Leading accounts of personal autonomy arecontent-neutral:they insist that there are noa prioriconstraints on the content of the desires or values that might motivate an autonomous action. In Gerald Dworkin's provocative words, ‘the autonomous person can be a tyrant or a slave, a saint or sinner, a rugged individualist or champion of fraternity, a leader or follower.’ ‘There is nothing in the idea of autonomy that precludes a person from saying, “I want to be the kind of person who acts at (...) the command of others. I define myself as a slave and endorse those attitudes and preferences. My autonomy consists in being a slave.” ’ John Christman similarly claims that ‘any desire, no matter how evil, self-sacrificing, or slavish it might be’ could be autonomously formed. The same seems to apply to Harry Frankfurt's view, that actions are autonomous if they stem from second-order volitions that reflect what the agent cares about; it puts no constraints on the content of what a person might care about. All of these accounts hold that the mere content of a desire or value is never sufficient to rule out that it might be autonomously acted on by someone. (shrink)

Leading accounts of personal autonomy are content-neutral: they insist that there are no a priori constraints on the content of the desires or values that might motivate an autonomous action. In Gerald Dworkin's provocative words, ‘the autonomous person can be a tyrant or a slave, a saint or sinner, a rugged individualist or champion of fraternity, a leader or follower.’ ‘There is nothing in the idea of autonomy that precludes a person from saying, “I want to be the kind of (...) person who acts at the command of others. I define myself as a slave and endorse those attitudes and preferences. My autonomy consists in being a slave.” ’ John Christman similarly claims that ‘any desire, no matter how evil, self-sacrificing, or slavish it might be’ could be autonomously formed. The same seems to apply to Harry Frankfurt's view, that actions are autonomous if they stem from second-order volitions that reflect what the agent cares about; it puts no constraints on the content of what a person might care about. All of these accounts hold that the mere content of a desire or value is never sufficient to rule out that it might be autonomously acted on by someone. (shrink)

Ron Harris captured the popular imagination in October 1999 with a website where he auctioned off the ova of fashion models to the highest bidder. This article treats the controversy surrounding Harris’ site within a dual frame of critical theory’s approach to reproduction and a folkloristic approach to discourse. The website fuses traditional narrative motifs and structures with the logic of advertising, seventies television, family-values rhetoric, and the fertility industry. I argue that the great attraction of ronsangels.com is that it (...) put into relief the intervention of mechanical reproduction in human fertility together with the state of genetics at the turn of the 21st century. The result is not only a disconcerting aestheticization and commodification of biological reproduction, but also the biological reproduction of a particular aesthetic and moral code—a generation of reality by model. (shrink)

This dissertation provides an account of individual autonomy. It begins by arguing that the dispute, in social and political philosophy, between negative and positive conceptions of liberty, can only be solved based on a theory of autonomy. The bulk of the dissertation then defends the view that individual autonomy consists in the capacity to regulate one's actions by values that are one's own in virtue of having been adopted through a process of critical reflection. ;This sort of view is regarded (...) with suspicion by those who doubt that rational judgment is central to a person's self, or identity. In particular, conative hierarchy views analyze autonomy as the capacity to act according to higher-order desires. But by doing so, they trivialize real worries about the possibility of achieving autonomy: Marxist social theory and Freudian psychoanalytic theory both seem to imply that autonomy is very difficult to achieve, and yet they do not pose any threat to the kind of "autonomy" described by conative hierarchy theories. Conative hierarchy theory fails to show that highest-order desires have special authority. ;Conative history theory recognizes that autonomy involves historical features in addition to structural ones. According to one version of that theory, a desire is autonomous if its subject would not have resisted its development, had she reflected on it with all relevant information about the processes involved, and with 'minimal rationality'. But the test fails when applied to hard cases, because it ignores the way in which the person's motives must depend causally upon her rational capacities. Furthermore, this view mistakenly follows conative hierarchy theory in denying the relevance of the distinction between a person's evaluative judgment and her mere desires. ;The conception of autonomy I defend derives support from the shortcomings of the two types of conative view. Their focus on desires masks the importance of values, principles, and ends. Most importantly, however, their shortcomings indicate that an autonomous person's values must be contingent upon critical reflection, which is free from certain irrational influences, even if its principles lack the universal validity of a categorical imperative. (shrink)

For decades, the greater part of efforts to improve regulatory frameworks for research ethics has focused on informed consent procedures; their design, codification and regulation. Why is informed consent thought to be so important? Since the publication of the Belmont Report in 1979, the standard response has been that obtaining informed consent is a way of treating individuals as autonomous agents. Despite its political success, the philosophical validity of this Belmont view cannot be taken for granted. If the Belmont view (...) is to be based on a conception of autonomy that generates moral justification, it will either have to be reinterpreted along Kantian lines or coupled with a something like Mill’s conception of individuality. The Kantian interpretation would be a radical reinterpretation of the Belmont view, while the Millian justification is incompatible with the liberal requirement that justification for public policy should be neutral between controversial conceptions of the good. This consequence might be avoided by replacing Mill’s conception of individuality with a procedural conception of autonomy, but I argue that the resulting view would in fact fail to support a non-Kantian, autonomy-based justification of informed consent. These difficulties suggest that insofar as informed consent is justified by respect for persons and considerations of autonomy, as the Belmont report maintained, the justification should be along the lines of Kantian autonomy and not individual autonomy. (shrink)