, and in support of this interpretation they sometimes adduce a scholium in M, κατόψιον. This does seem to prove that the scholar, whose note is copied in our scholium, found κάτοπτον in his text. Presumably he took (...) Σαρωνικο πορθμο κάτοπτον to signify ‘descried from the Saronic gulf’, having very possibly in his mind the phrase in Euripides, Hippolytus 30, where the temple of Cypris is said to be κατόψιον γς τσδε, visible from Troezen. At least we ought not without proof to lay to his account what appears to be the solecism of regarding κάτοπτον as if it meant ‘looking down upon’. Headlam's κατόπτην has at least an active force, but I cannot find that it means ‘one who looks down upon’, if that is the sense desired; it is a ‘spy’ or an ‘inspector’. And, at the end of all discussion, when one asks what in fact is this peak or headland that ‘looks down upon the Saronic crossing’, then commentators take refuge in silence or tend to contradict one another. An emendation that nobody can be sure he understands can hardly be regarded as satisfactory. It may be feared that what has happened is this. In order to get rid of κάτοπτρον, which appeared to them devoid of meaning, editors have introduced into the text a word which does not mean what they want it to mean, and which, if it had that meaning, would still present us with a picture which no man can recognize. (shrink)

The need for the critical edition of texts was not ended by the advent of printing. If anyone were naif enough to think so he could hardly be better instructed than by having his attention drawn to the cautionary tale of Locke’s Treatises Admittedly there were special circumstances affecting the printed text, notably Locke’s ‘determined anonymity’, understandable in the conditions of the time and given the drift of the work, but taken by Locke to the extremes of dealing with his (...) printer through an intermediary and of using a code-name for the work in his own private lists. Yet when allowance is made for these circumstances the fact remains that the text of Locke’s Treatises currently used is a gravely defective one. It is not that the variants are individually important or substantially affect the sense in more than a tiny minority of cases; it is rather that there are so very many of them that, cumulatively, they undermine confidence. As Mr Laslett points out there is a strong case for applying the canons of criticism, traditionally applied to the classics of the Ancient World and of modern literature, to documents of modern political theory. The resulting changes may not be great; and most are of the order of the abandonment of the solecisms Two Treatises of Civil Government and Second Treatise of Civil Government where Locke wrote Two Treatises of Government and Essay concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government But scholarship owes it to Locke to use all its resources to ascertain his text. (shrink)