Prophets are messengers in charge of communicating the orders and prohibitions they received from God. Throughout history, there are those who believe in these prophets as well as those who do not. While the thought rejecting prophethood sometimes manifested itself as a trend, sometimes it came out on a personal basis. For example, the "Berâhime", known to be of Indian origin, and the "Sümeniyya" movement, which has different rumors about its origin, can be given as examples. Again, it can be (...) said that the current of thought emerging under the name of “Deism” serves this purpose. On the other hand, personalities such as Abu Isa al-Verrâq, Ibn al-Rawendi and Abu Bakr ar-Razi, It is known that they objected to the prophethood of the Prophet. Although Ibn al-Rawendi was a scholar of Mu'tezile at first, he later left this idea and put forward mulhidish ideas. In addition to he tried to cancel the Hz Mohammed's prophethood. While Ibn al-Rawendi was doing this, sometimes he emphasized the miracles of the Prophet and sometimes claimed that there were some deficiencies and contradictions in the rhetoric of the Quran. According to Ibn al-Rawendi, there are many contradictory information in the Quran. According to him, unnecessary repetitions, unnecessary prolongation of the word in some places and the presence of non-Arabic origin words show that the Quran is not a miracle book and cannot be described as universal. Qâdî Abdulcabbâr, one of the scholars of Mu'tezile, handled these objections with great care and answered them. The number of such discussions in Kalam sources is quite high. For example, there are such polemics in Imam Mâturîdî's Kitâbü't-Tevhîd and in Bâkillânî's Kitâbü't-Temhîd. In this study, the discussion in the 16th volume of al-Muğnî of Qadi Abdulcabbâr will be discussed. In the aforementioned discussion, Qadı Abdulcabbâr firstly stated Ibn al-Rawendi's objection to the Qur'an, and then duly eliminated this objection. The most striking point here is that Ibn al-Rawendi ignored the features of the Arabic language, the integrity of the Quran and that it has a purpose while making these criticisms. For this reason, while presenting the criticisms, he severed the verses from their contexts, did not consider the before and after, and therefore did not understand or understand the message correctly. On the other hand, Qadı Abdulcabbâr gave convincing answers by linking the criticized verses with their contexts and revealing the real meaning. (shrink)

Özet Şii-İmamiyye’nin usûlde Mu’tezilenin etkisinde kaldığı iddiaları, hicri dördüncü asırdan itibaren dile getirilmektedir. Buna karşılık usûlî düşüncenin ilk mümessili sayılan Şeyh Müfîd’den itibaren mezhep içinden yükselen sesler bu iddiaları şiddetle reddetmişlerdir. Biz bu çalışmada Mu’tezile kelamına sistematik hüviyet kazandıran ve yazdığı eserlerle Mu’tezile kelamının bugüne ulaşmasında büyük pay sahibi olan Kâdî Abdülcebbâr ile İmamiyye’nin kelam düşüncesinin istikrar bulmasında ve Şeyh Müfîd’le başlatılan usûlî yaklaşımın benimsenip yaygınlaşmasında büyük bir yeri olan Ebû Ca’fer et-Tûsî arasında adalet ilkesi üzerinden bir karşılaştırma yaparak, söz (...) konusu iddiaların ne kadar sübut bulduğunu tespit etmeye çalıştık. Kısmi farklı izahları bir kenara bırakırsak, adalet ilkesinin ispat ve yorumlanmasında iki kelamcı arasında kayda değer bir farklılığın olmadığı görülmektedir. Abstract The claim that the Shi’i Imamite thought is heavily influenced by the Mu’tazilite outlook has been alleged since the fouth century of hijra. However, beginning with Shaikh Mufid, the first representative of the Usuli branch of Shi’a, the Shi’is vehemently denied this allegation. In this article, this issue is dealt with by making a comparison between the idea of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, the prominent Mu’tazilite scholar who made a major contribution to the consolidation of the schools’ theaching and that of al-Tusi, who also made a contrubitued to the integration of the Shi’ite kalam and the spreading of the usuli approach initiated by Shaikh Mufid. Leaving aside the differences in deatil, it seems that there is no noteworthy difference between their approcah to the issue of justice. Key Words: Qâdî Abd al-Jabbâr, Abû Ja’far al-Tûsî, Husn-Qubh, Divine Justice, Free Will. (shrink)

Eşʿarîliğin son aşamasını temsil eden Îcî’nin argümanları, ekoldeki geleneksel ve felsefî yaklaşımları yansıtmaktadır. Bu makale Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî realizmine karşı kullandığı temel argümanlarını sunmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı Îcî’nin argümanlarını değiştirmeden sağlam bir şekilde sunmak, açıklamak, itirazları tartışmak ve sonunda güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini değerlendirmektir. Makalenin amacı Muʿtezile’nin argümanlarını açıklamak değildir; yine de Îcî’nin argümanlarını daha net anlamak için bazı açıklamalar yapmaktadır. Makalenin ilk kısmında Eşʿarîler ile Muʿtezile’nin ahlâk anlayışları arasında belirgin bir çizgi çizmektedir. Tartışma noktasını belirtip kelâmî argümanlar için zemin hazırlamaktadır. (...) Îcî’nin argümanları üç kısma ayrılmıştır. Birinci kısımda Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî temellerine şüphe düşürmek için insanın seçme özgürlüğünü ortadan kaldırmak için polemik argümanını sunmaktayız. Argümana karşı eleştirileri tartıştıktan sonra Îcî’nin insanın gücü ve seçme özgürlüğü konusundaki gerçek görüşünü ortaya koyuyoruz. İkinci kısım, intrinsik değerler görüşüne karşı üç argüman ihtiva etmektedir. İlk iki argüman Îcî tarafından benimsenmiş, üçüncüsü ise genel bir şekilde diğer Eşʿarîlere atfetmiştir. Bu iki argüman yalanı ve doğruyu söylemenin intrinsik etik değerleriyle ilgilenmektedir, üçüncüsü ise Eşʿarîlerin meşhur: “Bir araz başka bir araz üzerinde konamaz” deyişine dayanmaktadır. Makalenin son kısmı, Îcî’nin Muʿtezile'nin ahlâkî vecihler teorisine karşı argümanını tartışmaya ayrılmıştır. Îcî’nin argümanını tartışmadan önce teori ve taraftarları hakkında yeterli bir açıklama yapılmıştır. Ayrıca Îcî’nin ve Muʿtezile’nin ilâhî ahlâk anlayışına dair kısa bir giriş, argümanın içinde tartışılmaktadır. Adalet ve hikmet gibi bazı ilahî nitelikler Eşʿarî ve Muʿtezile’nin bakış açılarından ele alınmaktadır. Sonuç olarak makale, Îcî’nin Muʿtezile’nin ahlâkî realizmine karşı argümanlarını açık ve net bir şekilde ortaya koymakta, itirazları sunup değerlendirmekte ve argümanların güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini göstermektedir. Son olarak, Eşʿarîlerin Muʿtezile’ye karşı ahlâkî argümanlarını daha etkili bir şekilde anlamak için bir çözüm önermektedir. (shrink)

İslam, kalbi sadece bir organ olarak telakki etmez. Kalp aynı zamanda insanın anlama ve idrak etme merkezini oluşturur. Bu sebeple hakikati görme veya hakikate kör bakma kalbin bir hareketi olarak ifade edilir. Anlamak istemeyen kalbin felaketi ise bu durumda mühürlenme/hatm olmaktadır. Mu’tezilî düşüncede her ne kadar mühürlenme bir akıbet/ceza, alamet veya diğer insanlar için maslahat kabul edilse de insanın iman etme özgürlüğüne engel olan bir belirlemeyi ifade etmez. İnsan, teklifin son anına kadar kendisi hakkında nihaî kararı verebilme yeti ve kudretine (...) sahiptir. Hem adli ilahi hem de insana verilen tercih etme imkânı gerçeğe ulaşmayı engelleyecek faktörlere müsaade etmemektedir. Bu sebeple hatm, bir sebep değil; bireyin kararıyla ilintili sonuçtur. Buna göre özgür bireyin kendisi hakkında verdiği net ve sabit karar mühürlenme olmaktadır. (shrink)

İslâm teoloji/kelâm geleneğinin filizlenmeye başladığı dönem, yoğun siyasi gelişmelerin, iç savaşların, hilafet tartışmalarının yaşandığı bir evrenin yanısıra, kendisinden önce üretilen fizikî, felsefî ve dinsel anlamda yaşanan gelişmelerle paralel bir sülûk izlemiştir. Bu anlamda kelâm tartışmalarının siyasi olgu ve olaylar kadar, fikrî anlamda tarihsel bağlam etrafında incelenmesi gerekmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Müslüman kelâm geleneğinde Mu’tezile’nin; nasıl, hangi şartlarda ve nelere itiraz ederek ortaya çıktığı, teoloji anlayışlarında neleri slogan haline getirdiği incelenecektir. Buna istinaden Grek geleneğinde üretilen felsefî metinler bilhassa atomculuk tartışmaları, Hıristiyan ve (...) Zerdüşt teolojisi, Mu’tezile’nin tarihsel bağlamda nasıl tepkisini çekti ve apolojik anlamda ne tür karşı koyuşlara sebebiyet verdiği tafsilatlı olarak tartışılacaktır. Kelâm problemleri ya da tartışmaları sadece i’tikâd boyutunda ele alındığında gayet tabii eksik kalacaktır. Bu amaçla Mu’tezile’nin beş esasından biri sayılan tevhid anlayışının o dönemin bağlamında hangi tartışmalara karşı reddiye nitelikli olduğu, ayrıntılarıyla ve tarihsel süreçten kopmaksızın din ve düşüncelerin birbirleriyle olan ilişkisi nispetinde değerlendirilecektir. (shrink)

Dini sahada tartışılan bazı kavramlar birden fazla disipline konu olmuş ve bu kavramlar her disiplinde farklı açılardan ele alınmıştır. Dinî nasların anlaşılmasında önemli yeri olan hakikat ve mecaz bu tür kavramlardandır. Hakikat ve mecaz salt dilbilimsel kavramlar gibi görünseler de birçok dini disipline de önemli ölçüde konu olmuşlardır. Fıkıh usûlü, bu kavramları yoğun bir şekilde konu edinen temel dini disiplinlerden biridir. İlk dönem dil kaynaklarında mecaza dair bir tanım yapılmamışsa da ana hatlarıyla “lafzın dilde vazedildiği anlam dışında kullanılması” mecaz kabul (...) edilmiştir. Günümüze ulaşan ilk fıkıh usulü eserinin müellifi İmam Şâfiî (öl. 204/820) ve Mu‘tezilî öncülerden Câhız (öl. 255/869), Ebû Ali el-Cübbâî (öl. 303/916) ve Ebû Hâşim el-Cübbâî (öl. 321/933) de sahip oldukları görüşlerini temellendirirken kavrama dair tanım yapmadan mecazı kullanmışlardır. Kelamcı usûlcülerden ilk defa mecaz tanımı yapan Ebû Abdullah el-Basrî’den (öl. 369/979-80) mecaza dair iki farklı tanım nakledilmiştir. Ebû Abdullah’ın yaptığı bu tanımlar ana hatlarıyla sonraki fıkıh usûlcülerin tanımları üzerinde önemli etkili olmuşsa da bu tanımlar yakın takipçileri tarafından kabul görmemiştir. Kelamcı usûlcülerden Cessâs (öl. 370/981) ve Bâkıllânî (öl. 403/1013) düşünsel mülahazalar içermeyen sade bir tanım yaparken Mu‘tezilî usûlcülerden Ebü’l-Hüseyin el-Basrî (öl. 436/1044) mecaza dair kelâmî mülahazalar içeren komplike bir tanım geliştirmiştir. Ebü’l-Hüseyin, yaptığı tanımda lafzın mecazi anlamda kullanıldığını ortaya koymak için ilk olarak hitabın türünün temel belirleyici unsurlardan biri olduğuna dikkat çekmiştir. Ebü’l-Hüseyin yaptığı tanımda ikinci olarak da lafzın hakiki anlamı gibi mecazi anlamının da bir vazՙ ile olduğuna işaret etmiştir. Ayrıca yaptığı tanımda açık şekilde ifade etmese de konu çerçevesinde yaptı değerlendirmelerde lafzın mecazi anlamda kullanıldığını ortaya koymak için karinenin de temel belirleyici unsurlardan biri olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Ona göre ancak lafzın hakiki anlamda kullanıldığına engel bir karinenin olması durumunda lafız mecazi anlama hamledilir. Mu‘tezilî usûlcülerin mecaz tanımlarını konu edinen bu çalışmada öncelikle İlk beş asırda dilcilerin ve Mu‘tezile dışındaki fıkıh usûlcülerin ortaya koydukları mecaz tanımları incelenmiştir. Daha sonra Mu‘tezilî usûlcülerin mecaz tanımları değerlendirilmiştir. Mu‘tezilî âlimlerin mecaz tanımları içerisinde ekolün düşünsel mülahazalarını dikkate alan Ebü’l-Hüseyin el-Basrî’nin tanımı yakından incelenmiştir. Mu‘tezilî düşünürlerden Kâdî Abdülcebbâr’ın mecaz anlayışını yansıtan tanımı günümüze ulaşmadığı için Ebül-Hüseyin’in tanımı incelenirken onun görüşleri de irdelenmiştir. Böylece Ebül-Hüseyin’e ait fıkıh usulü sahasında yoğun kelâmî mülahazalar ihtiva eden mecaz tanımının temelde Kâdî Abdülcebbâr’a dayandığı ortaya konulmuştur. Çalışmamızda son olarak Ebül-Hüseyin’den nakledilen mecaz tanımının diğer ekollere mensup usûlcüler üzerindeki etkisi de ortaya konulmuştur. Bu tanımın söz konusu usûlcülerden Fahreddin er-Râzî (öl. 606/1210) tarafından kabul gördüğü belirtilmiş ve Râzî’nin bu tanım çerçevesindeki görüşleri Mu‘tezile’nin düşünsel zemininde tartışılmıştır. (shrink)

Isma‘īl b. ‘Ali, who is referred to as Abū Sa‘d as-Sammān, was born in Ray, Iran, between 981 and 983 and he devoted most of his life to educational travels, especially for hadith and he returned to his city of birth towards the end of his life and died there in 1053. Isma‘īl b. ‘Ali is well-known with the name of as- Sammān, meaning butter trader, because of he was grew up in a family of butter traders. The movables and (...) real estates in his inheretence show that he belongs to a wealthy family. As-Sammān, who seems to be in the twelfth generation of Muʻtazilite tradition, approve the thoughts of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā’ī (ö. 321/933) and Abu'l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (ö. 436/1044) and he was accepted as the leader of the Muʻtazila in his own period. He had education from scholars such as Abū Tāhir al-Muḫallis, Ibn Abū Nasr at-Tamīmī and Abkasī (ö. 405/1014-15) in the discipline of hadith. As-Sammān, was an authoritative figure both in the fiqh of Hanafi and disagreements between thoughts of Hanafism and Shafi'ism as well as in the fiqh of Zaydism. In addition, he educated himself in the topic of Qur’anic recitation, scholars of narrators, genealogy, law of inheritence and arithmetic. Among the works of as-Sammān, who are stated as many, only one record seem to be extant until today: “Kitāb al-Muvāfaqa bayn ahl al-bayt wa's-sahāba wa mā ravāhu kullu farīqin fī haqq al-āḫar”, which was written to point out the fondness and respect between the first three caliphs and ‘Ali. Thus, it is not possible for us to have a detailed knowledge about his thoughts in kalam and fiqh. However, Ibn al-‘Adīm (ö. 660/1262) gives us some ideas about thoughts of al-Sammān through his will narrates in his “Bughyat aṭ-Ṭalab fī tārīḫi Ḥalab”. As-Sammān states that his thoughts of kalam and fiqh are formed on the school of Ahl al-‘adl wa't-tawḥīd, in particular parallel with Muʻtazila-Zaydiyya and he designed his will, which he gave about two years before his death, according to the Muʻtazilite theological paradigm. In this context, according to as-Sammān, Allah is one and eternal. Attributes of Allah such as Power, Knowledge, Life, Hearing, Sight and Wealth are by virtue of His essence. Allah does not resemble anything, nor a body or an accident. All actions of Allah are good, and He never do evil. Allah does not wish for a sin nor have any consent to sin. Allah does not test people with what they cannot afford. Allah does not oppress people nor punish anyone with no justice. Allah is faithful to his promise that he will reward people who are good and will punish people who do evil. Voluntarily actions are created by people themselves. Revelation regarding the doomsday and the hereafter are true. Also, worships performed by the living on behalf of the dead such as hajj, ‘umrah, charity, reciting the the Qur'an and visiting the graves of them are useful for the dead. Repentance which is the forgiveness of sins is the decisiveness of not to commit it again with regret. As-Sammān has been criticized because of his Muʻtazilite thoughts, but his credibility, his intellectual effort and his abilities have been appreciated even by his opponents. The combative and dynamic nature of his life was reflected in his will are analysed in this work and it is concluded that he expressed his thoughts on belief and deeds in his will as a true Mu‘tazilite manifesto. (shrink)

İnsanın özgür iradesinin ispatı problemine yönelik çözüm denemelerinden biri Tanrı’nın kendisini gönüllü olarak sınırlaması anlamına gelen ilahi kendini sınırlama (divine self-limitation) yaklaşımıdır. Yahudi ve Hıristiyan teolojilerinde görülen bu perspektifle modern dönemde Süreç ve Kuantum felsefelerinde karşılaşılır. Bu çalışmada ilgili düşünce biçimi, Mu‘tezilî bilincin düşünce biçimiyle kıyaslanmıştır. Öncelikle Tanrı’nın kendini sınırlamasının imkânı, sınır teorisi varsayımıyla sorgulanmıştır. Buna göre ‘sınır’ evrene ve insana ‘yasa’ olarak içkindir. Evren de insan da fiziksel, kimyasal, biyolojik vd. yasalara/sınırlara tâbidir. Bu yasaların yaratıcısı olarak Tanrı da sorumluluğun (...) kaynağı akıl da insanı sınırlar ve sınır demek kavram, anlam, amaç, sistem ve düzen/kozmos demektir. Bu düzenin toplumsal hali ise zaman ve mekân ile sınırlı insanın teklif sahibi kılınarak eylemlerinin de sınırlandırılmasıdır. Peki, akla sınırlama fonksiyonu veren Tanrı’nın da kendi iradesini, ilmindeki tasarımının bir sonucu olarak sınırladığı varsayılabilir mi? Yahudi teolojisinde bu sınırlama, onların inançlarıyla ilişkili yaşadıkları ıstıraplara karşı Tanrı’nın müdahale etmemesinin bir nedeni olarak görülmekle beraber sınırlı âlemlerin var olabilmesi için Tanrı’nın sonsuz ışığını daraltması ve geri çekilmesi olarak da anlaşılmıştır. Hıristiyan teolojisinde ise sonsuzluğun evreni yaratmasının keyfiyeti, Tanrı’nın Mesih ile enkarnasyonu, kötülük ve özgür irade problemlerini çözmek için bu teoriye başvurulmuştur. Tanrı’nın, vahiy aracılığıyla bildirdiği teklif, aynı zamanda insana akıllı, sorumlu, dolayısıyla özgür olduğunu da hatırlatmaktadır. Muhammed İkbal (öl. 1928) bu özgürlüğün insana ilahi kendini sınırlama teorisiyle verilebileceği kanaatindedir. Bu görüşle Mu‘tezilî bilincin Tanrı tasavvurunda sezilen sınırın birlikte düşünülmesi mümkün müdür? Zira tekliften doğan özgürlüğün gereği, Mu‘tezile’ye Tanrı’nın iradesinin ezeli olmadığını, tercihlerinin yaratıcısının insanın kendisi olduğunu düşündürmüştür. Yine tanrısal adaletin bir gereği olarak, insana kudretin fiilden önce verilmesi, nübüvvet ile va‘d ve vaidin gerçekleşmesi gibi teklife dair meseleler Tanrı hakkında zorunlu kabul edilmiştir. Bu bilinçte aklın sınırlama fonksiyonu Tanrı’ya taşınmış görünür. Tanrı insanın eylemlerinde etkin değildir, kötülüğü de yaratmaz. Hatta bazı isimlere göre kötülüğe güç dahi yetiremez. Tanrı’nın malumatının ve makduratının da bir sınırı vardır. Mu‘tezile’deki bu sınırlı Tanrı tasavvuru, söz konusu ‘özgür irade’ olduğunda ilgili teoriyle yeniden ifade edilirse, adil ve hakim olan Tanrı’nın, ilmindeki bilinçli/akıl sahibi/sorumlu/özgür insan tasarımının gerektirmesiyle gönüllü olarak kendi özgürlüğünü sınırladığı söylenebilecektir. Bu söylem, varoluşsal amaçlılık anlamında insanın neden özgür olduğunun değil, Tanrı’nın vahyettiğine inanılan bir evrende nasıl özgür olabildiğinin muhtemel cevaplarından biridir. (shrink)

The promise and the threat (al-wa’d wa al-wa‘īd) issue, which has been debated among theological sects, is primarily related to the problem of grave sin. This critical issue discussed in the framework of the problem of grave sin and in the context of the faith-action relationship has been shaped based on the definitions of faith of the emerging sects. Through examining the Qur’ān verses about al-wa’d and al-wa‘īd, answers to such questions whether the Qur’ān verses about to indicate generality (‘umūm) (...) or specification (khusūs) and whether divine promise and threat can change have been sought. In the beginning, the disputations occurring between Murji’ah and Mu‘tazilah, afterward, have become one of the essential matters of debate among Māturīdīs and the Mu‘tazilī scholars. Even though Imām Māturīdī expresses common criticisms against Khawārij and Mu‘tazilah, he mainly condemns the Mu‘tazilī doctrine. Mu‘tazilah treats the principle in question based on the idea that, by force of divine justice, it is necessary for God to reward the faithful and punish the disobedient. According to them, because a grave sin that is not repented requires to stay permanently in the hell, intercession (shafā‘ah) is not possible for such a person. However, Māturīdī argues that a claim of this kind cannot be valid from the point of justice by emphasizing that faith, which is a state of constant assent, prevents the punishment. In this essay, Māturīdī’s criticisms have been discussed with regard to directly related issues such as justice, grave sin, and intercession. (shrink)

Muʽtazilah is one of the kalām schools in which intellectual freedom is seen the most and therefore divergences within the sect are the most common. Although al-usûl al-ḥamsa/five principles constitute the main framework on which Muʽtazilah has agreed, opposing ideas have emerged within the sect on the principles of ʽadl (divine justice) and al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn and on the issues of nature and imamah. As a matter of fact, Muʽtâzilī scholars wrote many refutations to each other on the disputed issues. (...) One of those who have opposing views within the Muʽtazilah is Muḥammad b. Shabīb al-Baṣrī (d. mid 3rd/9th century), who lived between the end of 2nd and the middle of the 3rd century of hijra. Ibn Shabīb is one of the students of Ibrāhīm Ibn Sayyār al-Naẓẓām (d. 231/845), who was one of the leading scholars of Muʽtazilah. He initially opposed the principle of al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn, while he was Muʽtezilî, and accepted the Murji’ah approach on this issue. However, after he accepted the idea of irjā’, he continued his loyalty to Muʽtazilah with regard to the principles of tawhīd (divine unity) and ʽadl. Ibn Shabīb, who had a theological assembly of his own and is respected by the people in Baṣra, was an important scholar who stands out with his comprehensive knowledge of religious and philosophical schools of his time. In the doxographical tradition, his adoption of Murjī’ ideas is generally emphasized, except that he has not been referred to much. However, when the sources of kalām are examined meticulously, it is understood that he influenced many Muslim theologians with his works and views and that he was a source for them regarding many topics. The most important reason for this is that he was one of the first scholars to defend the Islamic belief against various philosophical and religious movements. Naturally, this situation provided him with a wide knowledge of religious and philosophical trends. Considering the quotations made from him, it is understood that he recorded this accumulation in a doxographical work. Another remarkable feature of Ibn Shabīb is that he was one of the first scholars to write in the genre of Kitāb al-Tawhīd. It is possible to see both contextual and methodological effects of this work in the quotations and narratives of Al-Māturīdī's book with the same name. What makes him different is that he adopts Muʽtazilī and Murjī’ ideas at the same time and develops a unique discourse on the subjects of grave sins and waʽīd (divine warning). Although he was raised in a strong tradition of thought such as Muʽtazilah, his ability to oppose his sect and his teacher Al-Naẓẓām and also to develop a different definition of faith despite accepting the doctrine of irjā’, makes him stand out as an original and intellectual personality. His different definition of faith is important in that it represents a more moderate approach to the issue of takfīr. For, he drew an encompassing framework based on the Quran and the Sunnah regarding the definition of faith and the conditions of takfīr, thus, he tried to preserve the unity of Muslims. He did not consider the denial of controversial issues that are not explicitly included in the Quran and Sunnah as a reason for takfīr. With this attitude, Ibn Shabīb took an important approach in ensuring social peace and free thought. In this article, all the information contained in Muʽtazilī sources, and doxographical works related to the life, scientific personality and theological views of Ibn Shabīb are gathered and analyzed, and then his theological thought is reconstructed based on these data. From this point of view, identifications and evaluations have been made regarding the issues that make him different and unique in the history of Muslim thought. (shrink)

The Zaydī-Muʿtazilī interaction, which dates back to the early periods, increased when The Būyid vizier al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād invited Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār to Rayy and many Caspian Zaydī scholars studied with Qāḍī. Ibn Sharwīn, who is mentioned among the students of Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār and accepted as one of the Zaydī- Muʿtazilī scholars, is one of these names. The works of Ibn Sharwīn, who had writings in the field of kalām and fiqh, did not remain within the borders of the (...) Caspian and reached the Zaydīs of Yemen; one of these works is Ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ. Considering that, unlike other theological schools, there are not many works on the definitions of theological concepts in Muʿtazilī literature and -as far as is known- did not reach today, this treatise helps to understand better especially the terms in Zaydī- Muʿtazilī theology and the effects of Bahshamiyya on Zaydī thought. This work, edited and translated based on the only extant manuscript only manuscript found in Yemen and a previous publication, on the one hand, is important in understanding the point of view of Zaydī- Muʿtazilī thought on the disciplines of theology, jurisprudence, debate, history of Islamic sects, on the other hand, it is a helpful resource for understanding the terms used in the theory of aḥwāl, which is still an intricate issue. Ibn Sharwīn in his Ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ; explains over 150 terms in relation to cosmology such as substance, accident, line, surface, space; to ontology such as existing, non-existence, originated (muḥdath); to epistemology such as knowledge, creed, ignorance, doubt, skepticism, obligatory and acquired knowledge; to methodology such as evidence, madlūl, debate, and disputation; to fiqh such as sunnah, farḍ, mandūb, cause, command-prohibition, general-particular (ʿumūm-ḫuṣūṣ); to the history of sects such as ʿadliyya, compulsionists (mujbira) and qadarī; to divinity such as the oneness of God (tawhīd); to justice such as promise and threat (al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd), good and evil, necessary and acquired, grace, compensation, repentance, major and minor sins; to the theory of al-aḥwāl such as attribute of the essence, determinant (muḳtaḍī), entail (muḳtaḍā), muṣaḥḥiḥ, cause. Describing ḥadd that corresponds to “definition” and ḥaḳīḳat that he used together with it as collectively exhaustive, mutually exclusive, Ibn Sharwīn defines knowledge, power, living (ḥayy), speech (kalām), speaker (mutakallim), permanent (bāqī) etc. in a way that is true for both God and human beings. While making these definitions, he draws on poems, linguistic usages and verses and divides the nouns into three parts at the end of his work, namely linguistic, religious and conventional (sharʿī and waḍʿī); in particular, he gives detailed information about metaphors and parts of truth. Another striking aspect of the work is the explanation of the meanings of the imperative mood which is included in the subjects of the Methodology of Fiqh. (shrink)

This article tries to show that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, one of Ash‘arī theologians of the contracting period, showed a Mu‘tazila tendency regarding the ontic value of divine attributes and his successors followed him in this regard. The problem of divine attributes, a heated discussion area of theology, has been interpreted differently by the theological sects over centuries. Mu‘tazila scholars before Abu Hāshim al-Jubbāī regarded those attributes as nominally attributed to God. For the first time, with Abu Hāshim, this relation was (...) approached with a realistic attitude: Although divine attributes are not accepted as particular realities, they are viewed as states/ahwāl, the universal model of kalam atomism. The pre-Gazzālī Ash‘arī theologians, on the other hand, ascribed real existence to divine attributes as particular properties, whether they adopted this universal model or not. According to Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, the founder of Ashʿarism, which does not include the universal category in any way, the attributes carried by God’s essence consist of particular qualities. al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī, who, like Abu Hāshim, made room for universals under the name of states, accepted particular qualities that led to universal attributes in a system compatible with Ashʿarism. Muta’akhkhirūn Ash‘arī theologians, building their thought system within the framework of the particular-universal dichotomy, felt the need to apply the theories of universals and predication to overcome the paradox caused by the famous motto “Attributes are neither Him nor other than Him”. On the basis of universal properties that have a lower degree of existence compared to particular properties, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s theory of particular attributes is intended to be associated with Abu Hāshim’s theory of universal (state). In this context, the value of divine attributes discussed on the ontic ground by the mutaqaddimūn theologians was drawn to the epistemic ground in the muta’akhkhirūn period. From the first kalām works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī to the last kalām works, he was distant from the ontic value of divine attributes. The statement that the derived word “knower”, which is appropriate for being a predicate in the propositional structure, and the infinitive “knowledge”, which is not appropriate for being a predicate, meet the same purpose, and that divine attributes are considered divine essence are the most important indications of this distance. Reviewing the works of prominent theologians, scholars of the time such as Fakhr al- Dīn al-Rāzī, Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī, Sa‘d al-dīn al-Taftāzānī, al-Jurjānī, and al-Dawānī, this article aims to demonstrate that Abu Hāshim’s view of the divine attributes in the ontic context was welcomed and that the evaluation of divine attributes shifted from particular realities to universal ones in the ontic context. The meaning of “God is knower” proposition according to the pre-Mu‘tazila in the ontic context will be analyzed. Then, its meaning according to Ash‘arite theologians from their framework of universals, will be investigated. (shrink)

One of the issues of discussion between Ahl al-Sunnah and the Mu‛tazila, who differ in many issues, is the relationship between divine command and divine will. Among those who express their opinion on is the Ash‛arī theologian Salmān al-Nīsābūrī. The author, who first cites his sect’s approach on this issue and then explains that Mu‛tazila’s contrary view, adopted the view that the belief, which follows as worship and good deeds commanded by Allah will be the same from his servants. In (...) this matter he basically elaborates three arguments the Mu‛tazila. He states that they build the first of these proofs on the impossibility of the commandment and the will being in a separate direction, and secondly on the fact that the desire for evil is bad. Finally, he adds that they bring evidence from the verses which translates as Allah desires the good of his servants and doesn’t intend his evil deeds. Nīsābūrī, doesn’t pass on these Mu‛tazilite proofs with an immediate answer, but also puts on his agenda possible other objections to those answers that he is giving. He makes the debate very comprehensive, especially on the first evidence he attributes to them. In this sense, he tries to refute the Mu‛tazila argument that the ruler cannot have a will contrary to what he ordered, based on some other rulers who would not want their orders to be fulfilled. Nīsābūrī, who cites some other objections on this issue, states that while there are claims regarding the necessity of order-will harmony, it isn’t consistent that these claimants develop their objections to the examples that show the opposite of their views. In other words, he says that these regarding cases invalidate Mu‛tazila’s claim of necessity. Nīsābūrī includes abrogation in the later stages of the debate and argues that abrogation, which means the abolition of a decree, hits a blow to their understanding of the necessity of order-will. The author also takes objections to his agenda and responds to them. He also examines Mu‛tazila’s approach on the content that if the will is contrary to the order, the rebel and the submissive will be confused, so they must be compatible. Since this claim confirms the meaning that the unbelievers obey Allah’s will with their blasphemy, he makes explanations that obedience will be achieved by order, not by will. On the other hand, the author tries to bind his interlocutors by emphasizing that there’s no room for discussion when it is seen at the relevant verses and seen that Allah doesn’t wish (some) unbelievers to believe. Nīsābūrī, also examines the argument made by Mu‛tazila as to the necessity of conformity between divine command and divine will, that wishing for evil is also evil. Nīsābūrī, who makes relatively more concise explanations on this subject, pointing to the source of this evidence and stating that it is reached from the realm of the perceptible (qiyas bi’l-shāhid). Then, he makes some explanations that the visible realm and the invisible realm cannot be evaluated in the same way and draws attention to the fact that Allah’s being unwise isn’t inferred from the worldly affairs that are happening against Muslims. Nīsābūrī also deals with Mu‛tazila’s evidence for the harmony of divine will and divine order through verses stating that Allah wouldn’t wish his servants to harm. At this stage, he makes comments that the relevant verses are suitable to be evaluated in another way. For this, sometimes makes linguistic explanations, sometimes refers to the content of other verses, and sometimes points to the meaning of the verse used as the evidence. In all of them, he ultimately tries to show that the verses raised by Mu‛tazila do not support their claim. While the author refutes those evidences, he also points out the problems that may arise if the view defended by Mu‛tazila would accepted. In this sense, Nīsābūrī points out that this view will also mean the occurrence of deeds that Allah does not want, and this would bring harm to the divine judgement. As a result, Nīsābūrī underlines that at least Allah’s order towards His servants, whom He knows won’t believe, isn’t in the same direction. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada İslam düşünce tarihinde çokça ele alınan yönetime gelmede “nass ile tayin” anlayışına yönelik genelde Mu‘tezile’nin özelde ise bir Mu‘tezilî âlim Ebû Tâhir Rüknüddin et-Tureysisî’nin eleştirileri konu edinilmektedir. “Nass ile tayin” anlayışı Kur’ân âyetleri ve hadisler üzerinden temellendirilmeye çalışılan bir husustur. Şii çevrelerle özdeşleşen bu anlayış bazı Sünnî ekollerde de dillendirilmiştir. Genelde dördüncü halife Ali’nin imâmeti çerçevesinde konu tartışılsa da bazı çevrelerde birinci halife Ebû Bekir’in imâmeti için de nass ile tayin iddia edilmiştir. Mu‘tezile temelde Şîa’nın imâmet anlayışına birçok (...) eleştiri yöneltmiştir. Bu iddialar doğrudan Kur’ân metni üzerinden yapıldığı için âyetler bağlamında yeniden konunun değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu noktada Mu‘tezilî bilgin Tureysisî’nin yaklaşımı önem arz etmektedir. O, mezheplerin görüşlerini temellendirmede esas aldıkları âyetleri dilin ve aklın sınırında anlama çabası içerisinde olduğu Müteşâbihü’l-Kur’ân adlı eserinde “nass ile tayin” fikrine yönelik eleştirilerini sürdürmektedir. Hem İmâmiyye’nin hem de Bekriyye’nin iddialarını âyetler bağlamında ele almakta ve bu fırkaları tenkid etmektedir. (shrink)

Mu'tazila and Shīʿa (Zaydiyya-Imāmiyya) have common views on many theological issues except the imamate. This issue has been generally accepted by other Islamic scholars rather than Shīʿa and by Western researchers. That in this interaction between the Mu‘tazila and the Shīʿa, the Shīʿa is the side mostly affected. However, it is an issue that should not be overlooked that the Shīʿa partially influenced the Mu'tazila in ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, over the other Companions. In this context, some persons from the (...) Baghdad Mu’tazila School such as Bishr b. al-Muʿtamir (d. 210/825), Jaʿfar b. Mubashir (d. 234/848), Jaʿfar b. Harb (d. 236/850) and al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854) argued that the imamate of Abū Bakr, who was less virtuous, was permissible although they considered ʿAlī as the most virtuous person after the Prophet. In addition, al-ʿAllāf (d. 235/849-850), al-Naẓẓām (d. 231/845), Abū Abdullah al-Basrī (d. 369/979-80) and Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) along with Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916), one of the chiefs of the Basra Mu'tazila School, and Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933) did not accept the order of caliphate as the order of virtue. This study focuses on the issue of whether the aforementioned affinity between Mu'tazila and Shīʿa affected Mu'tazila, especially in the interpretation of the verses associated with ʿAlī. In the study, the aforementioned problem was examined through the tafsīr al-Kashshāf of the Muʿtazilī mufassir al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144). In addition to the importance of tafsīr, the fact that al-Zamakhsharī took lessons from Shīʿīte/Zaydī persons and he wrote the tafsīr with the support of Zaydī leader al-Wahhās (d. 506/1112) is effective in handling this issue through al-Kashshāf's tafsīr. In the first part of the study, first of all, the interaction between Imāmiyya and Zaydism, which are the two most important branches of Mu‘tazila and Shīʿa, is briefly mentioned. Then, Mu'tazila’s and Al-Zamakhsharī’s view on ʿAlī's position among other caliphs is emphasized. Al-Zamakhsharī, who is from the Basra school of the Mu'tazila, does not consider ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib superior to Abū Bakr, unlike al-ʿAllāf, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī, Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī and Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, who are the leading figures of this school. In fact, the fact that he always observed the order of the caliphate while talking about the merits of the four caliphs supports the possibility that, unlike his predecessors, he accepted the order of the caliphate as the order of virtue. In the second part, it is questioned whether the narrations that al-Zamakhsharī included in his tafsīr of the verses associated with ʿAlī are similar to the narrations of the Shīʿīte/Zaydī/Imāmī tradition and whether he interpreted the verses in parallel with these narrations. In this respect, the tafsīr al-Kashshāf has been examined comparatively with the Sunni and Shiite tafsīrs prior to it. Eventually, while interpreting these verses associated with the Ahl al-bayt (members of the Prophet’s household), al-Zamakhsharī highlights the narrations that appreciate the virtues of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and his child. However, he also refrains from making comments that would be in line with the Shīʿa's belief in imamate. In particular, his tafsīr of the verse al-Aḥzāb 33/33 in the context of the Prophet’s wives is the greatest indicator of this situation. It has been determined that while al-Zamakhsharī includes the narrations highlighting the virtue of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and his children, he mostly follows the Sunni commentator al-Thaʿlabī. In particular, it has been seen that al-Zamakhsharī transferred the narration material in the interpretation of the relevant verses from al-Thaʿlabī's commentary almost in the same way. However, it is noteworthy that al-Zamakhsharī differs from him in some details such as linguistically supporting these narrations in some verses such as ʾĀli ʿImrān 3/61 and al-Māʾidah 5/55. An indirect influence can be mentioned because al-Thaʿlabī frequently narrates the narrations supporting the Shīʿītes in places where there is a Sunni-Shīʿīte conflict. Therefore, although there is no evidence that al-Zamakhsharī took these narrations from Shīʿīte sources, it is seen that he brought ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib-based narrations in Sunni sources into the fore. Even in the commentary of al-Ḥākim al-D̲h̲us̲h̲amī, al-Zamakhsharī's teacher in the line of Zaydi/Mu'tazili, the lack of Ali emphasis in the interpretation of the aforementioned verses supports our view. (shrink)

This article descriptively discusses the divine purpose in the creation of the world and especially the human being, and the value analysis of the concepts, expressing this purpose in the light of the views of Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024), who was from the Basra School, and systemized the five doctrinal principles of the Mu'tazila. Accordingly, it answers the question why God created the human on the basis of the purpose/aim in divine actions and examines the qualitative value of the (...) non-compulsory cause (dā’ī) that motivates God to create. In addition, the article shows that 'beneficence', the central concept in the purpose of the creation, is formulized as ‘tafaḍḍul’ (disinterested or gratuitous beneficence) with the title of wisdom before the creation and as ‘thawāb’ (reward) and ‘iwaḍ (compensation) with the title of wājib (necessary or obligatory) in the resurrection. It also emphasizes that ‘iqāb (punishment) is not a value for the beginning of creation, and therefore it is 'legal good' required by the resurrection. It also touches on that the concepts, expressing all this purposefulness are based on the values of 'benefit and good' (maṣlaḥa and ḥusn). This article concludes that while the main purpose of the beginning of creation is beneficence and its actual value is tafaḍḍul; the main purpose of re-creation is benefit and good, and the actual value is wājib. (shrink)

One of the issues covered by Muʿtazila’s idea of justice is the subject of the imposition of moral obligation (taklīf). The concept of the obligation (taklīf), which expresses that God imposes some difficult acts on His servants and asks them to fulfill them, is important because it explains God’s justice for His servants and His wisdom in creating them. For this reason, the main emphasis in the matter of imposition has been on the veneration of the servants and rendering benefits (...) to them in return for imposition. As a matter of fact, God offers His servants such a reward that it is not possible to achieve with anything other than obligation. This article presents examples of hypothetical obligations emphasizing the same issue. Al-taklīf al-zāid is an additional imposition period meaning that God does not end the life that he determines for the morally obliged (mukallaf), but prolongs the life of the servant in such a way that changes the result of his imposition. In Muʿtazilite thought, the issue of the additional imposition basically takes place in the form of two separate discussions about unbeliever and believer. While the additional imposition of the unbeliever deals with the situation of the unbeliever who is known to believe when his imposition (or life) is prolonged; the additional imposition of believer deals with the situation of the believer who is known to disbelieve when his imposition (or life) is prolonged. Abū ʿAli thinks that it is obligatory (wajib) for God to keep this unbeliever alive when it is known that he would come to believe if He did not kill him and his imposition had been prolonged. His argument in this regard is his thought that the additional imposition is a favour (lutf) for the unbeliever to believe. Abū Hāshim, on the other hand, says that it is not obligatory for God to prolong the imposition of unbeliever in such a situation, and that it would be good (hasan) to kill the unbeliever, even though it is known that he would have believed if his imposition had been prolonged. Because, according to Abū Hāshim, God already gave the unbeliever the opportunity to attain rewards in his first imposition. The unbeliever reached this end because he made a wrong choice in his imposition and it cannot be obligatory for God to re-present the circumstances that will change this outcome. According to him, the additional imposition of an unbeliever is not a favour (lutf), but it is like the enabling to act (tamkīn) and is not obligatory. As for the additional imposition of a believer, Abū ʿAli, Abū Hāshim and the Bahshamites agree that it is good to prolong the imposition of the believer who is known to be an unbeliever if his imposition was prolonged. The reason for their view is that God has endowed the servant with a reward, which would otherwise be unattainable, in return for the prolonged imposition. However, the Husaynites believe that prolonging the imposition of believer in this situation would not be good. Because the believer deserves a reward for his first imposition and in this case, his additional imposition will be a corruption (mafsada) for him. As a result of these different views, when we look generally, it is seen that the main concern in Muʿtazilite thought is to make the most appropriate decision for the benefit of the servant in all the impositions that God has imposed and is likely to impose. The Bahshamites have always prioritized offering more rewards to the servant. However, Abū ʿAli regarding the additional imposition of the unbeliever, and the Husaynites regarding the additional imposition of believer, prioritized the imposition’s resulting in belief, and they thought that it was more suitable for the benefit of the servant. Since the purpose of the imposition in Muʿtazilite thought is to provide the opportunity to attain the degrees that it could never been reached in any other way, regardless of the outcome, it should be said that the views of the Bahshamites on both additional obligations are more consistent within the general system of Muʿtazila. (shrink)

The theory of the tab' in the physics of Mu 'tazila has a distinct place. It is necessary to distinguish the scholars from the atheist naturalists who adopt the idea of nature. Tab ' theory is a problem with the essence of the entity. This theory is related to the structure of living and inanimate beings. When it comes to the habit and tempering of man, we use the word tab'; it is used the term of nature when it comes (...) to the structure of objects. In particular, the Basra School of Muʿtazila has given the emphasis on tab' theory emphasizing the freedom of man. They have implemented the tab ' theory to a number of topics related to knowledge, action, metaphysical, moral and Spiritual life. The nature, which is defended by Muʻtezile, is a force that Allah places in the nature of man and body. Nature, which is in the essence of both living and inanimate substances, is not independent of Allah. It has caused some problems defending some scholars, such as Muammer and Câhız from Basra School of Muʿtazila the idea of compulsory natural causality in the interpretation of some metaphysical subjects. In this regard, The scholars of Muʿtazila such as Nazzâm and Kâdî Abdülcebbâr, have acted more carefully. While Nazzâm does not see the theory of natural nature independently of divine power, he prefers to use the word "itimat" instead of the tab ' theory ', which he sees as part of pagan culture. (shrink)

Die traditionsreiche Reihe QUELLEN UND FORSCHUNGEN ZUR LITERATUR- UND KULTURGESCHICHTE, deren Ursprung auf das Jahr 1874 zur ckgeht, geh rt zum festen Bestand renommierter Publikationsforen der Deutschen Literaturwissenschaft. Von Ernst Osterkamp und Werner R cke an der Humboldt-Universit t zu Berlin herausgegeben, pr sentieren die QUELLEN UND FORSCHUNGEN hochwertige wissenschaftliche Arbeiten, die literarische Texte im Zusammenhang mit kulturhistorischen Ph nomenen, besonders auch mit den anderen K nsten, untersuchen. Philologische Studien mit transdisziplin rem Ansatz sind ausdr cklich erw nscht. Der Schwerpunkt (...) der Serie liegt auf der deutschen Literatur vom Mittelalter bis in die Gegenwart. Da die kulturgeschichtliche Ausrichtung der Reihe Aspekte interkultureller Erfahrung und nationaler Fremdwahrnehmung einbegreift, stehen die QUELLEN UND FORSCHUNGEN im Einzelfall aber auch komparatistischen Arbeiten offen. Ver ffentlicht werden Monographien, Dissertationen und Habilitationsschriften sowie thematisch geschlossene Sammelb nde. Die Ma st be f r die Aufnahme in die Reihe bilden wissenschaftliche Relevanz und Exzellenz in Methode und Darstellung. (shrink)

"Jürgen Habermas", so schrieb der amerikanische Philosoph Ronald Dworkin zum 80. Geburtstag des grossen europäischen Denkers, "ist nicht nur der berühmteste lebende Philosoph der Welt. Sein Ruhm selbst ist berühmt." Nach mehrjährigen Forschungen, intensiver Recherche und ausführlichen Gesprächen mit Weggefährten, Zeitzeugen sowie mit Habermas selbst legt Stefan Müller-Doohm nun die erste umfassende Biographie des bedeutendsten Intellektuellen unserer Zeit vor. Sie beleuchtet sowohl das Zusammenspiel von philosophischer Reflexion und intellektueller Intervention als auch das Wechselverhältnis von Lebens- und Werkgeschichte vor dem Hintergrund (...) historischer Ereignisse. Deutlich wird so das Bild eines einzigartigen Denkers, zu dessen wichtigsten philosophischen Errungenschaften eine Theorie verständigungsorientierten Handelns gehört, der, wenn er den Eindruck gewinnt, dass die Gesellschaft hinter ihren Möglichkeiten zur Gestaltung freier und gerechter Lebensverhältnisse zurückbleibt, zum unnachgiebigen Kritiker wird. (shrink)

"Empirische Ästhetik hat heute Konjunktur. Doch sie ist keineswegs eine Erfindung der Gegenwart. Schon im späten 19. Jahrhundert wurden zahlreiche Versuche unternommen, wissenschaftlich exakte Methoden in die Untersuchung des Schönen einzuführen. Unter Anschluss an Disziplinen wie Physiologie, Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft wird Ästhetik um 1900 zu einer Wissensform, die in ihren materiellen Grundlagen, in ihrer diskursiven Organisation sowie in ihren theoretischen Konsequenzen neuartige Verbindungen zwischen Gefühl und Genauigkeit erzeugt. Die Beiträge des Bandes diskutieren diese Entwicklung anhand verschiedener Facetten und Spielformen empirischer (...) Ästhetik, die von den frühen Einfühlungstheorien über experimentelle Laborforschungen bis hin zu Poetik und Kunstwissenschaft reichen."--Front inside flap of dust jacket. (shrink)

Driven by concrete applications, Algorithm Engineering complements theory by the benefits of experimentation and puts equal emphasis on all aspects arising during a cyclic solution process ranging from realistic modeling, design, analysis, ...

The volume's topic is a comparative analysis of the main authors and social groups who were engaged with the reception of hellenistic philosophy at Rome. It studies in which way their specific approach to philosophy can be explained by their Roman cultural and intellectual background. Thus the volume designs philosophical and cultural criteria to be common to the philosophical activities of Romans and make them discernible as specifically Roman.