In this paper I present an interpretation of J. G. Fichte's transcendental argument for the necessity of mutual recognition in Foundations of Natural Right. Fichte's argument purports to show that, as a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness, we must take ourselves to stand in relations of mutual recognition with other agents like ourselves. After reconstructing the steps of Fichte's argument, I present what I call the ‘modal dilemma’, which highlights a serious ambiguity in Fichte's deduction. According to the modal (...) dilemma, the conclusion to Fichte's transcendental argument—that as a condition of the possibility of our self-consciousness, we must recognize and be recognized by others—expresses either metaphysical or normative necessity. However, no normative conclusion follows from Fichte's premises, and the metaphysical claim that does follow from his argument appears to be implausibly strong. Thus the argument looks like a failure on either interpretation of the conclusion's modality. In the penultimate section of the paper, I propose a new interpretation of the argument that avoids the modal dilemma and provides a normative grounding of Fichte's concept of right. (shrink)

This paper addresses the following questions: what is Fichte’s first principle of right, how does he argue for it, and how does it function as the first principle of his substantive political theory? To answer these questions, the paper offers an overview of the main steps of Fichte’s derivation of the principle of right, explains its relationship to Fichte’s account of individual personhood, and then specifies some of the senses in which the resulting principle serves as the foundation of the (...) rest of Fichte’s political and economic theory. I focus on the developmental logic of Fichte’s account of the “summons” and the “relation of right.” This developmental logic, I argue, is both recapitulated and completed within Fichte’s political theory and political economy. (shrink)

My paper reconstructs Fichte's property theory and political economy in Foundations of Natural Right and The Closed Commercial State. Fichte's theory of property requires the rejection of the classical liberal theory of property rights. Fichte's alternative theory of property, in conjunction with his republican account of the state's role in guaranteeing individual rights, further requires the rejection of a market economy in favor of a planned economy. For Fichte's view entails the normative necessity of a political economy in which the (...) production and transfer of goods and services, across large sectors of the economy, are mandated by the state in advance in accordance with an economic plan. As a result, Fichte reconceives his contractualism as necessarily including the negotiation of a state‐enforced plan for eco- nomic activity. Thus, Fichte's new theory of property in Foundations of Natural Right has extremely wide‐ranging implications for the rest of his political and economic thought. The negotiation of fair terms of political associa- tion characteristic of classical contractualist thought becomes in Fichte's hands the negotiation of an economic plan that defines each individual's socioeconomic rights. I conclude with some brief remarks on the sense in which Fichte's theory serves as a cautionary tale for later socialists. (shrink)

In what follows we introduce and present a translation of Salomon Maimon’s “On the First Grounds of Natural Right”. To begin, we briefly discuss textual issues surrounding the essay. We then...

This paper uses a distinction drawn from the Kantian legal theorist Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach to categorize two approaches to analysing the concept of right, each of which is represented by vari...

Abstract In his 2009 article "Right and Coercion," Marcus Willaschek argues that the Categorical Imperative and the Universal Principle of Right are conceptually independent of one another because (1) the concept of right and the authorization to use coercion are analytically connected in Kant's "Doctrine of Right", but (2) the authorization to coerce cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative. Given that the principle of right just is a principle of authorized coercion, the fact that the authorization to coerce cannot (...) be derived from the Categorical Imperative implies that the Principle of Right cannot be derived from the Categorical Imperative. Against this claim, I first argue that a satisfactory deduction of the concept of right can be constructed out of the Categorical Imperative, the fact that we are embodied, and the fact that we act from motives other than duty. I then argue that the insufficiency of the Categorical Imperative, by itself, to generate the Principle of Right does not prevent us from interpreting the Principle of Right as a specification of the Categorical Imperative. I develop this point by means of an analogy with Kant's discussion of the moral law and the Categorical Imperative in the Groundwork. (shrink)

In an essay, I have established a new formula of the moral principle, different from the Kantian, and more convenient to use. It grounds itself in a new deduction,...

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 1176-1179, December 2021.