This essay exposes several problems with reductionist approaches to art, placing some specific focus on ‘The Science of Art’ by Vilayanur S. Ramachandran and William Hirstein . Their article seems to be representative of this genre in general, though particularly egregious in certain dimensions. My approach will differ greatly from that of a neuroscientist, philosopher, or psychologist, since I primarily take a critical feminist, social-literary perspective. I will argue that reductionist approaches to art are an intoxicating composite of arrogance, insight, (...) confusion and precision, an amalgam that challenges the commentator to distinguish what is worth praising, what is worth attacking, and what is best left alone. In particular, I will demonstrate that Ramachandran and Hirstein confuse arousal with beauty, with the disastrous result of excluding most of what is usually taken to distinguish ‘high’ art from its ‘lower’ forms, such as advertising, industrial design, and pornography. (shrink)

In this paper we investigated how justifications for price increases are associated with risky decision making and emotional responses. Across two studies with paired lottery choices and sequential decisions, we found that participants presented with a justification for price increases based on increasing demand decided to invest in a comparatively riskier asset more often than participants presented with a justification for price increases based on increasing tax or those presented with no justification at all. We also found that participants presented (...) with justifications for price increases based on increasing demand also reported more arousal displayed higher galvanic skin response than people in the other two justification conditions. Together, these studies provide evidence that the sole increasing demand underlying a price increase of a risky asset can influence the decision to buy it and suggests that emotional activation is involved in such a decision process. (shrink)

Humans accumulate porphyrins in the body mostly during the course of porphyrias, diseases caused by defects in the enzymes of the heme biosynthesis pathway and that produce acute attacks, skin lesions and liver cancer. In contrast, some wild mammals and birds are adapted to accumulate porphyrins without injurious consequences. Here we propose viewing such physiological adaptations as potential solutions to human porphyrias, and suggest certain wild animals as models. Given the enzymatic activity and/or the patterns of porphyrin excretion and (...) accumulation, the fox squirrel, the great bustard and the Eurasian eagle owl may constitute overlooked models for different porphyrias. The Harderian gland of rodents, where large amounts of porphyrins are synthesized, presents an underexplored potential for understanding the carcinogenic/toxic effect of porphyrin accumulation. Investigating how these animals avoid porphyrin pathogenicity may complement the use of laboratory models for porphyrias and provide new insights into the treatment of these disorders. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the concept of ontological frame. Secondly, two models are distinguished on this structure. The first one is connected to Kant’s concept of possible object and the second one relates to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source of possibility is the mere logical consistency of the notions involved, so that possibility coincides with analytical possibility. Kant, instead, argues that consistency is only a necessary component of possibility. According to Kant, something is (...) possible if there is a cause capable of bringing it into existence; to this end consistency alone is not sufficient. Thus, while the Leibnizian notion of consistency is at the root of the concept of analytical possibility, the Kantian notion of possibility is the source of real possibility. This difference plays an important role in the discussion of Gödel’s ontological proof, which can be formally interpreted on the ontological frame of the pure perfections. While this proof, under some emendation condition, is conclusive in the context of Leibniz’s ontological model, it is not so within the Kantian one. This issue will be the subject of the second part of the present essay. (shrink)