He addresses three main issues: first, the historical means by which economics has consciously surrendered its original association with ethical categories and criteria; second, the need to articulate the appropriate thoughtforms and vocabulary of ethical theory; and third, the illustration of areas in economics where ethical awareness is desirable and should be allowed to exert influence.

The place of money capital in the theory of the firm has remained a relatively neglected question in traditions of economic analysis. In this highly integrative work, issues in production, pricing, capital investment and financial theory are brought to new levels of interdependence. Developing a three-part argument, Money Capital in the Theory of the Firm deals successively with the theoretical issues and analytic motivation, the neoclassical tradition and postclassical perspectives. In doing so, it presents a self-contained foundation in the basic (...) structures of microeconomic analysis relating to optimize decision making in the firm and in the accounting concepts and statistical apparatus of probability theory relevant to the neoclassical aspects of the argument. Additionally, the book provides the essential mathematical development of such advanced topics as utility functions defined over stochastic arguments, the equilibrium theory of financial asset prices and yields, the cost of money capital, and investment decision criteria. This book makes an important contribution to the formation of new and analytically richer perspectives in the important area of economics it addresses. It will be of particular interest to those working in economic theory and microeconomics, and their advanced students. (shrink)

Glenberg's account falls short in several respects. Besides requiring clearer explication of basic concepts, his account fails to recognize the autonomous nature of perception. His account of what is remembered, and its description, is too static. His strictures against connectionist modeling might be overcome by combining the notions of psychological space and principled learning in an embodied and situated network.

Shepard's notion of “internalisation” is better interpreted as a simile than a metaphor. A fractal encoding model of visual perception is sketched, in which image elements are transformed in such a way as to maximise symmetry with the current input. This view, in which the transforming system embodies what has been internalised, resolves some problems raised by the metaphoric interpretation. [Hecht; Shepard].