Institutional economics and discourse theory stand unconnected next to each other, in spite of the fact that they both ask for the legitimacy of institutions (normative) and the functioning and effectiveness of institutions (positive). Both use as theoretical constructions rational individuals and the concept of consensus for legitimacy. Whereas discourse theory emphasizes the conditions of a legitimate consensus and could thus enable institutional economics to escape the infinite regress of judging a consensus legitimate, institutional (...) class='Hi'>economics has a tested social science paradigm (rational choice) of explaining and predicting the functioning of institutions. The article outlines a theoretical synthesis of the two theories by finding points in common and possibilities of fruitful combinations concerning the problem of legitimacy, institutional design and effectiveness of legal norms. (shrink)

Institutional economics and discourse theory stand unconnected next to each other, in spite of the fact that they both ask for the legitimacy of institutions (normative) and the functioning and effectiveness of institutions (positive). Both use as theoretical constructions rational individuals and the concept of consensus for legitimacy. Whereas discourse theory emphasizes the conditions of a legitimate consensus and could thus enable institutional economics to escape the infinite regress of judging a consensus legitimate, institutional (...) class='Hi'>economics has a tested social science paradigm (rational choice) of explaining and predicting the functioning of institutions. The article outlines a theoretical synthesis of the two theories by finding points in common and possibilities of fruitful combinations concerning the problem of legitimacy, institutional design and effectiveness of legal norms. Key Words: consensus • discourse theory • effectiveness of legal rules • institutional design • legitimacy • new institutional economics. (shrink)

Shigeto Tsuru is one of Japan's most respected senior economists. In these lectures, he provides a reappraisal of institutionalism as a school of thought and discusses its relevance for the issues which the economic profession today must tackle. Tsuru reconsiders Marxian political economy as an 'institutionalist school', which provides a context for the following discussion of J. M. Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter and Thorstein Veblen. He goes on to present the four key elements of modern institutionalism - i.e., the open-system character (...) of the economy; the problem of planning; the evolutionary process of modern economics; and the normative character of economics - by way of an examination of three present-day institutionalists, Gunnar Myrdal, John K. Galbraith, and K. William Kapp. Tsuru concludes with an evaluation of modern institutionalism and the future of institutional economics. (shrink)

In this paper, we take inspiration from original institutional economics (OIE) as an approach to study value change within the highly complex assembly of sociotechnical transformations that make up the energy transition. OIE is examined here as a suitable perspective, as it combines Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and a methodological interactionist perspective on value change, behavior and institutions, with technology figuring as a transformational factor. This combination overcomes conceptual and methodological shortcomings of alternative accounts of values. We will present (...) the contours of an OIE based conceptual framework connecting nature, humans, technology, the economic process, society, culture and institutions and habits, valuation and behavior. We illustrate how to use this framework to examine and understand how environmental, ecologic, safety, economic, and social concerns about the energy transition are (re)framed as (new) values in the belief systems and habits of individuals and groups. Moreover, we will explore how that may give rise to collective action, via the institutionalization of such revised values in the procedures, arrangements, norms and incentives guiding transactions. As such, this approach allows us in a fine-grained manner to conceptually and theoretically understand the way in which values change in the energy-transition, as a complex interaction of technology development and social relations. (shrink)

The article suggests that in a modern context, where value pluralism is a prevailing and possibly, even ethically desirable interaction condition, institutional economics provides a more viable business ethics than behavioural business ethics, such as Kantianism or religious ethics. The article explains how the institutional economic approach to business ethics analyses morality with regard to an interaction process, and favours non-behavioural, situational intervention with incentive structures and with capital exchange. The article argues that this approach may have (...) to be prioritised over behavioural business ethics, which tends to analyse morality at the level of the individual and favours behavioural intervention with the individual’s value, norm and belief system, e.g. through ethical pedagogy, communicative techniques, etc. Quaker ethics is taken as an example of behavioural ethics. The article concludes that through the conceptual grounding of behavioural ethics in the economic approach, theoretical and practical limitations of behavioural ethics, as encountered in a modern context, can be relaxed. Probably only then can behavioural ethics still contribute to raising moral standards in interactions amongst the members (stakeholders) of a single firm, and equally, amongst (the stakeholders of) different firms. (shrink)

Property rights are the rules governing ownership in society. This Element offers an analytical framework to understand the origins and consequences of property rights. It conceptualizes of the political economy of property rights as a concern with the follow questions: What explains the origins of economic and legal property rights? What are the consequences of different property rights institutions for wealth creation, conservation, and political order? Why do property institutions change? Why do legal reforms relating to property rights such as (...) land redistribution and legal titling improve livelihoods in some contexts but not others? In analyzing property rights, the authors emphasize the complementarity of insights from a diversity of disciplinary perspectives, including Austrian economics, public choice, and institutional economics, including the Bloomington School of institutional analysis and political economy. (shrink)

The paper presents, in the synthetic way, the issue of the rationality of the tax system and taxation principles in relation to the clearly visible fiscal crisis in the 21st century caused by, among others, COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis which is theoretical (descriptive, comparative) was carried out by using tools indicated in the area of New Institutional Economics (NIE). Attention was devoted primarily to the importance of specific institutional arrangements, broadly understood as the “rules of the game” (...) applicable in the political and economic spheres, and related to the problems of public finances. Research has shown that the appropriate design of tax rules may contribute, to some extent, to limiting the fiscal crisis. Tax policy, and even more broadly, fiscal policy, may determine the formula in which the economic achievements regarding compliance with tax principles and fiscal rules can be implemented. What is primarily important is the legal framework (one of the most important formal institutions) within which state policy in the field of public finances should be implemented. (shrink)

Original, or 'old', institutional economics (OIE) – also known as 'institutionalism' – played a key role in its early stages; it could be said that it was once the 'mainstream economics' of the time. This period ran approximately from the first important contributions of Thorstein Veblen in 1898 to the implementation of the New Deal in the early 1930s, where many institutionalists played a significant role. However, notwithstanding its promising scientific and institutional affirmation, institutional (...) class='Hi'>economics underwent a period of marked decline that spanned from the mid-1930s to the late 1980s, when a new season for institutional economics was set in motion. In order to cast some light on this complex issue – without any claim of completeness – we have organised the work as follows: in the first section we consider the main interpretations of this phenomenon. In the subsequent sections we analyse a number of 'endogenous' aspects which might have played a significant role in the period of decline: (i) the relations of institutional economics with Keynes's macroeconomic theory; (ii) the links between theoretical and empirical analysis and the supposed lack of a clear theory; (iii) the interdisciplinary orientation. (shrink)

Read Arturo Hermann's paper, 'The Decline of the "Original Institutional Economics" in the Post-World War II Period and the Perspectives of Today'...

In a recent manuscript, Rogowski and Lange (J Bus Ethics 177:63–77, 2022) evaluate whether the prisoner’s dilemma can be used as a legitimate framework with which to examine health-related economic ethics decisions. In this commentary, I build upon Rogowski and Lange (J Bus Ethics 177:63–77, 2022) using the original institutional economics literature to argue a more subtle, but critical point. Except in extreme circumstances, the use of the prisoner’s dilemma does _not_ qualify as a legitimate, comprehensive framework in (...) which to address most health-related economic ethics problems. Indeed, the intentional characterization of the prisoner’s dilemma as a robust health economic ethics framework is often used to mask the _absence_ of a formal ethical framework. However, this distinction may provide a more concrete, and appropriate, justification to use the prisoner’s dilemma to assess a wider array of health-related economic ethics problems. (shrink)

Stakeholder theorists have traditionally objected to the neoclassical conception of the firm as a vehicle for maximizing profit or shareholder wealth, thus opening up space for controversial engagement with neoclassical economics. The present paper fills some of this space by elaborating the parallels between stakeholder theory and classical institutional economics, a heterodox school of economic thought that has long been critical of a broad range of neoclassical ideas. Rooted in the writings of Veblen and Commons, classical (...) class='Hi'>institutional economics explores how the social provisioning process is coordinated or hindered by real-world business institutions. From this standpoint, stakeholder theory highlights the possibility of overcoming the institutionally ingrained conflicts and trade-offs for the sake of realizing common human interests in organizing the social provisioning process in an orderly and reasonable way. This argument not only illuminates the relationship of stakeholder theory to the wider societal context of modern capitalist economies but also elaborates novel aspects of the moral nature of stakeholder management. (shrink)

In this work we analyse the main interpretations of ownership in Original Institutional Economics (OIE) and their links with pragmatist psychology and psychoanalysis. We consider Thorstein Veblen's notion of ownership as a relation of possession of persons, and John R.Commons's distinction between “corporeal” and “intangible” property, that marks the shift from a material possession of goods and arbitrary power over the workers to the development of human faculties in a more participatory environment. For space reasons we do not (...) address other contributions developed both by the OIE and by the New Institutional Economics. We then consider a number of contributions of pragmatist social psychology and psychoanalysis that, although not dealing directly with the notion of ownership, can cast light not only on the private and “material“ aspects of ownership but also on its collective and “relational aspects”. The reason why we consider it useful to address different perspectives is that, as observed by the famous sociologist Karl Mannheim (1952), a landscape can be seen only from a determined perspective and without perspective there is no landscape. Hence, observing a landscape (or phenomenon) from different angles (or disciplines) can help to acquire a much clearer insight into the features of the various perspectives. And this is one of the main advantage of a pluralist approach to the study of economic and social phenomena, also aimed at overcoming the fragmentation so often present in social sciences. In this light, the interpretative theories that we address, however different in many respects, present notable complementarities, in the sense that the aspects more overlooked by some are more completely considered by the others. In our work, these different but complementary notions of ownership can help illuminate the manifold aspects of human relations, also with a view to provide a more tailored policy action for the solution of their more problematic aspects. (shrink)

He addresses three main issues: first, the historical means by which economics has consciously surrendered its original association with ethical categories and criteria; second, the need to articulate the appropriate thoughtforms and vocabulary of ethical theory; and third, the illustration of areas in economics where ethical awareness is desirable and should be allowed to exert influence.

The aim of this work is to illustrate the psychological contributions of Pragmatism and of the Original Institutional Economics (also referred to as OIE or institutionalism), and their relevance for improving the process of social valuing and, as a consequence, the effectiveness of policy action. As a matter of fact, both institutionalist and pragmatist theories were well acquainted with various strands of psychology, and some of them also provided relevant contributions in this respect. Moreover, these theories reveal, along (...) with various differences, significant complementarities, both between themselves and with important concepts of social psychology and psychoanalysis. The work will address the following aspects: (I) The main characteristics of pragmatist psychology with particular attention to their social implications. For space reasons, we will focus attention on the contributions of authors – John Dewey, William James and George Herbert Mead – more oriented to social sciences. (II) The psychological contributions of institutionalism. We will pay particular attention to Thorstein Veblen's theory of instincts and John Rogers Commons' theory of negotiational psychology. We highlight that these theories present, despite a number of differences, relevant complementarities. (shrink)

Presented at Amer Agri. Econ Assoc. annual meetings, Long Beach, CA, July 28 – 31, 2002..

This paper seeks to examine the relationship and the interaction between institutions, policy and the labour market in the light of the ideas of the first generation of institutional economists, who, in contrast to neoclassicals, conceived of the economy as a nexus of institutions, underlining, therefore, the significant role of institutional and non-market factors in the functioning of an economic system. They also criticised those who define (economic) welfare only in terms of efficiency and satisfaction of consumer interests; (...) institutionalists instead focus on issues related to justice, human self-development and labourers' welfare. In addition, early institutionalists paid considerable attention to the institutional framework of the labour market. In particular, the first generation of institutional economists highlighted the importance of institutions and other non-market parameters in determining the level of wages and employment (e.g. the role of the bargaining power of workers and employers). Furthermore, they made substantial contributions towards the field of labour policy and they were pioneers in the formulation of economic and social policy. Specifically, various modern institutions and labour market policies, such as unemployment benefits, industrial training and active employment policies, were implemented in the US, during the first decades of the 20th century, after the recommendation of the institutional labour economists. Therefore, their ideas, besides being interesting from a historical point of view, may also be useful in today's analysis of workers' problems and the functioning of modern labour markets. (shrink)

Our economic system, the market economy, is a part of a broader system or “society.” We frequently study the operation of the market economy as if it were autonomous, even though there are many complex and mutual relationships between society, the economic system and the other systems – political, cultural, religious, legal, etc. – that form part of society. In a market economy we may identify several components: a frame or background in which the economic activity takes place, a set (...) of ideas and theories, the values shared by this society, the set of institutions, norms and rules that control the economic behavior of people, and the incentives or motivations of the economic agents. The play of these elements defines the operation of a market economy. Is ethics an institution, or does it belong to the set of values and ideas? In this paper I will discuss the role of institutions, norms and rules in society, with special reference to the economic system, in order to gain insight into the relationship between institutions and ethics. I study first the concept and features of social institutions and norms; second, institutional change, and third, the relationship between ethics and institutions. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Mit Beginn der Spielzeit 2013/14 traten alle Maßnahmen des UEFA Financial Fair Play-Konzeptes in Kraft. Vornehmliches Ziel dieses regulatorischen Eingriffs ist es, der wachsenden Verschuldungs­rate auf Seiten der europäischen Vereine sowie der zunehmenden Abhängigkeit von Investoren entgegenzusteuern. Um die Effektivität und Effizienz solcher Maßnahmen zu erhöhen, ist ein tief­gehendes Verständnis der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen unabdingbar. Vor diesem Hinter­grund beschreibt und interpretiert der konzeptionelle Artikel das Verhältnis zwischen der UEFA und den Klubs mit Hilfe eines institutionenökonomischen Instrumentariums. Aus verfügungsrecht­licher Sicht wird (...) eine Verschiebung der Eigentums- und Machtverhältnisse zu Ungunsten der UEFA skizziert. Weiter zeigt sich, dass die Beziehung zwischen dem Dachverband und den Vereinen in vielen Aspekten einer klassischen Principal-Agent-Dyade entspricht. Die vorliegende Analyse baut diesbezüglich auf einer vorherigen Fallstudie von Schubert auf und entwickelt dessen Modell weiter. Die von der UEFA im Rahmen von Financial Fair Play verfolgte Strategie wird evaluiert, um daraus theoriebasiert handlungsleitende Gestaltungsempfehlungen zur Steigerung der Wirksamkeit des regulatorischen Eingriffs abzuleiten. (shrink)

Der brasilianische Aktienmarkt, dessen Rahmenbedingungen in den Jahren 2000/2001 grundlegend umgestaltet wurden, hat danach einen beeindruckenden Aufstieg erlebt, der erst im Herbst 2008 durch die globale Finanzmarktkrise und vor allem durch den Verfall der Rohstoffpreise gestoppt wurde. Dieser Aufstieg ist Anlass genug für eine Länderstudie, die sich mit den für Brasilien maßgebenden ökonomischen Faktoren und Institutionen auseinandersetzt und dabei folgende Frage beantwortet: Welche makroökonomischen Faktoren und institutionellen Veränderungen müssen zusammentreffen, um einen lokalen Aktienmarkt im Zeitalter der Globalisierung erfolgreich zu reformieren? (...) Die Antwort wird auf der Basis einer vergleichenden Analyse jener staatlichen und privatautonomen Regelwerke entwickelt, die für den Aktienmarkt rahmenbildend sind. Dabei werden unterschiedliche Regulierungstechniken und Arrangements einander gegenübergestellt und im Hinblick auf ihre Fähigkeit bewertet, die Markteffizienz zu verbessern. (shrink)

This book is about the conceptual foundations of an intermediate way between liberalism and socialism: a synthesis of classical and Keynesian political economy. Classical theory deals with proportions between individuals or collectives and society in tackling problems of distribution and value. Keynesian theory is concerned with the scale of economic activity as explained by effective demand. The economy considered is primarily a monetary production economy, not a market or a planned economy. The author sets up a system linking political economy (...) with other social sciences, i.e. sociology, law and politics in the traditional sense, thus establishing the unity of the social sciences. To complete the picture, issues of method associated with the theory of knowledge in the social sciences and the problem of linking theory with historical reality are also covered. (shrink)

An important part of what it means for agents to be situated in the everyday world of human affairs includes their engagement with economic practices. In this paper we employ the concept of cognitive institutions in order to provide an enactive and interactive interpretation of market and economic reasoning. We challenge traditional views that understand markets in terms of market structures or as processors of distributed information. The alternative conception builds upon the notion of the market as a ‘scaffolding institution’. (...) Introducing the concept of market as a ‘socially extended’ cognitive institution we go beyond the notion of scaffolding to provide an enactive view of economic reasoning that understands the market participant in terms of social interactive processes and relational autonomy. Markets are more than inert devices for information processing; they can be viewed as ‘highly scaffolded’, where strong constraints and incentives predictably direct agents’ behavior. Building on this idea we argue that markets emerge from (a) the economic interaction of both supply and demand sides, in continual and mutual interplay, and (b) more basic social interactions. Consumer behavior in the marketplace is complex, not only determining the market price, but also extending the consumer’s cognitive processes to reliably attain a correct evaluation of the good. Moreover, this economic reasoning is socially situated and not something done in isolation from other consumers From a socially situated, interactive point of view buying or not buying a good is something that enacts the market. This shifts the status of markets from external institutions that merely causally affect participants’ cognitive processes to social institutions that constitutively extend these cognitive processes. On this view the constraints imposed by social interactions, as well as the possibilities enabled by such interactions, are such that economic reasoning is never just an individual process carried out by an autonomous individual, classically understood. In this regard, understanding the concept of relational autonomy allows us to see how economic reasoning is always embodied, embedded in, and scaffolded by intersubjective interactions, and how such interactions make the market what it is. (shrink)

This book uses game theory to analyse the creation, evolution and function of economic and social institutions. The author illustrates his analysis by describing the organic or unplanned evolution of institutions such as the conventions of war, the use of money, property rights and oligopolistic pricing conventions. Professor Schotter begins by linking his work with the ideas of the philosophers Rawls, Nozick and Lewis. Institutions are regarded as regularities in the behaviour of social agents, which the agents themselves tacitly create (...) to solve a wide variety of recurrent problems. The repetitive nature of the problems permits them to be described as a recurrent game or 'supergame.' The agents use these regularities as informational devices to supplement the information contained in competitive prices. The final chapter explores the applicability of this theory, first by relating it to previous work on the theory of teams, hierarchies, and non-maximizing decision theory, and then by using it to provide a new approach to a variety of questions both within and outside economics. (shrink)

The paper maps out an alternative to a behavioural (economic) approach to business ethics. Special attention is paid to the fundamental philosophical principle that any moral ‘ought’ implies a practical ‘can’, which the paper interprets with regard to the economic viability of moral agency of the firm under the conditions of the market economy, in particular competition. The paper details an economic understanding of business ethics with regard to classical and neo-classical views, on the one hand, and institutional, libertarian (...) thought, on the other hand. Implications are derived regarding unintentional and passive intentional moral agency of the firm. The paper moves on to suggest that moral agency can be economically viable in competitive ‘market’ interactions, which is conventionally disputed by classical/neo-classical and institutional, libertarian economics. The paper here conceptualises active moral agency of the firm as the utilisation of ethical capital in firm--stakeholder interactions. This yields a reinterpretation of instrumental stakeholder theory. (shrink)

This paper discusses recent attempts by economists to analyze institutional structure using individualist methodology. It is argued that developments in game theory, as well as advances in the analysis of transactions costs, have proved surprisingly fertile in yielding insights into the nature and structure of institutions. The example of the university is used to illustrate the ways in which the economic approach to institutions can be applied. In particular, the nature of academic contracts and the non?profit status of universities (...) are related to the literature on contractual hazards. Although methodologically very different from sociological or historical analysis of institutions, it is argued that the new institutional economics may provide a bridge permitting greater contact between hitherto almost entirely separate disciplines. (shrink)

This book examines and compares the two major traditions of institutionalist thinking in economics: the 'old' institutionalism of Veblen, Mitchell, Commons, and Ayres, and the 'new' institutionalism developed more recently from neoclassical and Austrian sources and including the writings of Coase, Williamson, North, Schotter, and many others. The discussion is organized around a set of key methodological, theoretical, and normative problems that necessarily confront any attempt to incorporate institutions into economics. These are identified in terms of the issues (...) surrounding the use of formal or non-formal analytical methods, individualist or holistic approaches, the respective roles of rational choice and rule-following behavior, the relative importance of the spontaneous evolution and deliberative design of institutions, and questions concerning the normative appraisal of institutions. The old and the new institutionalism have often been paired on opposite sides of these issues, and the issues themselves presented in a series of sharp dichotomies. Professor Rutherford argues, however, that matters are both more complex and more challenging. Although each tradition embodies fascinating insights into the study of economic institutions - their functioning, evolution, and impact on human welfare - neither has as yet provided fully satisfactory answers to the problems identified. (shrink)

A collection of specially commissioned papers which apply new analytical methods to the dtudy of the institutions, their origin, maintenance, and adaptation, which play such an important role in agrarian relations and rural development.

Economic institutions governing such activities as food sharing among non-kin, the accumulation and inheritance of wealth, and the division of labor and its rewards are human-constructed environments capable of imparting distinctive direction and pace to the process of biological evolution and cultural change. Where differing structures of these institutions take the form of distinct conventions sustained by (near) mutual adherence, small initial differences may support divergent evolutionary trajectories even in the absence of conformist behaviors.

In this article, we provide a broad overview of the interplay among cognition, belief systems, and institutions, and how they affect economic performance. We argue that a deeper understanding of institutions’ emergence, their working properties, and their effect on economic and political outcomes should begin from an analysis of cognitive processes. We explore the nature of individual and collective learning, stressing that the issue is not whether agents are perfectly or boundedly rational, but rather how human beings actually reason and (...) choose, individually and in collective settings. We then tie the processes of learning to institutional analysis, providing arguments in favor of what can be characterized as “cognitive institutionalism.” Besides, we show that a full treatment of the phenomenon of path dependence should start at the cognitive level, proceed at the institutional level, and culminate at the economic level. (shrink)

_The assessment of institutional quality and its influence on economic performance is highly relevant in Nigeria due to the country's constantly changing governmental institutions, dynamic market circumstances, and diversified socioeconomic atmosphere. Thus, the study aims to investigate the impact of institutional quality on the economic performance of Nigeria. This study employed ex post facto research, while time series data was used, which spans from 1996 to 2021, sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Worldwide Governance (...) Indicators (WGI). The study employed unit root tests, Johansen cointegration, and the Error Correction Model as estimation techniques. However, post estimation tests such as normality, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity and stability tests were carried to ascertain the level of statistical accuracy outcome of the variables used. The findings suggest that there is a sustained nexus between the quality of institutions and characteristics related to economic growth. Also, it was equally found out that political stability has a significant impact in the short run. This suggests that a unit increase in political instability would definitely amount to a decrease in economic performance in Nigeria during the period under investigation. The study suggests enhancing accountability, transparency, administrative efficiency, and law adherence to improve Nigerian institutions. This can be achieved through reform implementation, capacity building, and good governance mechanisms, while reducing political unrest and fostering stability._. (shrink)

Winner of the Schumpeter Prize, 2000 and Winner of the Smith Prize in Austrian Economics, 2000, this book explores how the limitations of human knowledge create both opportunities and problems in the modern economy. The growing field of evolutionary economics has developed as a result of the traditional failure of the discipline to explain certain phenomena that impact greatly on the economy. These are: *_Evolution_ - the impact on the economy of natural change over time *_Institutions_ - the (...) impact on the economy of government and/or company policy, rules and regulations *_Knowledge_ - the impact on the economy that is felt when new information becomes available _Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics _is a punchy overview of these topics and one that has become regarded as something of a modern classic that no serious social sciences academic or student should be without. (shrink)

An important research programme has developed in economics that extends neo-classical economic theory in order to examine the effects of institutions on economic behaviour. The body of work emerging from this line of inquiry includes contributions from various branches of economic theory, such as the economics of property rights, the theory of the firm, cliometrics and law and economics. This book is a comprehensive survey of this research programme which the author terms 'neoinstitutional economics'. The author (...) proposes a unified approach to this research, integrating the work of various contributors and emphasising the common principles of inquiry that tie the work together. The theoretical discussion is accompanied by empirical studies dealing with a range of institutions and economic systems. This book will serve as the primary resource for economists and students who want to learn about this important branch of economic theory. (shrink)

As the answer to sustainability concerns, green economic growth has gradually attracted considerable attention. Notably, the optimization of the institutional environment contributes to green economic growth from the perspective of new institutional economics. However, few studies have systematically explained the connection between the institutional environment and green growth. In this study, the institutional environment was divided into three dimensions: governmental, legal, and cultural subenvironments. We adopted econometric models with the effect of every dimension on green (...) growth and empirically analyzed with the generalized method of moments, based on Chinese provincial panel data from the years 2000–2016. The results indicated that there was an inverted U-shaped relationship between China’s institutional environment and its green growth. That is, the institutional environment can initially promote China’s green growth but, if it is not changed, will eventually inhibit it. In addition, the analysis on the three dimensions of the institutional environment highlighted that the role of the cultural subenvironment in green growth is greater than those of the governmental and legal subenvironments. (shrink)

The following is a short introduction to this special issue, which builds on and significantly extends and updates the research published recently in the Iwanami Series on Japanese economic history. First, we offer a modern interpretation of four institutional elements that are particularly important for understanding the growth path of the Japanese economy. These are (a) ownership; (b) regulation of factor markets; (c) labor mobility and (d) the judiciary. These four elements properly clarify the incentive structure behind economic institutions. (...) We then briefly explain how the four articles in this special issue—two at the macro level providing updated estimates of long-run rates of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and total factor productivity (TFP), and two at the micro level examining institutional changes in specific markets—build on this unified framework, and deepen our understanding of Japanese economic history. (shrink)

The book highlights the ethical aspects and issues that are inherent to economics in the context of today's prominent social institutions. It reviews a range of problems concerning dominant social institutions, namely markets, government agencies, corporate entities, financial networks, and religious systems. Further, in each case, the book takes a detailed look at the economic problems as they arise within a broader sociological and political environment, taking into account the respective ethical/philosophical paradigms. It analyzes from an ethical point of (...) view topics like the evolution of economic thought, happiness and spirituality, and human values in relation to ethics. (shrink)

The essays in this book discuss human behavior and the institutions of capitalism. The essays are non-technical and are written so as to be accessible to students of all disciplines and to all other persons interested in capitalism and in economic behavior. They often present unconventional views of the topics they discuss. Those containing unconventional views discuss self-interested behavior, selfish gene theory, the meaning and social function of private ownership, the externality problem, the nature of the firm and the rise (...) of capitalism. The essays are not meant to be a textbook, but they offer a useful supplementary reading source for courses in business, economics and law that deal with human behavior in the marketplace and with capitalism, ownership, markets and firms. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction A Characterization of Economic Analysis of Law Normativity Preference and Obligation Concluding Remarks Note References.