This essay considers whether the just war tradition is compatible with Christian theologically grounded conceptions of mercy. After considering and rejecting positions that pit mercy and war against each other, the essay mines the work of Walter Kasper and James Keenan on Christian mercy to develop a position that reimagines mercy as compatible with traditional just war criteria. In particular, this analysis leads to the conclusion that Christians may endorse just war in the form of humanitarian intervention. By doing so, (...) they allow mercy to temper the aspects of warfare that diminish the humanity of others. (shrink)

This essay addresses two growing edges of the just war tradition. First, theorists have been accused of focusing narrowly on justifying war and governing its conduct, neglecting wider considerations that encompass justice during the years prior to and after war. Second, calling a war "just" allegedly makes it seem "good" so that it is easier to fight a war and to bend or set aside the rules. Based on "imperfect justice," we argue for a "justified" war theory, taking all criteria (...) and categories seriously, including jus ante bellum and jus post bellum. (shrink)

This collection of essays on policing and the use of force, while written over the course of the last twenty-five years, remains relevant and timely. Although issues in policing and questions about excessive force and brutality have been addressed by criminologists, sociologists, philosophers, and criminal justice ethicists, only a handful of theological ethicists treat this pressing matter. While the Christian moral tradition has a voluminous record of theological attention to violence and nonviolence, war and peace, there is a dearth of (...) references to policing. And most considerations of criminal justice issues by Christians and their churches concentrate on prison reform, or abolition, and the death penalty, but not policing. These essays, authored by a theological ethicist possessing professional experience in law enforcement, seek to fill this curious gap. They offer a framework for moral reasoning concerning the justification for police use of force and the just application of such force, and they propose just policing as a model that is consonant with promoting a just peace in communities and society. In addition, they explore the implications of such an approach for wider, international questions about just war, terrorism, the responsibility to protect, and post-war justice. (shrink)

. The perpetrator as person: Theological reflections on the just war tradition and the use of force by police. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 37-56.

ETHICISTS HAVE CRITICIZED THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S INvocation of "war" language as a response to the threat of terrorism in the post—September 11, 2001, world. Calling instead for a "police" model, these ethicists are found among both the pacifist and the just war traditions. This essay explores what a policing model might entail. First, it highlights some expressions of interest by just war ethicists in a police approach for tackling terrorism. Second, it critically surveys some representative examples of pacifist (...) appeals to such a paradigm. Third, it evaluates the call for a just-policing approach, showing how this model actually remains consonant with just war reasoning. Finally, the essay draws on the discipline of police ethics and examines what just cause, especially with respect to preemptive strikes, might look like in a just-policing approach to dealing with terrorism. (shrink)

The T&T Clark Handbook of Christian Ethics provides an ecumenical introduction to Christian ethics, its sources, methods, and applications. With contributions by theological ethicists known for their excellence in scholarship and teaching, the essays in this volume offer fresh purchase on, and an agenda for, the discipline of Christian ethics in the 21st century. The essays are organized in three sections, following an introduction that presents the four-font approach and elucidates why it is critically employed through these subsequent sections. The (...) first section explores the sources of Christian ethics, including each of the four fonts: scripture, tradition, experience, and reason. The second section examines fundamental or basic elements of Christian ethics and covers different methods, approaches, and voices in doing Christian ethics, such as natural law, virtue ethics, conscience, responsibility, narrative, worship, and engagement with other religions. The third section addresses current moral issues in politics, medicine, economics, ecology, criminal justice and other related spheres from the perspective of Christian ethics, including war, genetics, neuroethics, end-of-life decisions, marriage, family, work, sexuality, nonhuman animals, migration, aging, policing, incarceration, capital punishment, and more. (shrink)

Consensus among human rights groups and churches in recent years about cluster bombs has culminated in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. While there is apparent agreement that cluster bombs ought to be illegal, no substantive ethical treatment of this issue exists. In statements, references are typically made to the danger cluster munitions pose to civilians; it is alleged that these weapons are inherently immoral, and appeal is given only implicitly or in a cursory fashion to traditional just war reasoning. Taking (...) its cue from Jesuit moral theologian John C. Ford's influential article appearing in 1944 on `The Morality of Obliteration Bombing', and drawing on the more recent work of Oliver O'Donovan on `immoral weapons', this essay offers a critical moral assessment of cluster bombs and their use through attention to the principles of discrimination, proportionality, and the framework of double effect reasoning. (shrink)

In Fides et Ratio, Pope John Paul II commends the way in which the Church Fathers engaged philosophical schools, including those considered erroneous: “Faced with the various philosophies, the Fathers were not afraid to acknowledge those elements in them that were consonant with Revelation and those that were not. Recognition of the points of convergence did not blind them to the points of divergence”. Similarly, Kuipers seeks to provide a “serious, meaningful engagement with the positive elements and the constructive suggestions” (...) in—rather than simply to echo the standard criticisms of—Richard Rorty’s work. In the first half of the book, Kuipers identifies what he regards as the positive features of Rorty’s work. Focusing on Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he brings into relief the contours of his postmodern critique, respectively, of the Western philosophical tradition and of the traditional role of the philosopher. The book opens with a succinct account of Rorty’s critique of Western philosophy, an examination of Rorty’s variant of pragmatism, and an insightful discernment of “the emergence of an ethical concern for justice and human flourishing” in Rorty’s writing. Kuipers approves Rorty’s criticisms of philosophy-as-epistemology, with its emphasis on ontological, ahistorical foundationalism, and shares Rorty’s fear that the realist’s claim of correspondence to truth may lead to a substitution of coercion for conversation, which would thereby silence other voices. Because the human faculty for rationality is a limited tool, given our historical and linguistic contingencies, Rorty advocates instead an “edifying philosophy” with ad hoc, cultural criticism that inclusively seeks to find solutions for current social problems. This pragmatic shift from theory to practice, rather than leading to a loss of touch with the world, actually entails a sense of responsibility. Kuipers applauds how Rorty thus “gives us a heightened, ethical awareness of the responsibility involved in the intellectual task”. In contrast to fellow nonfoundationalist Joseph Margolis, who still affirms the role of the philosopher as someone possessing knowledge that others do not, Rorty holds that the responsibility for imaginatively and poetically redescribing ourselves belongs not only to the philosopher but to all members of society. (shrink)