Pan-Dispositionalism – the view that all properties (and relations) are irreducibly dispositional – currently appears to have no takers amongst major analytic metaphysicians. There are those, such as Mumford, who are open to the idea but remain uncommitted. And there are those, such as Ellis and Molnar, who accept that some properties are irreducibly dispositional but argue that not all are. In this paper, I defend Pan-Dispositionalism against this ‘Moderate’ Dispositionalism.

Suppose it is a law that all Fs are G. Does the law hold in all possible worlds? According to Necessitarianism, it holds in at least all those worlds containing F-ness. I argue that the Necessitarian must also take the law to hold in all those possible worlds which do not contain F-ness. Accepting the principle that a law can only hold in a world if it has some ontological grounding in that world, I argue that Necessitarianism is committed to (...) the claim that any law holding in the actual world is grounded in every possible world, and that any law holding in any possible world is grounded in the actual world. In other words, Necessitarianism takes all possible laws to be actual. (shrink)

I argue that the best explanation of law-like regularity is that properties are universals and that universals are irreducibly dispositional entities.

Zoos and animal rights seem utterly opposed to each other. In this controversial and timely book, Stephen Bostock argues that they can develop a more harmonious relationship. He examines the diverse ethical and technical issues involved, including human cruelty, human domination over animals, the well-being of wild animals outside their natural habitat, and the nature of wild and domestic animals. In his analysis, Bostock draws attention to the areas which give rise to misconceptions. This book explores the long history of (...) zoos, as well as current philosophical debates, to argue for a conservational view of their role in the modern world. Anyone concerned with humanity's relationship with other animals and the natural world will find this to be thought-provoking and rewarding reading. (shrink)

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

I remember at school someone once raising the problem of what would happen when an irresistible force meets an immoveable object. It's a bit like that with my present subject. For any possibility of an afterlife for human beings has long seemed to me out of the question because of the obvious complete dependence of our minds and consciousness on the brain, and because our minds, like our brains, must be a product of evolution. So how could a mind or (...) its consciousness possibly exist independently? But I've recently learnt of apparently undeniable evidence for the possible existence of disembodied minds or spirits. I'll give some account of one particular case – a staggering one, as far as I'm concerned. But suppose – just suppose – such do exist. All sorts of new problems then rear up. I'll give some examples of these too. So in the end I'm left baffled. (shrink)

According to the Contingency Theory of Laws, if there are possible worlds in which it is a law that all Fs are G, there are also possible F-containing worlds in which it is not. I argue here that the theory is forced to accept the possibility of nomic inversion: i.e. pairs of properties that have their actual nomic roles swapped in some possible world. Such inversions cannot be ruled out on grounds of logical or metaphysical inconsistency, and therefore – since (...) nomic inversion is counterintuitive – the Contingency Theory is undermined. (shrink)

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.