This article surveys briefly the main concepts of the nation and nationalism, and notes the wide range of interpretations. A distinction is drawn between Liberal and integral nationalism, the use of the Polish term nacjonalizm, and the alleged basic difference between nationalism in Western and Eastern Europe.The second part of this article is devoted to Walicki’s theses and contributions. They are characterized by a rejection of the concept of the artificiality of the nation, of “constructivism” and the “imagined community” model. (...) He does it not only on purely theoretical grounds but on the basis of an examination of the origins and development of Polish nationalism and patriotism which the above-cited writers have ignored. He concludes that only a profound knowledge of Polish history—sadly lacking in Western literature—would permit a more nuanced presentation of the general phenomena of nation and nationalism in Europe. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is analyse the notion of Central Europe used in historiography. The author reconstructs different meanings of this term used in the works of George Schopflin, Peter Burke, Oskar Halecki, Piotr Wandycz. This notion has not only geographic but also social and historical meaning.

A calculus of names is a logical theory describing relations between names. By a pure calculus of names we mean a quantifier-free formulation of such a theory, based on classical propositional calculus. An axiomatisation of a pure calculus of names is presented and its completeness is discussed. It is shown that the axiomatisation is complete in three different ways: with respect to a set theoretical model, with respect to Leśniewski's Ontology and in a sense defined with the use of axiomatic (...) rejection. The independence of axioms is proved. A decision procedure based on syntactic transformations and models defined in the domain of only two members is defined. (shrink)

Artykuł prezentuje i charakteryzuje sto-icką koncepcję wolności. Uważa się, że stoicki determinizm nie wyklucza koherentnej teorii wolności ludzkiej woli. Autor twierdzi, że stoi¬cy pozostawili wyjątek w teorii przeznaczenia, aby człowiek mógł być twórcą własnych myśli. Tylko w takiej sytuacji ludzie mogą być odpo-wiedzialni za efekty swych rozważań i ma sens uprawianie etyki normatywnej. Stoicy uważali, że aktów psychicznych nie dotyczy determinizm. Jest to założenie me-todologiczne, którego podstawą jest niemożliwość pełnego poznania przez człowieka tej sfery rzeczywistości. W rezultacie takiego rozumienia człowiek (...) może się ciągle zgadzać lub nie zgadzać z wydarzeniami występującymi na świecie i zależy to wyłącznie od niego samego. (shrink)

Since ontology is to be the science which studies that what exists, every ontological enterprise has to be preceded by an agreement as to what „existence” means. This is best done by giving a definition of existence. In the article the author examines definitions of existence that are used, or could be used, in various ontologies. To this aim he introduces a systematics of the possible definitions and with its help studies definitions of existence given by various authors. Definitions that (...) he consid-ers have the form „ ”, where „p” is a sentence (it is also possible to treat existence as an undefined primary term, but such a treatment in the context of ontology in which it is used may be regarded as a contextual definition). Thus, in fact the subject of the analysis is what is understood by the expression of the form „x exists”. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present moral philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre in its relation to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. For that purpose, his specific understanding of the tradition, a mode of its relation with an individual, and the distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge are discussed in the paper. Considered primarily as Thomist and Marxist thinker, MacIntyre’s conceptions emerge as strongly influenced by continental hermeneutics. From the hermeneutical point of view, some key elements of MacIntyre’s thought can be understood (...) in a new way, enabling in this way to overcome the most commonly expressed reservations formulated against his views.Key words MORAL PHILOSOPHY, HERMENEUTICS. (shrink)

"Traditional interpretations of Kantian idea of autonomy – based on the classical texts such as Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten – stress basically one point: action is autonomous only when an agent obeys the law. In this paper, the author tries to introduce an interpretation of Kant’s practical philosophy, which covers a wider perspective, resulting in the idea of “radical autonomy”. Re-reading classical texts of Kant in connection with Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (...) and Tugendlehre I try to show, that Kant’s conception of autonomy also allows for acting, that is not determined by the law (i.e. categorical imperative). Roughly, to be radically autonomous you do not have to be necessarily moral (there are other conditions that make your autonomy valid). This paper adopts reasons of „historicistic enlightment” (Schnädelbach), which is rather contrary to the general anti-historicistic context of Kant’s philosophy. Although this approach seems to be against the Kantian „metaphysical hipotheque” (e.g.: pure Faktum der Vernunft, absolute justification/Grundlegung of morality), it provides a (re)interpretation that allows to defend the broadened idea of autonomy. And this ‘radical autonomy’ shows some explanatory attractiveness of Kant’s ethical theory in the contemporary critical horizon of historicism. ". (shrink)

W artykule podejmujemy zagadnienie udziału emocji w~podejmowaniu decyzji w sytuacjach dylematów moralnych. Prezentujemy stanowisko, jakie w tej sprawie głosi współczesna neuroetyka. Według badaczy-neuroetyków podczas podejmowania decyzji w sytuacji dylematów osobistych biorą górę czynniki emocjonalne, natomiast w dylematach nieosobistych — czynniki poznawczo-kontrolne. Postulują oni też istnienie specjalnej klasy emocji — emocji moralnych — uczestniczących w wydawaniu sądów moralnych w sytuacjach dylematów moralnych. W artykule proponujemy własne odróżnienie dwóch rodzajów emocji moralnych — emocji nie-epistemicznych i epistemicznych.

The papers in this collection discuss broadly understood cognitive turns in the philosophy of language, inspired by the Chomskyan revolution in linguistics, Langacker's and Lakoff's Cognitive Linguistics, but also phenomenology, Relevance Theory and Classical Indian Philosophy. The individual texts investigate, from different angles, the relations between philosophy of language and linguistics, and contribute to the development of theoretical frameworks for studying language. Most of the contributions were presented at the first International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, PhiLang2009 (University (...) of Łodź, May 2009).". (shrink)

The main aim of the article is a comparison of two types of modal fictionalism (which is, to put it roughly, the antirealist view concerning the existence of possible worlds). The most popular version of modal fictionalism, proposed by Gideon Rosen, is compared with the modal fictionalism based on Stephen Yablo's ideas concerning object fictionalism. Both views aim to: (i) deliver an interpretation of existential quantifiers ranging over possible worlds, according to which quantifying over possible worlds does not imply ontological (...) commitments to possible worlds; (ii) give an analysis of modality. The distinctive feature of the former view is an account of all sentences with existential quantification ranging over possible worlds as elliptical versions of sentences of the form "According to fiction of plurality of worlds, there is a world, in which...". The modal fictionalist presupposes that the occurrence of the story prefix "According to such and such fiction" makes all quantifiers in its range uncommittal ones. The latter view consists in taking sentences quantifying over possible worlds as uttered in make-believe spirit, where the speaker pretends that there are possible worlds and hence does not commit herself to the existence of possible worlds. Important feature of this view is that its proponent presupposes that there is some kind of dependence between that what modal facts there are and what is pretended in the game of make-believe for possible worlds discourse. The first view lacks this feature. I argue that if one supposes that some of our ordinary modal statements, e.g. "This car could have had different colour than it actually has," provide information about features of objects they are about, then Rosen's version of modal fictionalism faces the problem of explaining how modal fictionalist's analysis of modality preserves this kind of information about objects. The proponent of the latter version has tools to explain how her analysis preserves those bits of information about objects. I conclude that this could be treated as a reason of preferring Yablo's version of modal fictionalism. (shrink)

Poszukiwanie źródeł rozwoju ludzkiej kultury jest charakterystyczne zarówno dla historyków, jak i filozofów dziejów. We współczesnej refleksji dziejowej niekiedy trudno odróżnić, kiedy badacz jest historykiem, a kiedy włącza w swoje badania elementy spekulacji dziejowej. Poglądy włoskiego matematyka, zawarte w książce Zapomniana rewolucja, stanowią dobry przykład twórczej syntezy historii i historiozofii. Epoka hellenistyczna, stanowiąca dla niego punkt zwrotny w dziejach ludzkości, dostarcza kryteriów oceny całej historii. Porzucenie zdobyczy tej epoki przez następujące po niej pokolenia prowadzi Russo do przyjęcia stanowiska pesymizmu historiozoficznego (...) i odrzucenia idei postępu. (shrink)

The aim of the thesis is to provide the foundations for a representation-based theory of meaning, i.e. a theory of meaning that encompasses the psychological level of cognitive representations. This is in opposition to the antipsychologist goals of the Fregean philosophy of language and represents the results of a joint analysis of multiple philosophical problems in contemporary philosophy of language, which, as argued in the tesis, stem from the lack of recognition of a cognitive level in language. In the thesis, (...) I first provide and argue a definition of cognitive/mental representations based on results in developmental psychology as well as theoretical considerations. Then, I use the definition to build upon it a richer theory of concepts and apply it to various philosophical conundra. The problems tackled include the problem of proper names (for which a solution is proposed that respects the post-Kripkean criticism), a unified meaning postulate for modalities and the epistemology and ontology of mathematical terms. The thesis concludes with a proposed application of the newly acquired framework to select social aspects of language use. (shrink)