IN THIS PAPER I intend to suggest that the tantalizing notion of dialectics as found, for example, in Hegel might be approached by reflecting upon some aspects of the notion of abstraction as found, for example, in Aquinas. It is more or less by accident that the two thinkers I wish to discuss here are Aquinas and Hegel rather than Aristotle and Marx, or even Meinong and Theodor Adorno. It certainly is possible to compare two metaphysicians of the stature of (...) Aquinas and Hegel, particularly if one restricts oneself to a well-defined issue. However, in this paper I do not intend to advance any such comparison in the strict sense of the term. Rather, I would like to show that certain basic features of the Hegelian and post-Hegelian notion of dialectics can be understood as an attempt at avoiding certain conclusions that almost inevitably have to be drawn if one accepts the classical conception of abstraction. (shrink)

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTH BOOK of his Metaphysics, Aristotle refers to a question which, according to him, was and continues to be an eternal philosophical issue. Although it was debated from the Ionian thinkers through the Italian schools to the post-Parmenidean systems, from Thales to Democritus and in fact even to Plato, it still remained controversial. This question, Aristotle claims, concerns being: What is it?

WHAT are the three previous papers inquiring about? What do we look for when inquiring about "the intelligibility of nature"? What does the expression 'intelligibility' mean?