This paper examines a passage of the eleventh chapter of the Rigs gter of Sa skya Paṇḍita on the division of arguments by consequence of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” with respect to the type of relation between P and Q. This passage appears in quite different versions in several available recensions of the Rigs gter, all of which are problematic to some extent. The different interpretations of the commentators can be (...) shown to derive from their reliance on different versions of the text, which they strove to make sense of through two distinct strategies. Following up on the examination of a division of arguments by consequence along the same line in the works of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Tibetan predecessors, in particular Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge :883–938, 2016b), I evaluate the diverging versions of the Rigs gter against a coherent logical scenario founded on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s discussion pertaining to the types of logical reasons in inference in the tenth chapter of his work and comparison with the classification by Phya pa. I offer a hypothesis regarding the genesis of the problematic versions of the passage on the classification of consequences in the Rigs gter based on the comparison with the classification found in mTshur ston’s epistemological work. I propose that the composition of this portion of the Rigs gter might have involved a textual reuse of mTshur ston’s classification, even though mTshur ston and Sa skya Paṇḍita disagree on background issues. This very disagreement imposed changes to the reused text that led to problematic readings. (shrink)

This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” ( apoha ), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X, which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in this paper (...) two strategies aiming at “breaking the circle”: (i) conceding the precedence of a positive understanding of X, from which a negative understanding (i.e., the understanding of “non-X”) is derived by contrast, and (ii) denying any precedence by proposing a simultaneous understanding of both X and non-X. I consider how these two options are articulated respectively by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika cum Svavṛtti and by one of his Tibetan interpreters, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and examine the requirements for their workability. I suggest that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s motivation to opt for an alternative solution has to do with his criticism of notions shared by his Tibetan predecessors, an outline of which is given in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, I present the surprising use of the charge of circularity by an early Tibetan logician against his coreligionists. (shrink)

The article presents Go rams pa’s interpretation of states of noncognizing mind explained by Sa skya Paṇḍita in his famous Tshad ma rigs gter. The text consists of translation of Go ram pa’s commentary to the second chapter of Tshad ma rigs gter, outline of the Tibetan text and introduction to the translation and edition of the original.

Root text and autocommentary on Buddhist logic.

Commentary on Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dgaʼ-rgyal-mtshanʼs Tshad ma rigs gter, treatise on Buddhist logic.

Root text with two commentaries i.e. Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas paʾi dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par ʾgrel pa tshad ma rigs paʾi gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa by Go-rams-pa Bsod-nams-seṅ-ge and Tshad ma rigs paʾi gter gyi mchan ʾgrel sde bdun gsal baʾi sgron me by ʾJam-dbyaṅs Blo-gter-dbaṅ-po on principles of Buddhist logic.

Root text and autocommentary on the principles of Buddhist logic.

The article presents Go rams pa’s interpretation and classification of cognizable object as explained by Sa skya Paṇḍita in his famous Tshad ma rigs gter. The text consists of introduction to the translation of the original, translation of Go ram pa’s commentary to the first chapter of Tshad ma rigs gter, edition of the original, and outline of the Tibetan text.

Basic course of study on Buddhist logic according to Sa-skya-pa sect of Tibetan Buddhism.

Exegetical works on Buddhist doctrines and philosophies according to the interpretation of Sa-skya-pa sect.

Some facts about differentiation between Jonang and Sakyapa doctrines.

On Tibetan Buddhist doctrines and philosophy according to Sa-skya-pa tradition.

Complete works of Zhu-chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen, 1697-1774 on Buddhist philosophy, liturgical and rituals texts of Sakyapa sect.

Collected works of Sakyapa scholar Nag-dbang-legs-grub, 1811-1861 comprised predominantly on Sakyapa doctrines, Buddhist philosophy, rituals, tantras, reverential prayers, etc.

Study of Tshad ma rigs gter, classic work on logic and epistemology by Sa-skya Paṇḍi-ta.

Commentary on the Tshad ma rigs gter of Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dgaʾ-rgyal-mtshan; dealing with Buddhist logic.

Collected works of author predominantly on Sakyapa liturgical, rituals, and sadhanas texts.

Commentary on Tshad ma rigs gter, a work on Buddhist logic by Sa-skya Paṇḍi-ṭa Kun-dgaʾ-rgyal-mtshan, 1182-1251.

Explanatory notes on the philosophical position (sidhānta) of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhist with Hinduism according to Sa-skya-pa scholar.

Collected works of ʼJam-dbyaṅs Blo-gter-dbaṅ-po on Nyingmapa and Sakyapa doctrines, philosophy, rituals etc.

On Buddhist doctrinal and philosophical interpretation of Sakyapa tradition.

This book argues for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology. The central claim is that a paradigm shift is underway in contemporary social ontology, from ideal to nonideal, and that this shift should be fully followed through. To develop and defend this central claim, the first step is to show that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social (...) ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. The second step is to show that, when taken together, objections to the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology) imply that this model needs to be given up in favor of nonideal social ontology. In other words, we should look to nonideal rather than ideal social ontology for core concepts. The third step is to offer a positive account, called the power view, of nonideal social ontology. This account places the concept of social power at the core of a general theory of the social world and replaces the flat and narrow conception of power in ideal social ontology with a richer and more extensive conception. In addition, it rectifies a shortcoming in nonideal social ontology by attending to class, which has been notably and oddly overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

The idea that what we perceive are tropes is anything but new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated in the first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based on pre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, either as a supporting argument for the advantages of content view when compared to the relational view of experience, or as a supporting argument in favor of the irreducible subjective character of experience. (...) In this paper, I take the content view for granted and argue in favor of what is herein referred to as the trope-content view of experience. My defense is a case of inference to the best explanation. The trope-content view can meet all reasonable desiderata on the experience and its content without assuming gaps or making the ad hoc assumption that there are different layers of content, or so shall I argue. (shrink)

This book is a philosophical reflection on the experience of time from within exile. Its focus on temporality is unique, as most literature on exile focuses on the experience of space, as exile involves dislocation, and moods of nostalgia and utopia. Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback proposes that in exile, time is experienced neither as longing back to the lost past nor as wanting a future to come but rather as a present without anchors or supports. She articulates this present as (...) a "gerundive" mode, in which the one who is in exile discovers herself simply being, exposed to the uncanny experience of having lost the past and not having a future. To explore this, she establishes a conversation among three authors whose work has exemplified this sense of gerundive time: the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, the French writer and essayist Maurice Blanchot, and the Brazilian writer Clarice Lispector. The book does not aim to discuss how these authors understand the relation between time and exile, but presents a conversation with them in relation to this question that reflects new aspects in their work. Attempting to think and express this difficult sense of time from within exile, Time in Exile engages with the relation between thought and language, and between philosophy and literature. Departing from concrete existential questions, Sá Cavalcante Schuback reveals new philosophical and theoretical modes to understand what it means to be present in times of exile. (shrink)

The connection between logic programming and formal argumentation has been studied starting from the landmark 1995 paper of Dung. Subsequent work has identified a standard translation from logic programs to argumentation frameworks, under which pairwise correspondences hold between various logic programming semantics and various formal argumentation semantics. This includes the correspondence between 3-valued stable and complete semantics, between well-founded and grounded semantics and between 2-valued stable and stable semantics. In the current paper, we show that the existing translation is able (...) to yield the additional correspondence between ideal semantics for logic programming and ideal semantics for formal argumentation. We also show that correspondence does not hold between eager semantics for logic programming and eager semantics for formal argumentation, at least when translating from logic programming to formal argumentation. Overall, the current work should be seen as completing the analysis of correspondences between mainstream admissibility-based argumentation semantics and their logic programming counterparts. (shrink)