The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, four types of meaning theories are presented (namely, formal or truth-conditional theories, use theories, structuralism and the cognitivist and conceptualist approaches) with respect to how crucial they consider the notion of truth to be in the explication of meaning. In the second part, Conceptual Semantics, as the theory that understands the inquiry into meaning as an investigation of our conceptual structure, and doesn't use truth as a key notion, is (...) advocated as a very promising approach. In the final part of the paper, a construal of truth as a matter of multiple fit is proposed as onethat both sits well with the framework of Conceptual Semantics and also sheds some light on the ways in which our cognitive system operates with the notion of truth. (shrink)

This paper claims that what philosophy primarily does is interpret our notions, offer ways of understanding these notions that are not scientific in nature but not contrary to science either. The paper draws a distinction between conceptual analysis, a highly constrained enterprise that is supposed to bring to light what was in the concept all along, and the interpretation of notions, a creative enterprise that offers ways of understanding notions that were not already prefigured by the content of these notions—philosophy (...) consists in the latter, not the former. It explains how these interpretations are justified and what the difference is between better and worse interpretations. The remainder of the paper is organized around three headings: philosophy and science, philosophy and language, and philosophy and progress. It claims that in philosophy there is no real progress, but that philosophy does move forward because the notions at issue are endlessly interpretable. (shrink)

The central aim of the inquiry begun in this text is to reach a semantic characterisationof philosophical discourse, that is, to describe the »language«, or the code, ofphilosophy. This inquiry contains an examination of the views on the nature andpurpose of philosophy held by Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, but manyother philosophers, semioticians, linguists and literary theorists are brought into thediscussion.In the first part of the text, the view is expressed that, with regard to the peculiarphenomena that characterize philosophy , (...) a theory of philosophy itself is needed, but such that would notitself be caught in the same kind of discourse. Then some methodological restrictionsare introduced: mainly, that the »philosophy« to be dealt with is the classicalcontinental philosophy, which is percieved as a body of texts. The aim of the inquiryis then formulated as the description of the code by which these texts are organized;the method of the inquiry is specified as a deductive-hypothetical one. In the end,an outline of a semantic theory is offered, as a basis for this description.The second part of the text starts the examination of Kant’s and Wittgenstein’sphilosophical views and their views on philosophy. Kant’s theory of knowledge ispresented as one which asserts the primary role of subjective a priori forms whichshape what we know as »reality«, and is therefore opposed to Wittgenstein’s picturetheory of language, where language simply mirrors what is given. The conclusion isreached, however, that both Kant and Wittgenstein propose a parallel dichotomybetween that which can be known/said, and the thing-in-itself or the mystical, andwith regard to this they both claim that the aims of philosophy as seen traditionallymust be reconcieved to a great extent.The inquiry is continued in an another article. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the conceptualization of space as a dimension relevant to personal identity and the central role that is attributed to language with respect to its constitution. It is argued that the identification with a certain geographical space and the use of certain language or linguistic variety can be regarded as crucial for the self-definition of individuals and also groups. We pursue a threefold goal: to highlight the contribution of geographical research to our understanding of the self (...) as a phenomenon situated in space; to discern merits, but also problems related to the recent strong emphasis of the role of language with respect to identity constitution, especially in constructivist and poststructuralist approaches; and on the basis of these findings, to draw conclusions concerning the given and constructed elements of identity, with a particular focus on space and language. In addition to a survey of relevant theoretical positions, empirical examples are presented with the aim to illustrate how geographically marked identity is constituted. (shrink)

In the introduction the paper presents, based on the work of Michael Devitt, the conflicting ontological positions of Realism and Constructivism. The former insists on the independence of the nature of the world from our conceptual apparatus, language or scientific theories, whereas the latter affirms its dependence. The central part of the paper is concerned with showing that the Realism/Constructivism dispute is unsolvable by way of a thought experiment followed by refutation of the arguments of key constructivists and realists . (...) The views of Hilary Putnam are also briefly assessed and rejected. In conclusion it is argued, partly with recourse to Carnap’s arguments, that the dispute cannot be resolved, that it is a kind of Kantian antinomy, and that being a realist or a constructivist is therefore a matter of decision. In the course of the article a view is also expressed with regard to the nature of philosophy. (shrink)

In der Einführung präsentiert der Artikel, basierend auf dem Werk von Michael Devitt, die widerstreitenden ontologischen Positionen des Realismus und Konstruktivismus. Ersterer besteht auf der Unabhängigkeit der Beschaffenheit der Welt von unserem begrifflichen Apparat, der Sprache oder wissenschaftlichen Theorien, während der andere eine solche Abhängigkeit affirmiert. Der Hauptteil des Artikels versucht darauf hinzuweisen, dass der Realismus-/Konstruktivismusstreit unlösbar ist, und zwar wird das durch ein Gedankenexperiment gemacht, dem die Widerlegung von Argumenten der Hauptkonstruktivisten und Hauptrealisten folgt. Die Ansichten von Hilary Putnam (...) werden auch kurz berücksichtigt und zurückgewiesen. Im Schlussteil wird, teilweise unter Rückgriff auf die Argumente Carnaps, behauptet, dass der Streit nicht aufgelöst werden kann, dass er eine Art kantischer Antinomie ist und dass es deswegen eine Entscheidungssache ist, ob man ein Realist oder ein Konstruktivist ist. Im Laufe des Artikels wird auch eine Ansicht zum Wesen der Philosophie dargelegt. (shrink)

Ova teorija pokušava rasvijetliti kako razumijevamo i rabimo pojam istine. Teorija se nadovezuje na neka gledišta Putnama i Goodmana, no razvija ta gledišta tvrdeći kako se istina sastoji u tome da se iskaz podudara s jednim od sljedećih parametara ili s više njih: kriterij interne konsistentnosti; osjetilni podaci; podaci iz pamćenja; ne-verbalizirana vjerovanja; drugi dijelovi diskursa. Opća kognitivna struktura, koja, prema Rayu Jackendoffu, služi kao točka konvergencije za značenje preneseno jezikom, pozadinsko znanje, opažanje, zaključivanje, itd., identificira se kao medij podudaranja (...) koje rezultira kognitivnim učinkom: »to je istina«. Teorija također tvrdi kako je istina pojam-obitelj, obuhvaćajući različite vrste istine. Ukazuje se na to da istina ima normativnu dimenziju, koja se obrazlaže kao mogućnost izazova tvrdnjama koje pretendiraju na istinitost, što pak pretpostavlja regulativni ideal univerzalne ljudske racionalnosti. (shrink)

La présente théorie tente de mettre en lumière notre compréhension et notre utilisation de la notion de vérité. Elle rejoint certains points de vue de Putnam et de Goodman, mais les développe en estimant que la vérité est une affirmation qui correspond à un ou à plusieurs des paramètres suivants : critère de la cohérence intérieure ; données sensorielles ; données de la mémoire ; croyances non-verbalisées ; autres parties du discours. La structure cognitive générale – qui, d’après Ray Jackendoff, (...) sert de point de convergence à la signification transmise par le langage, la connaissance d’arrière-plan, la perception, la déduction etc. – est identifiée comme intermédiaire de cette correspondance qui entraîne l’effet cognitif : « c’est vrai ». Cette théorie affirme en outre que la vérité est une famille de notions qui englobe différentes sortes de vérités. Il est souligné que la vérité comporte une dimension normative qui s’explique comme la possibilité de défier les affirmations prétendant à la vérité, ce qui suppose un idéal régulateur de la rationalité universelle de l’homme. (shrink)

U uvodu članak predstavlja, na temelju djela Michaela Devitta, sukobljene ontološke pozicije, realizam i konstruktivizam. Prvi insistira na nezavisnosti prirode svijeta od našeg pojmovnog aparata, jezika ili znanstvenih teorija, dok drugi tvrdi da takva zavisnost postoji. Središnji dio članka teži pokazati kako je spor između realizma i konstruktivizma nerješiv, i to pomoću misaonog eksperimenta na koji se nadostavlja pobijanje argumenata središnjih konstruktivista i realista . Također se ukratko razmatraju, te odbacuju, gledišta Hilaryja Putnama. U zaključku se tvrdi, pozivajući se djelomice (...) na Carnapova shvaćanja, da se spor ne može razriješiti, da se radi o svojevrsnoj kantovskoj antinomiji, te da je biti realistom ili konstruktivistom stoga stvar izbora. U okviru članka iznosi se također i gledište o prirodi filozofije. (shrink)

Članak se bavi problemom duše i psihičkoga u Carnapovim ranim spisima, ponajprije tek 2004. objavljenome Von Gott und Seele. Scheinfragen in Metaphysik und Theologie , te Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie . Nakon uvodnog izlaganja o logičkome pozitivizmu, te kratkog razmatranja pojma duše u Kantovoj prvoj Kritici i dubinski analognih shvaćanja u Wittgensteinovu Tractatusu – što oboje spada u relevantan kontekst Carnapova pristupa duševnome – prelazi se na analizu Carnapovih postavki, kao i polemiku s njima. Referat sistematizira Carnapova shvaćanja glede duševnoga (...) u tri komponente: 1. logičko-semantička analiza riječi »duša«, 2. logičko-epistemološka analiza dostupnosti tuđih psihičkih stanja i procesa, te 3. semantičko-epistemološka analiza smislenosti polemike realizam-idealizam s obzirom na realitet tuđih psihičkih stanja i procesa. Kritika Carnapovih shvaćanja usmjerava se, inkorporirajući novije uvide, na njegove semantičke pretpostavke, na tezu prevodivosti iskaza o psihičkome u iskaze o fizičkome, te na opravdanje spoznaje u subjektivnome, umjesto u intersubjektivnome. (shrink)

Dans l’introduction l’article présente, basé sur l’oeuvre de Michael Devitt, les positions ontologiques opposantes, réalisme et constructivisme. L ’un insiste que la nature du monde soit indépendante de notre appareil conceptuel, du langage ou des théories scientifiques, tandis que l’autre affirme qu’elle en soit dépendante. L a portion centrale de l’article essaie de montrer que le différend entre réalisme et constructivisme est insoluble, au moyen d’une expérience de pensée suivi par la réfutation des arguments des constructivistes et des réalistes les (...) plus importants. L es vues de Hilary Putnam sont pareillement brièvement examinées et rejetées. En conclusion on soutient, se référant partiellement aux arguments de Carnap, que le différend ne peut pas être résolu, que c’est une antinomie à la Kant, et que être un réaliste ou un constructiviste est par conséquent une question de décision. En course de l’article une vue est aussi exprimée sur la nature de la philosophie. (shrink)

This theory tries to shed light on how we understand and use the notion of truth. It draws on some views of Putnam and Goodman, but it develops these views by claiming that truth is a matter of a statement fitting one or more of the following: the criterion of internal consistency; sensory data; data from memory; non-verbalized beliefs; other parts of discourse. The common cognitive structure, as delineated by Ray Jackendoff, that serves as a locus of convergence for meaning (...) conveyed via language, background knowledge, perception, inference, etc. is identified as the medium of the fit that results in the “that’s true” effect. The theory also claims that truth is a family, encompassing different kinds of truths. It is pointed out that truth has a normative dimension, which is cashed out as the possibility of challenge to truth-claims, which in turn presupposes a regulative ideal of universal human rationality. (shrink)

Diese Theorie versucht zu durchleuchten, auf welche Weise wir den Begriff der Wahrheit verstehen bzw. sich dessen bedienen. Sie knüpft an manche Standpunkte Putnams und Goodmans an, baut sie überdies aus, indem sie behauptet, die Wahrheit bestehe darin, dass die Aussage mit einem oder mehreren der folgenden Parameter konform gehe : Kriterium der internen Konsistenz; Sinnesdaten; Gedächtnisdaten; nicht verbalisierten Glauben; sonstigen Diskursteilen. Die allgemeine kognitive Struktur – die nach Ray Jackendoff als Konvergenzpunkt für sprachlich übertragene Bedeutung, Hintergrundwissen, Wahrnehmung, Schlussfolgerung usw. (...) fungiere – wird als Medium des Übereinstimmens identifiziert, das in der kognitiven Das-ist- Wahrheit-Auswirkung resultiert. Die Theorie erklärt ebenso die Wahrheit für einen Familienbegriff, indem sie diverse Wahrheitsvarianten erfasst. Es wird auf die normative Dimension der Wahrheit hingewiesen, die als Möglichkeit der Herausforderung an die Wahrhaftigkeit prätendierenden Beteuerungen substanziiert wird, was allerdings ein regulatives Ideal der universellen menschlichen Rationalität unterstellt. (shrink)