The concept of privacy is intimately related to epistemological concepts such as information and knowledge, yet for the longest time had received only scant attention from epistemologists. This has begun to change in recent years, and different philosophical accounts have been proposed. On the liberal model of privacy, what privacy aims at is the protection of individuals from interference in personal matters. On the (more narrowly epistemological) informational model, privacy is a matter of limiting access to (or maintaining control over) (...) certain types of information. Furthermore, it is sometimes claimed that privacy aims at preventing the formation of (potentially negative) judgments by others. This paper compares and contrasts the various approaches and identifies a number of shortcomings. It then outlines an alternative account, the disattendability/civil inattention model of privacy, according to which what constitutes a breach of privacy is neither the acquisition of new information per se, nor the formation of judgments by others, but the fact that undue attention is being paid to routinized (or otherwise unobtrusive) aspects of the target’s everyday life. This account, it is argued, is explanatorily superior to its competitors, in that it accounts both for the cultural contingency of privacy conventions and for the emergence of new threats to privacy (e.g. from electronic surveillance). The paper concludes by reflecting on remaining tensions within the proposed account of privacy and by commenting on its social ramifications. (shrink)

This paper explores the temporal dimension of risks associated with the production, trade and consumption of food. The paper operates at many levels of substantive and theoretical analysis: it focuses on problems for understanding and action that arise from the invisibility of the hazards, explores the effects of those hazards on consumers and sets out the differences in risks that are faced by farmers, processors, traders and consumers. With its emphasis on that which tends to be disattended in conventional social (...) science analysis – the temporal and the invisible – the paper has implications for social theory at the level of ontology and epistemology. It concludes with reflections on the role of social theory in such contemporary timescapes of risk. (shrink)

Do LGBT+ persons have a moral duty of some form to resist heterosexist oppression by refusing to “cover” (i.e., “to ‘disattend,’ or tone down, their (despised) sexuality in an effort to fit into and be accepted by the mainstream” (Ghosh 2018, 273))? Writing in response to Kenji Yoshino (Yoshino 2002 and 2006), Cyril Ghosh argues that such a duty would itself be oppressive. In this reply to Ghosh’s new book, I wish to argue that while Ghosh demonstrates that Yoshino’s critique (...) of covering suffers some serious defects, his arguments leave open the possibility of a defense of a qualified moral duty on the part of LGBT+ persons to refrain from covering. (shrink)