Commentary on Tshad ma rigs gter, a work on Buddhist logic by Sa-skya Paṇḍi-ṭa Kun-dgaʾ-rgyal-mtshan, 1182-1251.

Collected works of author predominantly on Sakyapa liturgical, rituals, and sadhanas texts.

On the exposition of Buddhist logic; study initiated by Ngagyur Nyingma Institute.

Exegesis of Blo rig and Rtags rigs, treatise in logic in Tibetan Buddhism.

On correct method of understanding various Buddhist philosophical concepts according to sutras and tantras in accordance with Karmapa VIII Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje interpreation.

Exegetical work on Buddhist logic (pramāṇaśastra); includes questions/answers format on Prajñāpāramitā.

On Buddhist debate and dialectic according to Sakyapa sect.

Critical study on the life and works of Chos rgyal Khri-srong-lde-btsan, the 38th king of Tibet with special reference to Nyaya (tshad ma) text Bka' yang dag paʼi tshad ma.

Selected works of author's predominantly on Buddhist dialectical studies and mind training (Blo-sbyoṅ).

Collected works of Shes-rab-rgya-mtsho, 1884-1968 on Gelukpa doctrines etc.

Explanation of the philosophical position (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

On correct method of understanding various Buddhist philosophical concepts according to sutras and tantras. (Dus gsum gyi rgyal ba sras dang bcas paʹi bstan pa mthaʼ dag dang kyad par Rdo-rje-ʼchang Karma-paʼi dgong pa gsal bar byed paʼi bstan bcos thar paʼi lam chen bgrod paʼi shing rta zhes bya ba ʼdi yin no).

Some facts about differentiation between Jonang and Sakyapa doctrines.

Critical study on some important philosophical points of Buddhism and methods of cleansing social problems through Buddhist doctrines.

Collected works of Dmu-dge Bsam-gtan, predominantly on Buddhist doctrines, grammar, and history, including autobiographical writings (v.1), poetic works, refutations, etc.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesus the World-Protector:Eighteenth-Century Gelukpa Historians View Christianity1Michael J. SweetThe assumption that religion was so seamlessly woven into non-Western and preindustrial cultures that it was not even distinguished as a separate entity, let alone regarded as an object for study, has been a commonplace among Western scholars of religion for some decades.2 From this point of view, which can be broadly characterized as postmodernist and postcolonialist, the concept of religion (...) "is not a native category... it is a category imposed from outside... it is the other... colonialists who are solely responsible for the content of the term."3 This is a somewhat reductionistic and Eurocentric perspective that ignores the universal human capacity to empathically understand other belief systems.One counterexample to this school of thought is found in the works of three eighteenth-century religious historians, all of whom were learned monks in the Gelukpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism: Gombojab (Mgon po Skyabs, late seventeenth century–after 1766),4 Sumba Khembo (Sum pa Mkhan po Yes shes dpal 'byor, 1704–1776), and Tuken (Thu'u Bkwan Blo bzang Chos kyi Nyi ma, 1737– 1802), authors of The History of Buddhism in China, The Auspicious Wish-Fulfilling Tree,5 and The Crystal Mirror,6 respectively. These scholars had clear conceptions of their own and other religious systems (Tib.: chos lugs), and compared to earlier Tibetan accounts they present relatively tolerant evaluations of other religious philosophies—for example, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and the Literati Tradition (Ru jiao, "Confucianism")—while asserting the superiority of the Gelukpa form of Tibetan Buddhism.7As a case in point, we will see how they describe and evaluate Christianity, a religion that was quite foreign to them and that they appear to have understood only imperfectly. Earlier Tibetan Buddhist religious histories, of which the best-known are the Blue Annals of 'Gos Lotsawa and Bu ston's "History of the Dharma," are immensely valuable sources, but they are more parochial in their range of interest than those of the eighteenth-century Tibeto-Mongol scholars.8 For the earlier historians Indo-Tibetan Buddhism was the only religious system worth serious consideration, and Chinese Buddhism, Indian non-Buddhist religious philosophies, Bon, [End Page 173] and Islam were dealt with in a polemical or (especially in the case of Islam) a frankly hostile fashion. Something changed in the eighteenth century that produced works closer to modern comparative religion than to medieval heresiography.A major motive for this shift was surely the triumph of the Manchu Qing dynasty, which by the mid-eighteenth century had incorporated Tibet and Mongolia definitively into its sphere. Thus, the horizon of the Tibeto-Mongol intelligentsia widened to include the vast Manchu empire, whose leadership in its turn was becoming increasingly aware of other Asian societies and of the European colonial powers. I believe it is significant that Sumba Khembo, Tuken, and Gombojab were all of Mongol ethnicity, the first two from Amdo and the last from Mongolia; they were able to combine an encyclopedic mastery of Tibetan Buddhist texts and ritual with the greater objectivity available to people stemming from the geographical and cultural periphery of that tradition. All three of them were exposed to the cosmopolitan world of imperial Beijing, where they had ample opportunity to meet followers of non-Buddhist religions of a wide range of ethnicities.9By the mid-eighteenth century there were four Catholic churches in Beijing, serving thousands of Chinese Christian converts. Dozens of European priests were employed by the imperial court as well.10 The prevailing syncretic view of the three major Chinese religious philosophies (sanjiao)—Buddhism, Daoism, and the Literati Tradition—as being mutually complementary,11 prevailed in the capital. This is the view that is approvingly cited by Tuken: "there are three great traditions (lugs srol) which clarify the ultimate nature of things, the Literati Tradition, Daoism, and Buddhism."12In turning to these scholars' treatment of Christianity, we find the earliest notice of this religion in Gombojab's History of Buddhism in China,13 written around the mid-1730s.14 Gombojab renders the name of Jesus in its traditional Chinese form of Yesu; he is called the World... (shrink)

The Tibetan Buddhist logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge devoted a large part of his discussion on argumentation to arguments by consequence. Phya pa distinguishes in his analysis arguments by consequence that merely refute the opponent and arguments by consequence that qualify as probative. The latter induce a correct direct proof which corresponds to the reverse form of the argument by consequence. This paper deals with Phya pa’s classification of probative consequences based on the type of the logical reason (...) involved. I first establish the basis of Phya pa’s classification—the typology of logical reasons in inference-for-oneself—with a special attention to logical reasons consisting in the ‘apprehension of something incompatible [with the negandum]’ and among them the specific case of the ‘apprehension of the cause of something incompatible [with the negandum]’. The treatment of the latter is shown to be instrumental in Phya pa’s classification, as well as in explaining the divergences that occur in the models adopted by his successors, such as gTsang nag pa brTson ʾgrus seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge. Turning to Phya pa’s effective application of this typology when he resorts himself to arguments by consequence, I examine Phya pa’s rephrasing, in the form of four arguments by consequence, of the discussion on the relation between the two realities found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and relate it to a parallel discussion in an earlier Madhyamaka work by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags. I compare the variant versions of these four arguments in three Madhyamaka works of Phya pa and show that the differences pertaining to the identification of the type of the logical reason result from apparently insignificant variations in the formulation of each of the arguments. In the conclusion, I discuss the potential philosophical or practical interest of such a classification. (shrink)

Rgyal ba rdo rje 'chaṅ yab yam gyi rnam thar rin chen gter mdzod -- Saṅs rgyas thams cad kyi rnam 'phrul Rje-btsan Ti-lo-pa'i rnam mgur -- Bde gśegs phag mo gru pa'i rnam thar -- Bram zc chen pos mdzad pa'i ṅoh ha bskor gsum blo gsal mgal brgyan -- Bka' yoṅ dag pa'i tshad ma źes bya ba mkha'i 'gro ma'i man ṅag -- Bya btaṅ stag rtse sku skye'i rtogs brjod med snaṅ chu zla'i zlos gar (...) -- 'Gu-ru rin-po-che'i rnam thar bstod pa dbyid kyi sgra dbyaṅs. (shrink)

-- v. 4. Tshad ma rig pa -- v. 5. Dbu ma -- v. 6. Mdzod ʼdul.

Buddist literature; explanatory commentaries on Tantra philosophy, and commentary on the Mañjuśrīnāmasaṅgīti (Praise to Manjushri).

Collected works of the author on Buddhism and Dge-lugs-pa doctrines; includes biography.

On the fundamental essence of Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Study on Mādhyamika philosophy of Tibetan Buddhism.

Study on Buddhist logic according to Candrakīrti.

This study investigates the types of citation transformation preferred by both English L1 (native language) writers and Turkish writers who use English as a foreign language (L2). The corpus consists of 34 theses, 17 of which are Turkish writers’ theses in English language including 10 M.A. and 7 PhD theses and 17 English L1 writers’ theses comprised of 10 M.A. and 7 PhD theses. Based on the relevant literature, a rubric was prepared by the researchers in order to analyse the (...) theses by means of qualitative content analysis. The findings revealed that three forms of content integration consisting of direct quotation, patchwriting and critical evaluation were markedly different in English L1 and Turkish writers’ theses. Turkish L1 writers’ overuse of direct quotation and patchwriting attracted attention compared to English L1 writers. (shrink)