The KK principle states that knowing entails knowing that one knows. This historically popular principle has fallen out of favour among many contemporary philosophers in light of putative counterexamples. Recently, some have defended more palatable versions of KK by weakening the principle. These revisions remain faithful to their predecessor in spirit while escaping crucial objections. This paper examines the prospects of such a strategy. It is argued that revisions of the original principle can be captured by a generalized knowledge iteration (...) principle, Weak-KK, which states that knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. But Weak-KK is vulnerable to an unknowability result and therefore must be rejected. The arguments here suggest that retreating to weaker iteration principles is not an option for the KK enthusiast. (shrink)

In vertebrate development, the HOX genes act to specify cell identity along much of the anterior‐posterior axis of the embryonic central nervous system. In all vertebrates examined to date, the vitamin A metabolite retinoic acid is implicated in the patterning of the anterior posterior axis and the induction of HOX gene expression. Two recent papers have extended the study of retinoic acid induction of HOX genes to the closest relatives of the vertebrates, amphioxus and tunicates(1,2). In both these species, exogenous (...) retinoic acid is able to induce ectopic expression of HOX 1 genes in the anterior central nervous system. This suggests that retinoic acid control of anterior‐posterior axis formation and HOX induction is not specific to vertebrates. However, in the more distantly related echinoderms and arthropods, retinoic acid does not seem to act in the same way. Thus the role of retinoic acid in anterior‐posterior axis specification may be a chordate innovation, perhaps linked to the evolution of another chordate character, the dorsal neural tube. (shrink)

According to Ladyman, the world consists of nothing more than relations that relate to no particulars. Could the world be nothing but structure? In this chapter it is argued that even though there are a number of problems with the standard view of relations accompanied by a particularist ontology, substituting for it a world of pure structure is not progress. A world of pure structure would be no more than a Platonic entity, lacking any resources for concretization. Consequently, there would (...) be no possibility of distinguishing between a world-kind and its concrete instance or instances. It is also argued that the view has insufficient empirical motivation. The history of science does not support the claim that structure is preserved through theory change nor that the structural components of a theory are extricable from its ontological commitments. (shrink)

Through a close reading of the two definitions of evil in the Introduction to Responses to Thalassios, this article points out a circular, cognitive-affective-somatic, genetic mechanism that St. Maximos the Confessor considers responsible for the initiation and transmission of the fallness as a human condition and the specific manifestation of it in the form of passions. It elucidates the first definition as mainly phenomenological, by identifying the circular mechanism and its behavioural expressions, and the second definition as more aetiological, by (...) explaining why this mechanism emerges and reemerges with the fallen humanity despite its catastrophic results. CONTRIBUTION: This article highlights a double genetic mechanism that St. Maximos the Confessor grasped within the fallen human condition as a curse solvable only in Christ, a notion largely carved out by previous Maximian scholarship, but fully explained and valuated here. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to explore the limits of a conception of metaphysical explanation based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). For this purpose, I will focus on one of the alleged counter-intuitive consequences of an unrestricted application of the PSR, namely: Radical Monism. First, I will articulate such a conception of metaphysical explanation. Then, I will explain how is it that from a famous argument that rests on the PSR (i.e., Bradley’s regress) Radical Monism indeed seems (...) to follow. Right away, I will argue against the natural reaction that such argument triggers, namely: that we shall accept pluralism and relations as brute facts. Finally, I will sketch a qualified version of the PSR that allows us to avoid Radical Monism without compromising the essential content of the PSR. (shrink)

One of the main moral costs of stare decisis lies in the continuous possibility of entrenching morally deficient decisions in the law. Although legal systems usually make provision for dealing with morally deficient precedents, there are cases in which the legal obligation of later courts to follow one of these precedents is undefeated. This possibility affects the overall justification of stare decisis. One traditional answer to this problem consists in accepting this moral cost, on the belief that the benefits of (...) stare decisis outweigh it. On this view, when there is an undefeated legal obligation to follow a morally deficient precedent, the court must simply follow precedent. In this article, I question this approach and defend an alternative solution. I argue that, under some conditions, a court facing a morally deficient precedent should have the power to either follow the precedent or suspend its application to the parties by ordering a temporary stay of proceedings and referring the case to a higher court with power to overrule the precedent. This proposal entails exercising an equitable power recognised by the legal system, which I defend against three possible objections. (shrink)

A general practice of precedent is one that can plausibly apply to any well-functioning legal system. This practice, which can be grounded in the Rule of Law, needs to make it the case that courts always have a legal reason for following relevant precedent – even if the precedent is morally suboptimal, so long as it is not evil. Without this reason, a precedent may be treated as having no legal influence for the later court (‘the Null Model’), and this (...) runs counter to the Rule of Law. On top of this reason, courts may have a general legal obligation to follow precedent – stare decisis – but this risks entrenching morally bad decisions in the law. We need, therefore, a type of reason that lies in between the Null Model and stare decisis as a necessary step for any future justification of stare decisis. But how can courts have a legal reason for following morally suboptimal precedent? They can have that reason, I argue, in virtue of a specific judicial duty, positively laid down in a legal source, which aims to advance the Rule of Law in an institutionalised way. In this article, I aim to explain and justify that judicial duty. (shrink)

I show how the Cosmological Argument (CA) is undermined by one of its own premises: the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). First, I explain the type of CA that I am thinking about. Second, I explain a traditional modal objection against the PSR, which is ultimately based upon our intuitions in favor of contingency. Third, I show how this modal objection begs the question against the necessitarian, and then I reformulate the CA in more neutral terms. Fourth, using this more (...) neutral version of the CA, I argue that the main problem with the PSR goes way beyond its apparent necessitarian consequences. As an argument used by Bradley shows, embracing the rationalist path that underlies the PSR seems to commit us to a form of Radical Monism. I conclude by showing how this result ultimately undermines the CA. (shrink)

The present essay approaches two different conceptions of Enlightenment and modernity. The first part considers Michel Foucault’s understanding of modernity as an “attitude” or “critical ethos” belonging to that age, that necessarily questions that which we have come to be in various contingent processes ; the second part considers Jürgen Habermas’s proposal, which invites us to understand modernity as an “unfinished project”, as a certain potential or rational ideal that is still to be carried out. Towards the end of the (...) essay both stances are confronted, whereby an attempt is made to engage elements retrieved from each in a productive dialogue, and to raise some criticisms and observations regarding the sociohistorical conceptions of each author. (shrink)

This article explores how Chinese Daoist thought can address the need of an ethics that can cope with “the Anthropocene.” It explores the similarities between Daoist thought and posthumanist theories which arose partially as a response to the challenges of the Anthropocene. And it examines how Daoist thought can radicalize posthumanist thinking by means of an ethics based on a genuinely flat ontology that treats all things, human and nonhuman, as equal.

In the traditional understanding, human dignity is often portrayed as a «final», «inherent», and «absolute» value. If human dignity as the core of the status of a human being did indeed have thos characteristics, this would yield a severe limitation for obligations that stem from the moral status of non-human animals, plants, eco systems and other entities discussed in environmental ethics; for obligations that arise from human dignity standardly take priority over the duties toward entities with non-human moral status. Yet, (...) many theorists of human dignity nowadays have given up the traditional picture in favour of a more «contingent» understanding of human dignity that abandons one or more of its traditional characteristics.In this paper, I argue that to the contrary, we have good reasons to think that the three characteristics of human dignity just mentioned can indeed be attributed to a value that deserves the name «human dignity». In a first part, I argue for a specific understanding of the three value characteristics under consideration. After these preliminaries, I show in a second part that given such an understanding, we have ample evidence that we can indeed say that human dignity is an inherent, absolute and final value; and also that these three characteristics are properties of a single value. (shrink)

Assisted dying and human dignity are two extremely contested topics in Bioethics. This volume offers the first book-length attempt to bring both together. Its authors develop detailed philosophical analyses of dignity, and how it relates to assisted suicide and euthanasia.

This article examines an episode of Chilean history during the days of the dictatorship of General Pinochet: Ingrid Olderock’s life and her criminal actions against people such as Alejandra Holzapfel and others. I use a secular framework for ethical evaluations of human behaviour related to armed conflicts in Latin America. In that context, I engage the following steps. First, I describe Ingrid Olderock’s life, briefly summarising some facts about her educational and political environment based on Nancy Guzman’s Ingrid Olderock: The (...) Madame of the Torture Dogs. This description is complemented by chronicles recently published by Alejandra Matus. Second, I suggest that the ‘commander’ concept (a concept arising within the ethical distinction between active and reactive actions by Gilles Deleuze) helps to assess the case at hand. Finally, I follow the main idea that human activities can be determined without having a transcendent system of values – an idea traditionally linked with Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s viewpoints, as declared by Deleuze. (shrink)

Collaborative consumption activities like saving food and buying used clothes are an important and rapidly growing part of sustainable consumer behavior. Many political and commercial campaigns promote collaborative consumption practices by highlighting subsets of normative motives, such as sustainable, social, and ecological effects. Whether or not consumers can comprehend these claims and incorporate them into their decision-making process is, however, unclear. This article introduces a new experimental study design to ethical consumer research—an adapted version of the Defining Issues Test—that enables (...) to assess consumers’ ability to cognitively and intuitively understand moral arguments in collaborative consumption contexts. The experiment was conducted with N = 435 collaborative consumers from Germany. The findings indicate that in different collaborative consumption contexts, consumers consider different moral arguments as important. Furthermore, the findings also indicate that consumers can incorporate the provider’s point of view in their moral judgment. (shrink)

Schaffer ha argumentado que la prioridad ontológica del cosmos puede ser inferida a partir de la ausencia de la libertad modal de sus partes. En este artículo ofrezco razones en contra de las siguientes premisas de su argumento: (i) el supuesto según el cual los objetos fundamentales gozan de libertad modal, y (ii) el supuesto según el cual los objetos que están en la relación de ser compañeros de mundo, dada la teoría de contrapartidas, carecen de libertad modal.

Motives of espionage against ones own country in the light of idiographic studies The money is perceived as the common denominator among people who have spied against their own country. This assumption is common sense and appears to be self-evident truth. But do we have any hard evidences to prove the validity of such a statement? What method could be applied to determine it? This article is a review of the motives behind one's resorting to spying activity which is a (...) complex and multifarious process. I decided to present only the phenomenon of spying for another country. The studies on the motives behind taking up spying activity are idiographic in character. One of the basic methodological problems to be faced by the researchers of this problem is an inaccessibility of a control group. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit untersucht die Frage, ob der aktuelle Schutz des geistigen Eigentums bei Arzneimitteln in Deutschland moralisch zu rechtfertigen ist. Die Untersuchung orientiert sich dabei am aktuellen Diskurs und ordnet die bestehenden Positionen entsprechend ihrer Abstraktheit. Dabei bilden Argumente gegen einen Schutz geistigen Eigentums die allgemeinste Ebene, und Argumente, die sich spezifisch gegen deutsche Arzneimittelpatente richten, die konkreteste Ebene. Ich werde zeigen, dass starke deontologische und konsequentialistische Positionen existieren, welche die realpolitischen Auswirkungen von Arzneimittelpatenten kritisieren. Die konsequentialistische Position argumentiert in (...) erster Linie mit den jüngsten Wirtschaftsdaten, während die deontologische Position die bürgerlichen Autonomieansprüche betont. (shrink)

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This article closely examines the content of an important passage in Maximos the Confessor’s Ad Thalassium 42, in which we can identify a ternary soteriological structure (Adam-Christ-us) recurring in the work of the Byzantine theologian. The main focus of the article is to highlight and analyse the relationship that he evokes, but does not detail, between human nature and the exercise of will – in the case of Adam, as the protological and lapsarian exemplar of humanity; in the case of (...) Christ, as its teleological and soteriological exemplar; and in the case of us, as natural descendants of the former and possible spiritual followers of the latter. Contribution: This article highlights a general soteriological structure and the circular dynamics between nature and will as the central anthropological mechanism of this structure, both of which are relevant to Maximos the Confessor’s entire work in general and to his moral psychology, including his concept of the passions, in particular. (shrink)

This article closely examines the content of an important passage in Maximos the Confessor’s Ad Thalassium 42, in which we can identify a ternary soteriological structure (Adam-Christ-us) recurring in the work of the Byzantine theologian. The main focus of the article is to highlight and analyse the relationship that he evokes, but does not detail, between human nature and the exercise of will – in the case of Adam, as the protological and lapsarian exemplar of humanity; in the case of (...) Christ, as its teleological and soteriological exemplar; and in the case of us, as natural descendants of the former and possible spiritual followers of the latter.Contribution: This article highlights a general soteriological structure and the circular dynamics between nature and will as the central anthropological mechanism of this structure, both of which are relevant to Maximos the Confessor’s entire work in general and to his moral psychology, including his concept of the passions, in particular. (shrink)

En este ensayo nos ocupamos del tema de la confesión protestante, en el marco de las tesis de Foucault sobre el saber y el poder. Para ello, nos apoyamos en dos tradiciones distintas: de un lado, el análisis de Weber de la relación entre la ascesis y el capitalismo en las sociedades reformistas; de otro lado, el análisis político de Foucault sobre la pastoral en cuanto estrategia de poder que está vinculada a la cuestión sobre la subjetividad. La hipótesis es (...) que la confesión protestante puede ser analizada a la luz de los postulados sobre el poder, para tratar de mostrar cómo la cuestión del uso del tiempo y la disciplina en la actividad son cuestiones que están, en parte, en el origen –en sentido genealógico– de los dispositivos de codificación moral de las sociedades modernas. En la primera parte, interesa ver cómo la confesión protestante constituye una estrategia de poder que articula los sujetos al problema del gobierno de sí. El objetivo es describir la emergencia de ciertas modalidades confesionales, relacionadas con los manuales casuísticos o tratados sobre el arte de gobernarse a sí mismo, que derivan en prácticas de control de la actividad. Luego, nos ocupamos del problema de la subjetividad, caracterizándola mediante el concepto de pliegue. Para cerrar, aprovechamos las reflexiones sobre la confesión protestante para responder a la pregunta de ¿cómo es que los enunciados devienen práctica social? (shrink)