The paper presents an argument for respecting conscientious refusals based on the Thomistic account of conscience; the argument does not employ the notion of right. The main idea is that acting against one’s conscience necessarily makes the action objectively wrong and performed in bad faith, and expecting someone to act against his or her conscience is incompatible with requiring him or her to act in good faith. In light of this idea I also examine the issue of obligations imposed on (...) objectors as well as the claims that conscientious objectors should change their profession. (shrink)

In the paper I discuss Geach’s rejection of volitions (inner acts of the will) both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in systematic action theory – a rejection followed by some analytical commentators of Aquinas (like Davies and Kenny). I claim that Geach’s interpretation of Aquinas’s action theory in terms of tendencies (treating the will as a special kind of tendency) enables – pace Geach – a sound defense of volitionism both in the exegesis of Aquinas and in the action (...) theory. In other words, I offer arguments in favour of volitions (inner acts of the will) starting from some insights to be found in Geach, and I response to some standard objections against volitionism. Moreover, I try to sketch a framework (based on an ontology of tendencies suggested by Geach) suitable to discuss some other volitionist claims. I proceed in four steps: first I introduce the definition of a volition or inner act of the will that may be ascribed to various camps in the volitionism debate; then I discuss three main arguments of Geach against volitionism – the argument from trying, the argument from voluntary omissions, and the argument from natural theology. I pay special attention to the issue of the timing of volitions. (shrink)

W artykule dyskutuję z interpretacją tomistycznej teorii uniwersaliów w książce Pawła Rojka Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne w kontekście problematyki „ukrytego nominalizmu”. Stawiam sobie w nim trzy cele. (i) Proponuję uściślenie definicji powszechnika, pozwalające bronić zasadniczych tez Pawła Rojka dotyczących ukrytego nominalizmu; (ii) pokazuję, że zaproponowana przez Pawła Rojka interpretacja Akwinaty sama popada w ukryty nominalizm; (iii) proponuję, w oparciu o teorię triplex status naturae Awicenny, inne odczytanie tomistycznej teorii uniwersaliów, które wydaje mi się unikać pułapki ukrytego nominalizmu.

The following paper discusses John of St. Thomas’ study of the way in which a habit (moral or epistemic virtue or vice) is a cause of an action it prompts. I begin with contrasting the question of causality of habits with the general question of the causal relevance of dispositions (2). I argue that habits constitute a very peculiar kind of dispositions marked by the connection with the properties of being difficult and being easy, and there are some special reasons (...) to admit the irreducibility of dispositions of this kind. I argue also that there is a special sort of causal connection between a habit and an action it actually prompts. Then I present an analysis of four theses of John of St. Thomas on the causality of habits, which, I think, constitute the most mature and reliable study of the causality of habits in the scholastic tradition: (i) Habits are efficient causes of actions they prompt (3.1). (ii) Virtues do determine the very natures of actions they prompt (3.2); (iii) Virtues do not have a proper counterpart among the characteristics of actions they prompt (3.3); (iv) The formal object of causality of virtue is a masterpiece performance of an action (3.4). In my analyses of John’s arguments for these theses I make three claims: not all powers are “in state of readiness for action”; habits are powers of powers or dispositions of powers; the general concept of a strategy is the key to grasp the properties of being difficult and being easy, and habits should be analysed as a kind of strategies. (shrink)

Wonderful Knowledge. Aquinas on the Immutability and Eternity of God’s Knowledge The general concept of knowledge is a kind of concept closely akin to transcententals: its use is not restricted to a certain kind of being, and it does not itself designate a kind of entity. Such concepts may be applied to God not as metaphors: when we grasp (through the analysis of cases of finite knowledge) some general traits of knowledge as such, we can show that God has knowledge, (...) and his knowledge, as opposed to ours, is infinitely perfect. We have no insight into this realization of knowledge as opposed to ours, but as far as we know what general traits of knowledge are, it is important to know that God has infinitely perfect knowledge. To grasp the general traits of knowledge, I focus on the topic of mutability and immutability of knowledge analyzed systematically by Aquinas, and thus on the topic of identity criteria specific for knowledge in general: the question of when knowledge that p and knowledge that q are (in a certain knower) one and the same knowledge; the criteria of identity of knowledge vary according to natures of knowers. I think that the problem of the criteria of identity of knowledge is rather neglected in omniscience-immutability discussions. I analyze Aquinas’ arguments for the thesis that human knowledge is mutable, and God’s knowledge is absolutely immutable (they concern the role of tense). The analysis sheds light on some general traits of knowledge: it is always something formulated by the knower which manifests some truth to him, and in general the way it is formulated corresponds to (i) the way it manifests some truth, (ii) its identity criteria, (iii) the way it is propositional, (iv) the way it is related to tense, and finally (v) the nature of the knower. Focusing on the criteria of the identity of knowledge shows that God’s knowledge is absolutely immutable, and that time and change in its objects are nevertheless undoubtedly real. Keywords: God’s knowledge, knowledge, criteria of identity of knowledge, immutability; tense; transcendentals; omniscience-immutability arguments. (shrink)